

# THE COMING CHINA



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


# THE COMING CHINA





ENTRANCE TO WHITE STAG TEMPLE, AMOY



457

# THE COMING CHINA

268  
Globe

BY

JOSEPH KING GOODRICH

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WITH 32 ILLUSTRATIONS FROM  
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TO THE MEMORY OF

LIU HSIU-TSAI

MY TEACHER, WHO FIRST INTRODUCED

ME TO THE HISTORY OF HIS

COUNTRY



## INTRODUCTION

BEFORE really beginning to write about what that great nation, China, may do and probably will do when once the leaven which is now working shall have brought about an activity along lines of development that we of the West, and — to speak with what may be rather displeasing frankness — we of America especially, are disposed to look upon as a trait of character sharply differentiating us from the continental Asiatic, it is only honest to mention some impressions that were made forty-five years ago, when as a lad I first went to China to live in one of the smallest, most conservative of the treaty-ports, Swatow, up the coast about two hundred miles or so from Hongkong. The long journey from New York to Hongkong was far more picturesquely made at that time than it is now, if it was not so quickly done. To go by way of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the China Sea was altogether too costly, so I went by steamer to Aspinwall (Colon) — let it be remembered that even the pioneer trans-continental railway, the Union and the Central Pacific, was not opened until three years after I made my first trip to the Far East. From Aspinwall I crossed the Isthmus by the Panama Railway, taking the best part of a day to accomplish the forty or so miles, went up the west coast by another steamer to San Francisco, and, after three weeks' delay there, took passage in a large sailing vessel, loaded with wheat and flour, direct for Hongkong; although we passed in front of Honolulu and so close to the beach that we could distinguish a single individual on the shore, and our numbers were read from the observatory so that our passing was reported by the next mail going back to San Francisco. Afterwards we sighted

Guam, Luzon, and the Bashee Islands, and the entire voyage across the Pacific was accomplished in seventy-seven days, towards the end becoming so tedious that we were very glad indeed to see the coast of China late one afternoon near the end of August, and the next day to get on shore at Hong-kong. I stayed there only one day and a half and then went by a small steamer to Swatow, where I landed early one morning and at once passed into a new phase of life that was almost inconceivably different from anything I had previously known or, to tell the truth, even dreamt of.

When I recall the backwardness of China in the year 1866, and the fact that a similar appearance of unprogressiveness was a marked feature of life in that part of the world until a very few years ago; and then when I note the tremendous strides the Chinese have made during a decade or so, it seems as if the charge of inertia must be withdrawn; and if for just and sufficient reason it is once withdrawn, even for a moment, the very doing so connotes a change in all things Chinese so radical that never again will it be possible to renew the charge of inertia; because the motion which will have been imparted is to endure for all time. But will it go on to self-destructive acceleration; or will it be wisely controlled by the rulers and leaders of the Coming China, so as to benefit the Chinese themselves and contribute to the welfare of the whole world?

It is only fair to the Chinese to say that the faults of backwardness and unprogressiveness, to which I have alluded, were not solely limited to their ways of doing things. There were clear and unmistakable signs still to be noticed of that leisurely and conservative way of transacting business that had come to the European official and merchant in the lazy life of British India, the Tropical Islands, and elsewhere. There was little necessity admitted for being in a hurry to do anything except the pursuit of sport, and the comforting rule of "never doing anything to-day which can possibly be put off until to-morrow" was amusingly lived up to. Day after day would be spent in "pottering" about a bank



S. S. Faikhan mooring at the Wharf.



or office, idling with account books, and such perfunctory matters, with occasionally a talk, through an interpreter too frequently, with a native merchant which might or might not result in a profitable transaction. Rarely was work put out of hand which could easily have been done at any time. Letters that might perfectly well have been answered as soon as they had been read, were put into pigeon-holes until "Mail Day"; for it seemed to be considered contrary to the unwritten but very inflexible law of business etiquette to give a letter a date even twenty-four hours ahead of the day when mails for abroad closed. Consequently, on the arrival of Mail Day — and it might be Sunday as well as Monday — there was a momentary break in the apathy that hung over the little foreign business community. Everybody, from "Taipan" (the heads of banks, commercial houses, steamship agencies, and the like, are so called) down to the lowest-rank native office "boy" (always a man in years!), had to be on hand at an early hour. Coats and collars went off, "punkahs" swung violently over desks (if it was summer time), all hands went about in a frantic rush, and there was the greatest possible excitement until the steamer's whistle announced her speedy departure. It seemed to be our ambition to get shipments of treasure or merchandise passed through the Customs and alongside the steamer *after* the "Blue Peter" had been lowered as a sign that the anchor was "hove short" or the buoy "unshackled"; while to send a clerk "shinning" up the "chains" or clambering up the half-raised companion ladder after the engines had begun to move, was considered a real triumph of business enterprise. I well remember a rebuke administered to myself for daring in my youthful enthusiasm and inexperience, for I was then a veritable "griffin" (a newcomer), to attempt a departure from this rule of putting off everything until the last minute. A mail steamer had arrived at daylight and she was bulletined to sail at four o'clock in the afternoon. It was a part of my duty to superintend the weighing, packing, shipping, and insuring of boxes of "chopped" dollars and silver bullion.

I knew all this treasure was in the vault and that everything was prepared for making the shipment; therefore soon after eight o'clock in the morning I told the Shroff to get ready. He was rather surprised and demurred a little; but he set about to obey me. Just then my employer passed and asked what I was doing. When I had told him and given my reasons, which I shall always feel were good and sufficient, he sharply reprimanded me for departing from established precedent and being in such indecent haste; it would be quite time enough, he said, to attend to the matter after tiffin. I swallowed the rebuff; the Shroff and the coolies who were to do the heavy work all grinned, and I took my lesson to my desk, although I never did see what was gained by such rigid adherence to what was so much revered by some of my Chinese friends, and had seemingly come to be a shibboleth of foreigners, too, obedience to "Old Custom!" In this sort of whirl passed Mail Day. If the steamer was so inconsiderate as to appear in the afternoon or evening, there was always some reason for despatching her at daylight the next morning, and we had to work all night. Then came the relapse; everybody tired out, hot, dusty, cross, and uncomfortable; often it was late at night when I, the junior clerk, was sent off in the house-boat with the letters, unless some one of my seniors had friends going away to whom he wished to say good-by. The whole staff would be half-starved; yet the same process would be begun again the next day: putting off what might have been done forthwith, wasting time instead of making the best and most reasonable use of it, and so going along from hour to hour until the next Mail Day brought its own accumulation and rush. Conditions have so much changed in these times of almost daily mails, across the Pacific, by Suez Canal, by Siberian Railway, that only a very, very few old-timers will recognize the picture I have drawn; but those who do must admit that it is correct.

In 1866 there was but one line of steamers giving European mail service to China ports, the Peninsular and Oriental

Steam Navigation Company, British, whose small vessels sailed from Ceylon to Hongkong and Shanghai; from the former port still smaller steamers furnished facilities for travelling up the coast to Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow and return. The postage on a letter weighing half an ounce from the United States to any open port in China was forty-eight cents, if the letter went to Southampton, England, and thence by direct P. & O. steamer to Alexandria, Egypt, crossed the Isthmus by train, via Cairo, on to Suez, thence by another P. & O. steamer to Point de Galle, on the Island of Ceylon. Here the steamer from Suez was usually sent to Bombay or Calcutta; another service of the same company took passengers, mails, and cargo to Australia; and a third was the China line. The regular lines to Japan were not opened for some time after the date of which I am now writing. If it were desired to hurry the letter forward, or if — by mishap — it was just too late to catch the steamer at Southampton, it had to be marked "Via Marseilles," and fifty-two cents postage affixed. Then it was sent by rail across France to that port, at which place the P. & O. steamers always called on their way to or from Alexandria. There was only one mail a month, and it can readily be imagined how eagerly we looked for the semaphore signal that announced, "Steamer coming with European mails." At that time there was not a telegraph line in all of China. The nearest approach to telegraphic communication with the world at large that we had, was to send a letter-message to Shanghai and Tientsin, thence to Peking, thence by special courier to Kiahkta, just across the Russian frontier, far north of Peking, in Siberia, where the message was given into the hands of the Russian telegraph service, but it had to be written in either Russian or French. This process, of course, consumed a lot of time, and before a message from the south of China was actually "on the wire," days enough had passed to permit now of sending a letter by mail steamer across the Pacific Ocean, and almost to get a reply in the same way. There was, in the autumn of 1866, no regular and —

properly speaking — public telegraph service across the Atlantic, so that — in very truth — there was really no such thing as “cabling” to America from China.

It was not long after my arrival in China that a French steamship company, La Compagnie Messageries Maritime, opened a monthly line from Marseilles to Shanghai, following the route of the P. & O., with the addition of a stop at Saigon, and alternating with the English Company, so that we then had a fortnightly mail service between Europe and China; but the postage was not reduced until the Pacific Mail Steamship Company opened its trans-Pacific line from San Francisco to Hongkong via Yokohama, under the American flag. These American steamers were huge, high, broad, and short “side-wheelers” with walking-beam engines, and were totally unfitted for such a long voyage in what was all too often anything but “pacific” waters. They were, however, delightfully comfortable for passengers, having wide free decks, well ventilated cabins, and spacious saloons; but they were deadly slow, for when they were steaming eight or ten knots an hour, they were supposed to be doing something wonderful. The voyage from Hongkong to Yokohama took anywhere from a week to ten days, as against four days now; and, once out in the broad Pacific headed for San Francisco from Yokohama, the cruise by “great circle” sailing was from twenty-five to thirty days’ duration, where now it is made easily in fifteen or sixteen days, including a stay of twenty-four hours or so at Honolulu.

In those old days there was positively no Chinese postal service. The European officials of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service rendered every facility at their command and it was a great deal, everything, in fact, in forwarding mail from the incoming European steamers on arrival at Shanghai, to the “outports,” that is, the few places which had then been thrown open to foreigners for residence and trade. It was the self-enforced duty of the steamship agent to make up a bag of mail to be sent forward by any steamer which might be going out on a branch line. At Hongkong

there was a general post-office, and all ports in Southern China, that is, including Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Formosa, Canton, Whampao, and Macao, used the stamps issued by that colony for posting letters to go abroad; local letters were simply put into the steamer's bag and distributed by the agents at the proper port. At every other port there was a post-office in each of the consulates representing nations which might have steamers bringing in mails from abroad or from the other coast ports, and it was necessary for us first to find out what steamer had arrived and what flag she flew; then to send to the proper consulate for our mail.

The leading reason for the opening of that particular port of Swatow, which was not one of the original treaty-ports, was to give another entrance for the accursed Indian opium; and this was, for a long time, almost the only thing that figured in the list of imports, while the exports were nearly limited to boxes of "chopped" dollars or silver bullion sent to Hongkong to pay for the drug. These "chopped" dollars demand a moment's notice, for they led up to a condition of affairs in financial and mercantile life which is now proving burdensome, absolutely anomalous, and productive of grave scandals. Whenever, in those early days, and I refer, of course, back to the very beginning of trade between the Chinese and Europeans, a Spanish or a Mexican dollar (and these were virtually the only medium of exchange in transactions wherein foreigners were purchasers) came into the hands of a Chinese merchant or shopkeeper, he forthwith tested it with the means at his command, then put upon it his own private mark, an impression sharply cut upon a small steel die, called by the foreigners a "chop." It was nominally a guarantee of value, but I never knew it to be held as such. This "chop" was a tiny Chinese ideograph, usually one of those making the owner's felicitous "hong" or shop name, corresponding to "The Blue Bell" signs of our forefathers, although sometimes it was one character of the individual's personal name; the impression was deeply

punched right at the middle of the coin. This same process was repeated by each merchant or tradesman in turn, until the coin was thinned out sometimes to half again its original diameter and became more or less cup-shaped. It was so nearly impossible for the ordinary person to know which of these "chopped" dollars were genuine (for counterfeits were simply innumerable), that specially trained men, called "Shroffs," were required to examine and pass them. At least one such Shroff was attached to each native commercial house of any importance, and in the foreign banks and "hongs," as well, there were always several. Usually the Shroff was subordinate to the head of the staff of native employees, the "Compradore," who was responsible for the Shroff's integrity, as he was for all the staff. The custody of all the funds of the establishment was given to the Shroff, who was occasionally guaranteed by the bond of a responsible guild, and all cash receipts and payments passed through his hands. As paper currency became slowly popular, this, too, was entrusted to the Shroff. Such currency was rarely anything but the notes issued by the foreign (at that time British only) banks in the colony of Hongkong and the leading China port, Shanghai, and circulated by their branches and agencies at the minor ports. The few notes, bills of exchange, and other paper money coming from Chinese banks or merchants, never even reached the principals of the foreign business houses, the Shroff accepting such entirely upon his own responsibility and at his own risk. The guarantee of the Compradore, himself backed by a strong guild, or the bond (as we should call it) of the guild to which the Shroff belonged, was almost always quite sufficient security, and there were remarkably few cases of misappropriation of funds or loss through the Shroff's unfaithfulness or errors in judgment. These native accountants and cashiers, the Compradores and Shroffs, have remained as an institution, as a veritable incubus, as I think I shall be able to show, even until the present day, although the necessity for them has long since disappeared; the



ANOTHER VIEW OF AMOY



A EUROPEAN HOME, AMOY



"chopping" of dollars has practically been discontinued; the testing of "sycee," or silver bullion, can now readily be done by chemists or local mints or assay offices; while any qualified foreign cashier should be amply competent to pass upon the genuineness of all bank-notes which pass through his hands.

I have dwelt at some length upon all these matters, in order that the contrast between conditions to-day and those which existed until, practically, ten years ago or so may be shown more clearly. These newer conditions will be discussed fully in their proper places later; but it must be admitted that the way the Chinese merchants availed themselves, in those days of nearly half a century ago, of the Western methods for facilitating international business intercourse, indicates a degree of progress and a desire to advance with which few Americans or Europeans have been disposed to credit the Chinese. This is but one of many cases in which we are even now labouring under grave misapprehension, perhaps deliberate misjudgment.



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THE COMING CHINA



# THE COMING CHINA

## CHAPTER I

*"CHINA FOR THE CHINESE"*

WE have become so accustomed to think of China as the very ideal of immobility, the epitome of all things conservative, that it is difficult to imagine that land and its people as evincing any of the progressiveness which is claimed to be characteristic of China's island neighbour, Japan, the rest of the world generally, and of the West particularly. If we were to judge by practically all the evidence of what we had as history until very recently there is really no other opinion that we could have formed. But, as a matter of fact, the histories of China given to us heretofore have not done the Chinese full justice. This does not necessarily mean that those histories were intentionally unfair; only that the writers had not been able to put themselves in the proper perspective. It is not intended now to write a history of China; that is not in any way the purpose of this book. Still it is well to ask ourselves some questions: Is history always and infallibly a safe guide in determining what is right to-day or what may be in the future? Are we always quite correct when we quote Patrick Henry and say: "I know no way of judging of the future but by the past"? It would be an unwise

thing to do in this particular case of trying to estimate what the Coming China will be. If it were wise, then there is little hope for China and less for us who are interestedly watching for her true development. We Americans would be mistaken, probably, in trying to push our diplomacy in the Far East along broad lines, or for humanitarian or altruistic purposes, if we were to be governed or even influenced solely by what has been in the past. It is just this blind way of trying to determine the future by the past which makes Japan see in our friendliness towards China a sordid motive, and which leads so many Japanese publicists to think that the United States wants Manchuria for itself, or, perhaps, even a larger slice of the Celestial Empire than just those three Eastern provinces. It is undeniably this lamentable mistake of judging the future by the past that makes Japan disapprove so vehemently America's growing popularity with the Chinese and America's frank championing of China's interests on every reasonable occasion. It was probably an unmistakable evidence of this Japanese jealousy that led the "Philadelphia Public Ledger" to say, apropos of Mr. Secretary Knox's suggestion to neutralize the Manchurian railways: "Japan realizes that China is the 'big game' of the future for it, and it was assumed that if the American influence could be checked and its diplomacy branded as a fiasco, there would be a loss of prestige and corresponding decline of American influence in China." In the opinion of many Japanese, at the time the Secretary's proposal was so openly flouted, and perhaps in that of many others as well, it seemed for a time as if Japan's

manceuvre to bring about this belittling of American effort in China's behalf had succeeded remarkably well. But even so, shall we say this precludes further effort to help China recover what is incontestably her own, to reassert vigourously her own autonomous rights, and to advance along a path that would have been entirely impossible for her to tread without grievous stumbling twenty years ago, even had there been, what was then almost an incredible thing, a desire on her part to enter such a bewildering road? This is itself a brilliant example of the possible danger of judging of the future by the past. In the world's political and international history we *do* find *few* cases of disinterestedness on the part of a great and powerful nation lending such aid to another, a smaller one physically or a weaker one militantly; there has rarely been aught of altruism about such action, and there has almost infallibly come later a demand for compensation by the helper that has worked disastrously for the helped. Hence, we must not be altogether surprised that Japan pretended to assume that America's apparent friendliness was a cloak for selfishness; and yet it seems to call for no great attainment in statesmanship, nothing more than might fairly be expected in the veriest tyro, to show Japan that such procedure was opposed to every American principle, that it was impossible for the United States to contemplate exacting from China a tangible reward for her friendly effort in the matter of the Manchurian railways. Events of the past eighteen months have gone far towards making even the hottest of the Japanese publicists see this, and it is not too much to say

now that the neutralization of the Manchurian railways has not yet been finally and indefinitely shelved. The movement inaugurated by Mr. Secretary Knox has found favour with many Chinese, who may bring it up again in such a manner as to appeal to the sense of justice of other great Powers, who have shown a disposition to resent the semi-official utterances of some Japanese that Japan is in Manchuria to stay and to dominate the whole territory.

Just when the Chinese began their existence, even as the people whom we now call by that name, is unsatisfactorily determined by what we can see as we look back along the thousands of years during which they must have been pretty much the same as they were when we really came to know them. Nor can we put our fingers precisely upon the exact time when those same people, recognized as representatives of an organized nation, first began to have intercourse with other peoples to the south and west of themselves. It is quite probable that the words at the end of the twelfth verse of the forty-ninth chapter of the prophecy of Isaiah, "Behold, these shall come from far; and, lo, these from the north and from the west; and *these from the land of Sinim*," referred to the Chinese; and this prophecy dates back to about 712 B.C., or more than a century and a half before the Chinese sage, Confucius, was born, who is assumed to have lived B.C. 551-479. From that early date onward there is ample evidence to warrant the statement that the people of China possessed some knowledge of southwestern Asia and of, at least, the adjacent parts of Europe continuously, and were in desultory communi-

cation with the West for many centuries, or, indeed, until this was interrupted by what we can but think was good and sufficient cause.

It is certain that the ancient Persians knew and used the silk fabrics from China, and that, in the second century B.C., Phœnician, Carthaginian, and Syrian merchants carried on extensive trading operations in every direction, which included a considerable and profitable commerce with China. It was, too, about this time, one hundred years or more before Christ, that the first mention of a country, unmistakably identified as China, occurs in European history — in a battle between Phra-orates and the Scythians the Chinese aided the latter and ravaged the shores of the Caspian Sea (Lengfelt). In Chinese records it is stated that at a date which corresponds with the year 61 of the Christian era, the reigning emperor, Ming Ti, had a dream which, to his conviction, confirmed a declaration that had been made by Confucius five hundred years before that time, in which the native philosopher foretold “a sage having the true wisdom would be born in the West.” On the strength of his dream and the prophecy, the Emperor sent an envoy to the West “to procure books which should teach this true religion.” The Imperial instructions were fairly explicit, it would seem, but the ambassador was loath to face the hardships and perils of the almost unknown country lying beyond the extreme western Chinese frontier — a territory considered then to be nearly an impassable desert and even now well known to be anything but an hospitable and attractive region. He deflected his course towards the south and eventually

entered India from the northwest, through the western passes of the Himalaya Mountains. Here he procured Buddhist books, sutras, and manuscripts, and engaged some priests to return with him. Apparently the Emperor was satisfied with the report of his ambassador, although it would have been extremely interesting had the mission faithfully executed the Imperial command, since that might have resulted in the early introduction of the true Christian doctrine in circumstances highly favourable thereto. The slight conflict between this account of the introduction of Buddhism and the accepted Chinese one, although the two agree fairly well in date — for it is usually said that “a form of Buddhism, or the religion of Fo, was introduced about A.D. 68–81” — is not material and need not be considered as detracting in any way from the honour of the Chinese who is said to have been sent expressly to India to investigate Buddhism.

In the year 126 A.D. a Chinese general went as far west as the Valley of the Caspian Sea, and from that region took back to his own people the grapevine, which was thereafter successfully cultivated in many places, particularly in Northern China. In 166 A.D. the Roman Emperor, Marcus Antoninus, sent an embassy to China by sea to procure the rich silks of that land, whose fame had long before reached the ears of Europeans; but silk culture was not properly attempted in Europe until some centuries later, during the reign of the Roman Emperor Justinian (528 A.D.). We are accustomed to associate the word “tea” — a corruption of the Chinese “cha” — solely with China, but as a matter of fact



INTERIOR OF THE TEMPLE OF FIVE HUNDRED GENIL, CANTON



this plant was taken into China from India about the year 315 A.D. In these early centuries of our era, trade between China and Arabia, Greece, and Constantinople was developed to very considerable proportions. There is a French translation of what purports to be the narrative of two Mahomedan travellers (merchants, apparently) in India and China during the ninth century. The original was written in Arabic, of course, and it has not been given the dignity of an English translation (so far as we know), which fact may, possibly, militate against its value. It is probably from this book, however, that the statement is taken of the sacking, about 877 A.D., of Kan-fu, a seaport on the southern coast of China, to which place all the Arabian and European traffic was directed. One hundred and twenty thousand Mahomedans, Jews, Christians, and Parsees are said to have lost their lives, but if the enormous number is even approximately correct, there must have been a very large proportion of native converts and attendants, for all could not possibly have been foreign merchants and ships' crews. What we gather from Chinese accounts which may bear upon this uprising justifies us now in assuming that the disorderly conduct of the foreigners gave something of provocation to the Chinese.

Nestorian Christians were well treated by the Chinese officials for a time, but in the same ninth century they were proscribed and virtually extirpated. Some of their missionaries, returning to Europe, took with them silk-worm eggs to Constantinople; but it is possible this was an act of smuggling, for it is alleged that the Chinese authorities were then opposed to the export of such

articles, having in mind to retain, as far as possible, a monopoly of sericulture. Trading missions from Rome, Constantinople, and Arabia to China continued down to about the year 1100. Why this profitable intercourse for both parties engaged therein was suspended is something that goes outside the scope of this work, although it would be interesting to investigate the subject. In the year 1406 we read of a displeasing act of the Chinese in sending an armed force some distance from home merely for conquest, without due provocation. At that time an army made an attack upon the island of Ceylon. It was successful; it captured the king, who was taken to China as a prisoner of state and hostage, and for some time after the island paid tribute to China. The Chinese garrison seems, however, not to have been long maintained; it made its way back home as well as it could, and Ceylon, in fact if not in name, disappeared from the list of countries sending tribute bearers to Peking.

From this, as well as from much more of similar import — too voluminous to be epitomized even here — it is evident that until the beginning of the sixteenth century of the Christian era, for considerably over seventeen hundred years in fact, foreign intercourse, both official and commercial, between China and the southern and southwestern parts of Asia, as well as the southeastern parts of Europe, was carried on continuously, excepting, possibly, during the period of the Mongol invasion. There was no sign of any policy of exclusion and an unwillingness to maintain friendly intercourse. The empire was open and free to all foreigners of every

calling and profession, subject, of course, only to such restrictions and limitations as were usually placed upon strangers in all countries at that time; yet even in this we fail entirely to detect any invidious distinction between native and alien: a glance through any reasonable edition of the account of Marco Polo's travels will clearly establish this. The peoples of western Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries knew nothing of China from actual experience, and they themselves were equally unknown to the Chinese; while we know perfectly well how hazy was the legendary knowledge in western Europe of China until well into the sixteenth century. In modern Europe, if we apply the term to the Atlantic border of the continent, this was a period of exploration and rather unsavory exploitation along the west African seaboard principally. It was a time of brave deeds, undoubtedly, on the sea, but of evil ones on the new shores; things were done openly and with royal sanction and approval that would to-day justly gain for the perpetrators short shrift and the richly deserved punishment of hanging at the yardarm, if caught open-handed on the high seas, or at any convenient tree or gibbet upon landing on any shore. China, unfortunately for her own peace, was soon to be disabused of her confidence in the reasonable integrity and good faith of those men from the West who had hitherto generally borne themselves in such a way as to justify the Chinese in meeting them half-way, in giving them every facility for official and commercial intercourse, and in looking upon that intercourse as broadening their own horizon in every desirable way. This may seem a strange thing to say

of China only four hundred years ago, but it is the truth, and is susceptible of incontrovertible proof. The acquaintance which the Chinese were about to make with these newcomers from Europe was destined to be anything but a happy one or satisfactory in all ways. The French appeared in China for the first time in 1506; the Portuguese came in 1516, and the Hollanders followed very soon after them; the Spaniards landed in 1575; the British arrived in 1635, and the Russians sought acquaintance in 1658. With the possible exception of the British and Russians, all of these were nothing more nor less than pirates of the sea; to call them explorers and hardy adventurers may be euphemistically true, but when they landed on the shores of China they continued to act just as such freebooters might have been expected to deport themselves towards such peaceful agriculturalists and commercial people as the coastwise Chinese. From this beginning dates a revulsion of feeling which has caused much trouble since then; but it cannot be wondered at. So far as we know, the first agreement of something like a convention in form which the Chinese Government ever made was not a commercial treaty at all, but merely a sort of diplomatic note to determine certain disputed boundaries between China and what was claimed as Russian territory; this was done in 1689. It was not precisely an harmonious commencement of intercourse with her big northern neighbour and, with rare exceptions, has proved to have been for China an unfortunate precedent, although China was successful in maintaining her rights. The early influence of the British hardly tended to create a favourable

impression upon the minds of the Chinese people as to the good faith of those who called themselves Christian people and followers of the Prince of Peace. The East India Company openly opposed all Christian propaganda in India and wherever it sent its representatives, from the very first day of its chartered existence until its control of affairs, both diplomatic and commercial, terminated in 1834, although it is credited with having given assistance to missionaries in China. There was, apparently, no disposition to relieve the Chinese in the matter of the opium trade, and the Company flagrantly evaded its duty, multiplied onerous treaty obligations, and did all in its power to increase its revenue by stimulating the consumption of that curse, Indian opium, until it was not surprising that so many Chinese statesmen and publicists asked the pertinent question: “Why does not the British Government encourage the natives of India to use opium, instead of trying to dispose of nearly the whole supply to us?”

That there is no country known to the native inhabitants thereof by the name of “China” is something that is now fairly familiar to almost everybody. Of very recent years, within ten at the most, some of those who consider themselves decidedly progressive have begun to use, when speaking Chinese, the name “Chin-ha”; but this is an adaptation of something Japanese, a most amusing example of “going round Robin Hood’s barn,” because the ideographs which the Chinese call Tsun-Kwoh, “The Land of Ts’in,” are pronounced by Japanese, usually, “Chin-ha.” The people themselves call their country by a number of names, no one of which

can, by any process of transliteration or even adaptation, be made to resemble the word "China." The most popular native term is "The Middle Kingdom." It has generally been assumed that this term had a geographical or physical significance; that China was *the* civilized centre of the whole world, as it was known to the ancient Chinese, around which on all sides clustered hordes of "barbarians," inhabiting regions into which scarcely a ray of the true civilization that was the peculiar belonging of the Chinese alone had penetrated; and probably to a good many of the uneducated and lower classes "The Middle Kingdom" does even now convey that meaning. But the true force of the word "Middle" is rather different from that — it indicates a *juste milieu*, a conservative, proper, middle path along which the Chinese, as a whole people, have pursued the even tenor of their way for so many centuries; that it connotes a certain sense of self-complacency, a superiority, in fact, may well be. The Chinese are a very poetical people and in their stanzas the names bestowed upon their own country are almost innumerable; these are often most fanciful and ornate, sometimes extravagant, as is but natural. When the officials or even the educated of the lower classes wish to be a bit grandiose, they speak of their country as "The Celestial Empire," or rather, the ideographs which have generally been translated in that way convey the meaning of "the land that is like unto heaven," for the Emperor calls himself "The Son of Heaven," and the whole empire is often designated by the appellation "under-heaven." China is a name probably derived from that of the Ts'in Dynasty, or

Ch'in as it is also rendered, which occupied the throne during the second half of the third century B.C. There was but one ruler of this line, Ch'in Shih Huang, or Chwang-seang-wang, who achieved much prominence. Until that time China had been virtually divided into a number of independent feudal States, Ch'in being along the western frontier, where its ruler and people might naturally be expected to become expert in warfare and enured to physical hardship, as compared with the more peaceful agriculturists and traders of the other states, remote from the frontier, along which was waged almost continuous warfare. If, however, we attach any importance to the reference in the biblical prophecy of Isaiah, and admit that the name *Sinim* referred to China, it is evident that the country was known by a name similar to the one we use, long before the days of the Ch'in or Ts'in Dynasty. Chwang-seang-wang is said to have begun his feudal chieftainship when only thirteen years of age, but he is declared to have displayed extraordinary ability and to have been possessed of most ambitious aspirations. He felt that the land was inherently weak because of division into so many independent feudal States, and he set himself to the task of uniting them under his own rule. In this he was successful and he developed into “a statesman of puissant energy and strongly marked individuality.” To call him “The Napoleon of China,” as has been done, is hardly fair to either personage, even if he did arrogate to himself the pretentious title of “The First Emperor,” Ch'in Shih Huang, expecting to compel history to begin from himself. In order to force, if possible, acquies-

cence with his weakly egotistic scheme, as well as to try to obliterate all written record of the past, thus preventing, as he hoped, comparisons which might be invidious, he commanded the destruction of the whole of the existing literature. The learned men of the time and the official censors and historiographers justly resented this iconoclastic act, and the latter, orally and in written records, criticised it most adversely and vehemently, as they were bound to do by virtue of their office. To their opposition the Emperor retorted by ordering four hundred and sixty of them to be buried alive "for the encouragement of the others," but even this strenuous measure proved abortive. The surviving literati hid away as many of the books and records as possible, and from these, aided by their marvellous memories, "wax to receive and marble to retain," they were able to reproduce the greater part of the destroyed literature. "China is perhaps the only country in the world in which so overwhelming a calamity could have been followed by effects so relatively slight."\* Professor H. A. Giles, one of the most eminent Sinologues and Chinese lexicographers, speaks of this act of vandalism as one of the greatest literary crimes ever perpetrated.

The language the Chinese speak is, to themselves, "the clear speech," the gibberish of the outside barbarians being to them as disagreeable and as unlike a proper human method of conveying thought orally as was the "Ba-ba" of their neighbours to the cultured Greeks of long ago. The dialects spoken all over the empire differ from one another so much, particularly in the south,

\* A. H. Smith, "China and America To-day."

that not infrequently a peasant who goes a couple of score of miles from his home finds as much difficulty in making himself understood as does an Englishman after crossing the Straits of Dover. Hence it is very important for a person who intends to go to China to reside to make sure that the Chinese he learns is the right dialect to use in the particular locality where he is going to settle. The written language is, of course, the same all over the land, even if it is read quite differently in one district from the sound given it in another. The "Mandarin Dialect," the language of officials, is supposed to have the same pronunciation and intonation all over the country, yet even this is not literally true.

In order to arrive at a reasonably clear understanding of present conditions in China, so far as the same relate to "China for the Chinese," and to prepare for some exposition of the views of leading men there, it is imperatively necessary to give a brief resume of the principal events since the time when what had been fairly amicable and quite satisfactory intercourse, commercially speaking, was suspended and the first coming of Europeans after the Cape of Good Hope had been doubled. Within less than twenty years from the time when Columbus made his first voyage across the Atlantic, bound, as he thought, for Japan and probably China, the Portuguese had rounded the southern extremity of Africa and reached the Malaccas, at that time one of the many far-outlying tributaries of China. Five years later, in 1516 or 1517 — almost four hundred years ago — they arrived at Canton. Proceeding up the coast they established "factories," that is, trading

establishments, at the great city of Ningpo, in Chekiang province, and at the smaller seaport of Ch'uan-chow, or Chin-chou, in Fuhkien province. Instead of living up to their alleged wish of engaging in friendly commerce alone, they conducted themselves in a most lawless manner until the Chinese, incensed at their outrageous behaviour, diametrically opposed to what the natives knew were the pretended standards of "Christian" Europeans, rose in their wrath and attacked the "foreign settlement" at Ningpo. They are said to have killed twelve thousand of these "Christians," including eight hundred natives who were doubtless pandering to the unlawful strangers, and to have burnt thirty-five foreign ships and native junks. The particular acts of the Portuguese to which the Chinese took such righteous and strenuous exception were not merely that these "peaceful traders" infested the entire coast of China as pirates, seizing inoffensive trading junks and looting towns and villages, but that these ghoulish marauders made a raid on the tombs of some "Chinese kings," in the neighbourhood of Ningpo, for the purpose of rifling them of the treasures buried therein. Besides these offensive acts, the Portuguese sallied out into neighbouring villages and kidnapped native women and girls whom they compelled to yield to their lust. This attack, and the consequent expulsion of all that remained of the foreign community, took place in 1545, and four years later, upon equally just provocation, the same thing occurred at Ch'uan-chow; and thus, because of conduct for which no condemnation could have been found to be too strong, had the Chinese themselves been

the offenders, the Portuguese permanently lost their position on the mainland of China. Then, for the first time, they took possession of the small, almost detached peninsula known as Macao; but even this was accomplished by a contemptible piece of deception. Pretending that some articles, which they falsely represented were intended to be offered as tribute to the Emperor, had been injured by sea-water during a storm, and that these must be dried and prepared afresh before presentation, they secured permission to erect “sheds” at Macao for that purpose. The “sheds” were expanded into residences, offices, and all other needful buildings for a permanent settlement, until the Portuguese subsequently remained as tenants of the place, on payment of a sum of money equal to five hundred ounces of silver. Unable to expel these unwelcome “tenants” the Chinese, in self-defence, tried to delimit Macao from the mainland by putting up a high, strong wall across the narrow neck. The place has ever since remained a very lawless and turbulent Portuguese colony, but this delimitation was not permanently effected until a few years ago.

The Spaniards next came to the attention of the Chinese; not by direct communication on the mainland, but because of their actions in the Philippines. The archipelago was seized by them in 1543, and speedily the officials became imbued with the idea that the large number of Chinese settlers were a menace to their own safety. The Spaniards thought that these Chinese merchants, market gardeners, pedlers, and coolies would, with the assistance of the native Filipino population, drive them from the islands. Accordingly, without any

semblance of reasonable provocation, they began an indiscriminate massacre of the Chinese which lasted for several days, until practically all were murdered. A repetition of this crime took place sixty years later, when, in addition to the former apprehension, the Spanish officials suspected the Chinese of being in league with Koxinga, who will be described in the paragraph dealing with the British. It may well be imagined what sort of an impression these subjects of the most Catholic sovereign made upon the Chinese Government.

When the Dutch appeared upon the scene some time after the opening of the seventeenth century, they attacked both Portuguese and Spaniards wherever they found their vessels in circumstances that promised easy victory. They assaulted Macao in 1623, but were repulsed by the Portuguese and went to the Pescadores, a group of small islands now belonging to Japan between the southern end of Formosa and the continent. Here they built a fort, compelling the Chinese fishermen to labour for them without making adequate compensation, and conducted themselves in such a lawless manner generally as to justify the Chinese in looking upon them as nothing more than international freebooters. The Hollanders do not appear to have committed any serious overt acts upon the continent; they were persuaded by the Chinese to leave the Pescadores and go to Formosa. They were driven from this island by Koxinga and then tried to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the Chinese by performing the prostration before the Emperor known as "kaotao," literally "three times kneeling and nine times knocking"; that is, the person perform-



PEOPLE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR DRAGON BOATS, CANTON



ing this abject act of homage and almost worship kneels and knocks the forehead thrice upon the ground or floor, then rises to his feet and again repeats the prostration twice. As this act may be alluded to again, it is well to understand how debasing it is. The Dutchmen's effort to curry favour was entirely without success; the Chinese officials simply jeered at them and sarcastically declared it was out of the question to talk of “trade” with foreign ambassadors who had been received in audience by their Imperial master or his representative for such ceremony.

The English did not appear upon this Far Eastern scene until long after the continentals had made an unfavourable impression which has never been completely effaced; they were hotly opposed by the Portuguese, who represented them to the Chinese as “rogues, thieves, and beggars.” Because of some crass stupidity on the part of the native garrison, or possibly through a most extraordinary and lamentable misunderstanding, although it is not impossible that the Portuguese misrepresentations were at the bottom of it, the Chinese forts on the river near Whampao fired upon British ships of war bearing the trade commissioners; but after two or three hours bombardment, the forts were taken and the British flag raised over them. This in itself was not an act to inspire the Chinese officials with implicit confidence in the good faith of these newcomers. Then letters were sent to the Viceroy at Canton remonstrating against the unprovoked assault from the forts, explaining the capture, and asking permission to trade. Careful attention should be given to the primary motive

of this visit and to the sequence of events, because the Chinese have their own version of this "friendly" effort to inaugurate commercial intercourse and to engage in profitable trading operations; that differing version is not entirely without reasonable justification. This was the beginning of England's commercial relations with China. In 1670 Great Britain made a treaty with the pirate chieftain Koxinga, a very interesting character, who then ruled Formosa as an absolute monarch. The Chinese Government had not recognized him in any way, but, on the other hand, it was not in a position to punish him; therefore, being quite unable to maintain its own prestige on the island, it wisely ignored the King of Formosa, as the British dubbed Koxinga. This was the first commercial convention entered into by a European power with a Chinese official of assumed, if not recognized, authority, and it is peculiarly interesting because it contained a distinct provision in the matter of jurisdiction. The extra-territorial clause in the treaties made between Western Powers and China and Japan has always been galling to the governments of those nations, however reasonable may have seemed its provisions in times past when there was no legal process in either China or Japan which secured protection for the foreigner in life and property. Japan speedily began preparing herself to show that this extra-territorial jurisdiction might be done away with in her case, by bringing up her police and judicial system to a standard somewhat comparable with those of Europe and America, and by framing codes that guaranteed protection to aliens; in this she has been successful and the extra-

territorial provision disappeared from the treaties which became operative in 1899. China, too, has felt the stigma which this clause puts upon her, and now seeks to have it expunged; but the proper compensating security for the lives and property of aliens has not yet been provided — even Japan refused to recognize her neighbour as an equal in this respect. In that convention which British officials made with Koxinga, the extra-territorial principle was clearly provided for, the "King" undertaking to punish all wrongs or injuries done to the British by his "subjects" and the resident British officials obligating themselves to do the same to their nationals when convicted of improper act towards a Formosan.

It is certainly not easy for us in America and Europe to-day to understand clearly the conditions which existed in China two hundred and fifty years ago. The Manchus, the reigning dynasty, had secured dominion over the whole empire without much effort, partly because of dissatisfaction on the part of the native populace with the upstart Ming Dynasty, a very short-lived one which had quickly degenerated into sensuous uselessness after the death of its plebeian founder, and partly because of unwillingness on the part of anything like a true native dynasty to fight for its rights, had it been able to gain the support of the apathetic, peace-loving Chinese. The Manchus felt that they were aliens, and, as a matter of fact, they have never yet got over that feeling; nor have they ever been looked upon as anything else by the people of China proper. When the nations of Europe came clamouring for privileges, "rights" as they too often arrogantly declared them,

that were entirely beyond the grasp of the Eastern Asiatic mind, it is not surprising that the Manchus were jealous of these total strangers, even less familiar to the people than were the Eastern usurpers of the Chinese throne then attempting to rule the empire. These Manchus must have felt that intercourse between the "barbarians" from the West with their Chinese subjects might easily bring about complications which would add seriously to their own grave burdens. It is quite conceivable that they considered the possibilities of success in the trading operations gaining for the Europeans the favour of the Chinese to such an extent as to bring about a coalition which would be fatal to themselves. They were, therefore, reluctant to imperil the slender strength of their hold by granting trade privileges which were regarded by them with comparative indifference *per se* or, more probably, with absolute detestation. How could they imagine what awkward complications for themselves might arise if these Western men, equipped with instruments of warfare far exceeding in power the native weapons, and possessing a knowledge of the art of war which they themselves had never attained, should once establish themselves firmly upon Chinese territory? It may, perhaps, be argued that this hypothesis is altogether opposed to the idea of that superiority over all the rest of the world in everything which characterized the Chinese in times past; but it is beginning to be more than suspected that among all those vain officials there were, even two or three centuries ago, some very wise heads who realized that there might be something for China to learn from abroad.

The Chinese officials succeeded for a while in keeping the English penned up in their factories in Canton, where they chafed at the restrictions of the local authorities, who successfully deceived the merchants and common people with their misstatements as to the moral character of the strangers, until all the Chinese looked upon the English as very fiends incarnate. Lord Napier called the Governor-General of the two "Kwang" provinces, Kwang-tung and Kwang-si, "a presumptuous heathen," in one of his despatches to the British Foreign Office, declaring that he was guilty of the basest conduct and cared nothing for commerce "so long as he received his pay and his plunder." But we must remember that "commerce," in the opinion of these Western men who pretended to wish only for the development of commercial relations with China, at that time spelt almost nothing but opium, for that was almost the only import the English were trying vigorously to sell the Chinese. Opium had been known to the Chinese for more than a thousand years at that time, and undoubtedly the "smoking habit" had been developed long before the Europeans sought to engage in the business upon a large scale at enormous profit; but it was only at this time that the government's attention was seriously drawn to it. In 1729 a very firm edict had been issued prohibiting all dealings in the drug; ordering the sellers to be punished with the "cangue," a severe form of the pillory, only the victim had to carry his broad frame, through which his head was poked, on his own shoulders; and the keeper of an "opium den" was to be imprisoned or, it might be, strangled. All persons in any way

connected with the importation, carriage, or sale of the drug, styled "foreign medicine," were likewise liable to severe punishment. It must be remembered that there was, at that time, no such thing as a treaty "of friendship and commerce" between Great Britain and China containing that objectionable "extra-territorial rights" clause; consequently China was, as a matter of fact and according to international law, supreme within her own domain, having made a law governing the import, sale, and use of opium, with perfect justice she could claim the right to punish, in her own way, even a British subject who deliberately violated that law on Chinese soil. But this view of the case was not concurred in by the British authorities. Had the occasion arisen for the exercise of the perfectly just and defensible sovereign right, and a British subject been punished for breaking the law, just as many Chinese were, we can imagine the storm that would have followed; insufficient credit has been given the Chinese officials for their clemency in this matter.

In 1781 the East India Company took charge of the production of opium in India, although after the close of the eighteenth century it was not carried to China in the Company's ships; this being done by "free," in contradistinction to the "monopoly," ships flying the British or Portuguese flag, and possibly in some American bottoms, notwithstanding that the business involved considerable risk. The smuggling of opium by British subjects led to war, exceptions having been taken to what were called "high-handed acts" of Chinese officials; but we should, in justice to all parties, say that

conditions were so anomalous and there was such moral incapacity on each side to see from the other's point of view that an armed conflict *must* ere long have taken place, even had there been no such moving cause as opium. After the very brief interval of “peace” which followed this first war, an accumulation of misunderstandings brought on another conflict, in 1842. It was at about this time that Sir Harry Parkes — whose statue now ornaments the water front at Shanghai as a mark of appreciation for his efforts in behalf of trade! — declared that he mistrusted all Chinese and “would put up with no nonsense from obtrusive officials.” It is a great pity that there were so many European statesmen of this class to deal with the delicate problems in China half a century ago, and so few of the Lord Elgin type, whose simple rule was never to make an unjust or unreasonable demand and never to withdraw a demand once made. Even in those early days this method appealed to the Chinese officials with results that were never unsatisfactory, although these might not always be sufficient from the Chinese standpoint. In 1859, just before the combined English-French expedition which captured Peking, the American envoy, Ward, visited the Chinese capital, but refusing to perform the kaotao, did not see the Emperor, and failed to establish his position. In March, 1861, British and French embassies were established in Peking, and those of other Powers followed in due course. Then came the Taiping Rebellion and Gordon's “Ever-victorious Army,” and after a long interval the “Boxer” troubles of 1900. From this very condensed story have been omitted many important

political details, reference to indemnities, and much other matter that is pretty well known; but we now anticipate a little and properly quote Sir Robert Hart, Commissioner-General of the Chinese Customs Service. In 1900 he represented the Chinese as saying, "We did not invite you foreigners here — you crossed the seas of your own accord and more or less forced yourselves upon us. We generously permitted the trade you were at first satisfied with, but what return did you make? To the trade we sanctioned you added opium smuggling, and when we tried to stop it you made war on us! We do not deny that Chinese consumers kept alive the demand for the drug, but both importation and consumption were illegal and prohibited; when we found it was ruining our country and depleting our treasury, we vainly attempted to induce you to abandon the trade, and we had then to take action against it ourselves. War ensued; but we were no warriors, and you won, and then dictated treaties which gave you Hongkong and opened several ports, while opium still remained contraband. Several years of peaceful intercourse followed and then Hongkong began to trouble us. It was originally ceded simply to be a careening-place for ships, but, situated on the direct route to the new ports, it grew into an emporium; and being also close to our coast and rivers, it became a smuggling centre. In your treaties you had undertaken a certain control of any junk traffic that should spring up, but when that traffic became considerable you discontinued the promised control, and our revenue suffered.

"Originally uninhabited, Hongkong now became the



TANG KANG OR POLUM BRIDGE



home of numerous Chinese settlers, many of them outlaws who dared not live on the mainland. These became British subjects, and you gave the British flag to their junks, which were one day British and another day Chinese, just as it suited their purpose; and out of this came the 'Arrow' war, followed by new treaties, additional ports, legalized opium, and fresh stipulations, in their turn the cause of fresh troubles. Whether it was that we granted you privileges or that you exacted concessions, you have treated the slightest mistake as violations of treaty rights, and instead of showing yourselves friendly and considerate, you insult us by charges of bad faith and demand reparation and indemnities. Your legalized opium has been a curse in every province into which it penetrated, and your refusal to limit or decrease the import has forced us to attempt a dangerous remedy; we have legalized the cultivation of native opium, not because we approve of it, but to compete with and drive out the foreign drug, and it is expelling it, and when we have only the native production to deal with, and thus have the business in our own hands, we hope to stop the habit in our own way. Your missionaries have been everywhere teaching good lessons and benevolently opening hospitals and dispensing medicine for the relief of the sick and the afflicted; but wherever they go, trouble goes with them, and instead of the welcome their good intentions merit, localities and officials turn against them. When called upon to indemnify them for losses, we find to our astonishment that it is the exactions of would-be millionnaires we have to satisfy! Your people are everywhere extra-terri-

torialized; but instead of a grateful return for this ill-advised stipulation, they appear to act as if there were no laws in China, and this encourages native lawlessness and makes constant difficulties for every native official.

"You have demanded and obtained the privilege of trading from port to port along the coast, and now you wish the inland waters thrown open to your steamers. Your newspapers vilify our officials and our government and, translated into Chinese, circulate very mischievous reading; but yet they have their uses, for, by their threats and suggestions they warn us what you may some day do, and so they help us indirectly, although that does not conduce to mutual respect and liking. All these things weaken official authority, therefore the official world is against you; and they hurt native tradesmen, therefore the trading classes are indignant. What countries give aliens the extra-territorial status? What countries allow aliens to compete in their coasting trade? What countries throw open their inland waters to other flags? And yet all these things you compel us to grant you! Why can you not treat us as you treat others? Were you to do so, you would find us friendly enough, and there would be an end of this everlasting bickering and these constantly recurring wars. Really, you are too short-sighted; you are forcing us to arm in self-defence, and you are giving us grudges to pay off instead of benefits to requite."

## CHAPTER II

### *WESTERN ATTITUDE IN THE PAST; VIEWS OF LEADING CHINESE*

THERE should not be any serious concern felt in America and Europe because of the present conditions in China, or on account of the manifest ambition of the leaders of public sentiment there to sound the call of "China for the Chinese"; rather, there may well be a sympathetic effort to help in this movement. But caution is needed lest the movement be diverted from a course which shall make for the good of many, into a channel that must inevitably lead to the destruction of the comparatively few who seek to guide the state improperly and bring disaster to all. It should be remembered that the intercourse between the Chinese people and Europeans and Americans — that is, the relations which have now been continued for the past three centuries or so — began in an unfortunate way. The Chinese, from time immemorial, have been an exceptionally self-contained people, not apparently anxious to deal with outside peoples, save in a very small way of trade along the borders of their own country, and in the matter of religion to have had some intercourse with India; this subject will be discussed later. From this isolation, if we may properly use the word in this

connection, because never in the whole narrative of Chinese history would it be literally correct to do so, came a somewhat rude awakening when, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there appeared commercial men from the West who insisted upon forcing their way into China and in establishing themselves at certain ports for purposes which inured to their own benefit almost exclusively. In the preface to the second edition of Laurence Oliphant's "Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan, 1857, '58, '59," the author said: "Those who are conversant with the unscrupulous character of a certain class of adventurer, who are unfortunately generally to be found in the van of mercantile enterprise, cannot but augur the worst consequences from their contact with a race so simple, and at the same time so vindictive, as the Japanese." Changing the adjectives so as satisfactorily to describe the peaceful, plodding, suppressed lower classes of China, the wily, dextrous Chinese merchants, and the procrastinating, unscrupulous officials of that country, these words might very well have been applied to the Chinese, apropos their relations with the Western peoples, from a time long before Lord Elgin made his visit to the Far East. It becomes clear as we read the many books that are now available and which tell us of the earliest intercourse between Europeans and Chinese, that there was always too great a disposition to "demand" rather than "insist upon" compliance with privileges, at first, and treaty obligations later. In other words, there was insufficient knowledge of the Chinese character, and, as a consequence, Europeans

were led into the error, not an unnatural one it must be admitted, of assuming that a treaty, when signed and duly ratified in conformity with European usage, was absolutely binding upon both parties thereto, both officially and as to the common people of the respective countries. This, we must bear in mind, was rarely, indeed we may almost say never, the view that Chinese officials in those remote days took of a treaty; as to the merchants and common people, they had no more notion of what a treaty was than an Apache Indian has of Sanskrit; that there could be anything in an agreement made between some of their own mandarins and certain objectionable, intrusive "barbarians" which affected themselves, was something inconceivable. A treaty usually meant, to these mandarins, a sort of amnesty which brought cessation of something that was momentarily annoying. A Chinese official, writing in London recently and in English, has said, and truthfully, that neither the acts nor the omissions of the authorities at Peking have any real or permanent effect on the life of the masses in China, except so far as they register the movements of popular sentiment and demand. Otherwise, as the statesmen and peoples of America and Europe have learnt to their cost, such treaties and conventions remain a dead letter. The government may enter into such obligations, but it cannot put them into effect, except in so far as they are endorsed by public opinion. The passive resistance of so vast a population, rooted in a tradition so immemorial, will defeat in the future, as it has done in the past, the attempts of the Western powers to impose their

will on the Chinese nation through the agency of the government.\*

It is true, if we admit the correctness that no people now have the right to insist upon being absolutely secluded from all the rest of the world, that the "brotherhood" of man now means, among other things, a right to come and go with reasonable freedom, yet always respecting the laws of the strange land into which we may go, then the closed doors of China had to be opened, and doubtless this could not be done by any ordinary, persuasive measures; such would probably have been met by stolid opposition more impregnable than the Great Wall of China itself. There had to be "a diplomatic and military display" if an entry was to be effected; yet this much being granted, it is now plain that the succeeding attitude of the Europeans was such as not to impress favourably the Chinese. In a report of a conversation between Emperor Hien-fung and Ki Shuh-tsan, ex-Judge of Kwang-tung, in 1851,† there is given an opinion of Western people which shows clearly what effect had been produced upon the Chinese, at that time, by the methods of the foreign visitors and, naturally, it is not favourable: "In the nature of barbarians there is much to suspect. . . . The other tribes (that is, other foreign peoples) are jealous, too, of the English barbarians for having carried their point (against China) and so, although so far as outward appearances go, they trade together amicably, each party

\* See "Letters from a Chinese Official; being an Eastern View of Western Civilization." New York, 1904.

† See Lord Elgin's "China and Japan," Vol. I, pp. 100 et seq.

is, in fact, considering his own interests and no cordial understanding is possible." In answer to the question by the Emperor: "How is it that the nation of the Flowery Flag (the United States of America) is rich and powerful and yet not troublesome?" came a statement not tended to elevate the foreign barbarians very high in the estimation of Chinese rulers: "As a general rule, the outer barbarians trade because their nature is covetous. If one of them breaks the peace (makes trouble with China), the prosperity of the others' trade is marred. Thus the English are at this moment beggared (and, therefore, not likely to go to war); but if they were to break the peace, it is not on their own trade alone that injury would be inflicted; other nations are therefore certain to object to any outrageous proceedings on their part. Were they to commence a disturbance the Americans would certainly be the last to assist them." "Why would not the Americans assist them?" "Your servant has been told that the Americans have business relations of great importance with Wu Sung-yan (How-qua, formerly a hong merchant of Quang-tung); indeed, they have had money of Wu. Every movement of the English barbarians is certain to be privately communicated to the family of Wu by the Americans, and Wu Sung-yan thereupon makes his private reports to Sen and Yeh (Governor-General and Governor of Kwang-tung province, who also bribed the foreigners' interpreters to furnish them privately with full reports of everything that went on), who take precautionary measures accordingly. Thus, last year, it was by a communication from the Americans that it was known that a man-of-

war of the English barbarians was coming to Tientsin (the Peiho). Not that this shows any sincere friendship for us on the part of the Americans, it was simply that their desire for gain is strong, and that they were afraid that their trade would be disturbed by (the act of) the English." The remainder of this most curious and interesting document may be found in the official report of the expedition, published as a Parliamentary Blue Book, which may be procured with some little trouble; this extract is inserted here to show, in a remarkable manner, the position which foreigners then held in the eyes of the Chinese authorities, and the views by which those officials, as well as the merchants, were influenced in their dealings with the strangers from the West.

From this and much other similar evidence, we are compelled to infer that the reasons which led the Europeans in the sixteenth and later centuries to make their way into China were not such as to appeal to the respect of the Chinese officials, and that their methods were not precisely those which make for good. This is not the place to discuss the efforts of the Protestant Christian missionaries along totally different lines; these met with equally violent opposition, yet of a different nature, and this subject will be one of the topics of a later chapter. What is now evident is that the motive of Americans and Europeans, a century ago, was not one of disinterested friendship and that their relations, the one against the others, were not tended to inspire respect. Their antipathy to Chinese methods in diplomacy, commerce, and every other way, without duly considering the ages of that civilization — so different from their own, to be



TEMPLE AT LOONG-WHA



LOONG-WHA PAGODA



sure — which were back of it and were its reasonable inspiration, was most unfortunately harsh and unsympathetic; their sole desire, so far as the Chinese themselves could judge, was to exploit China for their own sordid, selfish benefit. The very beginning of this modern trade between Europeans and Chinese brought with it the curse of opium, a business which has been so fearlessly exposed\* that, after what has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, no more need be said here; our duty in this matter will be discussed in a later chapter.

In later years we Americans cannot evade the charge of unfriendliness that the Chinese have made because of our attitude towards Asiatic labourers. The writer speaks from actual knowledge when he says that the principles expressed in our Declaration of Independence and those of our Constitution were well known to many of the Chinese literati half a century ago, and it is just such men who contend that our subsequent exclusion bills stultified ourselves. While there was pressing need for labour on the Pacific Coast, and while the calls of the contractors for the Panama Railway, as well as the early development of various industries in the Western states and territories, could not be satisfied with "white" labourers, the Chinese coolies were made welcome; but so soon as there appeared to be even a slight indication that some of those Asiatic workmen entered into competition with miscalled Americans, there arose a cry for exclusion that was too insistent for politicians to neglect, even after it was shown that some of those

\* "Drugging a Nation: The Story of China and the Opium Curse," by Samuel Merwin.

very "sand-lot" leaders were employing Chinese as domestic servants. The yielding to this demagogic clamour did not make a favourable impression upon the better-class Chinese, and it did cause unfriendliness among those of the coolie class who had learnt of advantages gained in the golden land by some of their friends, and now found themselves debarred from sharing in those good fortunes. It is not here contended that there was absolutely no justification for the exclusion legislation; such a kindly disposed stranger as the Right Honorable James Bryce, the British Ambassador, in the recent revised and expanded edition of his magnificent work, "*The American Commonwealth*," voices the sentiment of many when he says: "As a separately organized faction seeking to capture the Federal Government, it [a small, independent party] could not succeed against the national parties, because the Union as a whole is so vast that it would be outvoted by one or other of them. But if it is content to remain a mere opinion or demand, not attacking either national party, but willing to bestow the votes it can control on whichever will meet its wishes, it is powerful, because the two great parties will bid against each other for its support by flatteries and concessions. For instance, the question which has interested the masses on the Pacific Coast is that of excluding Chinese immigrants and latterly Japanese also, because they compete with the whites and bring down wages. Now, if the 'anti-Mongolians' of California, Washington, and Oregon were to create a national party, based on this particular issue, it would be insignificant, for they would have little support over five sixths

of the Union. But, by showing that the attitude of the two great parties on this issue will determine their own attitude towards those parties, they control both, for each desires to secure the vote of California, Washington, and Oregon; each vies with the other in promising and voting for anti-Asiatic legislation. . . . In the Pacific states the feeling against the Chinese, who took lower wages, often one half of what whites obtain, was for a time not merely the prime factor in Californian state politics, but induced the [United States] Senate to ratify treaties and Congress to pass acts, the last one extremely stringent, prohibiting their entry. . . . Of the East Asiatic races that have entered the United States on the Pacific side of the continent, it has not been necessary to speak in this chapter, because their immigration has been stopped. Statutes passed at the urgent instance of Californian working-men, who disliked the competition of Chinese coolies, exclude all Chinese, except persons of the educated classes, such as merchants, students, and travellers for pleasure; while under an arrangement made with the Japanese Government in 1908, the influx of Japanese labourers, which was increasing rapidly, has also been stopped. In 1900 there were in the United States 81,000 foreign-born Chinese, and it is possible that the number may increase slightly by illicit importations on the frontiers of Mexico and Canada. In 1908 there were more than 150,000 Japanese; but since then many have departed and scarce any have arrived. Neither they, nor Chinese, nor Malays, nor Hindus, can be naturalized, but the children of those races born in the

United States, are born citizens and may vote, if registered, so any large addition to their numbers is all the more deprecated. It is needless to add that they remain quite distinct from the white inhabitants. The feeling against the entrance of the yellow races, less strong against the Chinese than it was in 1880, and qualified among the employers by the desire to have plenty of steady labour, is still strong enough to maintain the policy of exclusion, and does not seem likely to disappear in any period which can at present be foreseen. A like feeling exists in Australia, and has there dictated an even more rigid warning off of all Asiatics. The humanitarian sentiment towards other races, which was so strong in the middle of last century, has visibly declined. No one, except a fruit grower who wants Japanese labour for his orchards, openly complains of the exclusion, or a well-to-do householder who suffers from the difficulty of obtaining domestic service, which while great everywhere is greatest on the Pacific Coast, and the all too frequent outrages perpetrated by whites upon men of a different colour excite less censure than they would have done in the last generation."

But as a matter of principle, it is asking too much to expect the Chinese people to regard those extreme exclusion measures as anything but unfriendly towards themselves, and the inevitable effect was to arouse somewhat of a similar feeling of opposition to the presence of Americans in their own land. We know only too well that this opposition has occasionally blazed up in ways that were exceedingly threatening; for example, the boycott, in the Shanghai and Yangtze districts a

few years ago; and we know, too, that these conflagrations have been extinguished only with the aid and cooperation with us of the Chinese authorities. Still, a faithful exposition of facts, as they appeal to an experienced observer, demands the statement that many Chinese officials, merchants, even labourers, too, looked past the act of legislators in framing bills inimical to their countrymen and saw the spirit which inspired the legislation; these men willingly absolve the true Americans — who are the living representatives of half a dozen or more generations in the United States — from all intention to exclude them from America unfairly. These Chinese hold the newly made “citizen,” imported through the eastern gates of the United States too often from the worst corners of Europe, responsible for the stigma put upon themselves or their fellow-countrymen. It cannot be denied that there is a good deal of truth in this opinion. The better classes of Americans feel strong in their superiority; they instinctively believe that their civilization is not built upon such a weak and unstable foundation that it cannot withstand the shock of the “ways that are dark and tricks that are vain” of the “peculiar Chinese”; but they are willing to see their civilization go down, as not fit to survive, if it is made of such feeble stuff as to be overwhelmed by the Asiatic. Such Americans very properly ask why the civilization with which their own is allied has not succumbed to the contact with Asiatics in other parts of the world, if there is so much to dread from the incoming of the Chinese? If the answer is made that the standards of living and of wages are higher in this country than

elsewhere, the reply is that eventually conditions of life, wages, and all such things in these United States must adjust themselves to the standards of the great world, or we must put ourselves in the untenable position of being more exclusive than even the Chinese people ever dreamt of being.

Nearly half a century ago the writer made the acquaintance in China of a native "first-class interpreter" in the Chinese Customs Service, a position which in itself connotes more than ordinary parts. This man had travelled over pretty nearly the whole of his native country, in India, and widely over Europe. He had been graduated from Oxford with honours, when it was not considered as quite the graceful thing to do, by the Universities of Europe and America, to be lenient in the matter of qualifications in bestowing degrees upon interesting and attractive Asiatics; as has since become a rather foolish fashion. Mr. Weng had his M.A. for actual merit; he was truly well educated; he spoke and wrote English just as we do, without a trace of that precision which sometimes betrays the stranger and equally without any of the "slang" that is too often affected by many. His reading was most catholic and the good use he had made of his opportunities for observing men and customs was remarkable. In many conversations with him he always declared stoutly that he could never wish to become anything but what he was, a true, loyal, and patriotic Chinese; but, on the other hand, he said he could not respect a Western man who would give up his birthright to become a Chinese subject. He admired much that he had seen in

Europe, particularly the stable form of representative government in England, and that, he said, was something his own people must eventually imitate, if China was ever to take the place among the advanced powers of the world to which her history, her civilization, and the inherent worth of her people gave her a right to aspire. The sense of his many expressions was this: "When the time comes — and it will come before long — for China to assert herself, you will see that she has learnt well the lessons the Europeans and Americans have forced her to study. I do not mean to say that I think my people will ever requite your harshness and unfairness in kind; but you must see that it is going to take a very long time to efface the resentment caused by the exactions Western people have demanded in trading rights, residential privileges, the unjust acquisition of territory, the improper exacting of indemnities, and all sorts of punishments for mistakes (crimes, if you like!) for which we were not originally alone responsible. Those crimes and mistakes came about because you foreigners insisted upon our giving what we did not wish to give, and something that we did not understand; for 'foreign commerce,' as you interpreted the words, is a very different thing from what we understand it to be; you make it absolutely selfish, we think the benefits should be shared about equally between the two parties engaged in it. Strictly speaking, the Europeans who came here two or three hundred years ago did not 'open' China, for ours had never been a 'closed' country. We had sent our ships far away from home long before that; and we had given every reasonable facility to trading

vessels from the West, long before those comparatively newcomers arrived, and we had no serious trouble with those earlier merchants. It is true that they sometimes behaved in a way that utterly shocked our sense of propriety and our people treated them as they richly deserved; but there were no such 'indemnities' exacted as your friends have demanded for much less! I believe the time will come for us to requite those injustices, and then you will see. For myself, I think we must have some very important changes in our system of government; we can not altogether adopt the British form of constitutional government; that would be too radical, I fear; and as for your American republican form, that is simply impossible. We must do away with our literary examinations and the giving of appointments in the army, navy, and civil service simply because of the candidates' knowledge of our ancient classics and their ability to write a pedantic, flowery essay yards long upon some absurd, academic topic. There must be substituted an education that is liberal, and technical training must be fitting for every department. These things may be attempted gradually, and when they are accomplished we shall be ready to assert ourselves; to demand the doing away of the degrading extra-territorial clause in our treaties with you foreigners which now makes you supreme on Chinese soil, where we ought to be alone in all matters. I am connected with our customs Service, and you know that I am subordinate to a foreign Commissioner who is the head of the staff; with me are associated several foreigners, as assistant interpreters and clerks. Why? Because you claim that



TWO MODES OF CONVEYANCE



we Chinese are not to be trusted to administer the affairs of the service, and you pretend to think we may squander or steal the revenues, upon which you have a lien to provide payment of those indemnities you have extorted from us. I am ashamed to say you have some ground for your want of confidence, but we are learning something of the necessity for an honest civil service, and it will come; when we shall have paid off our obligations to you we shall not tolerate this big, highly paid staff of foreign employees. You know what I think of the accursed opium traffic, and who are, in my opinion, responsible for it, and my opinions are those of every right-minded Chinese — even those who are wretched victims of the smoking habit. Just how we are to get rid of the curse and stop the importation of the drug, I do not know, but we must do it if China is ever to regain her self-respect. I am very sure we cannot count on help from any foreigners except a handful of merchants and, of course, all the Christian missionaries; but what can they do against the combination of the rich Parsee importers at Hongkong, the scores of European firms at the ports, and the thousands of Chinese distributers? Until the British Government does something to stop the cultivation in India and the export thence to China, we are almost helpless."

Every one having the slightest knowledge of Chinese affairs from actual observation on the ground, and all who have had the opportunity to talk with intelligent Chinese at any time since the first demand for reparation was made and complied with from sheer physical inability to resist, must admit that these sentiments are pre-

cisely what thousands have expressed. As to the stigma put upon the Chinese officials by taking control of the customs service, equally many natives have had the same thing to say; and, too, all whose utterances were entitled to the least respectful consideration have agreed with Weng as to the slender justification Europeans have had for insisting upon this control, in the laches of many mandarins *into* whose hands public funds have been entrusted but *through* whose hands but little of the money has passed into the national funds or for the purposes for which it was appropriated. Yet always, when this admission has been made with manifest shame and mortification, there has followed the declaration that the change in the method of educating and training public servants, which had been recognized as an imperative necessity by one or two many years ago, and by yearly increasing numbers of late, will correct this. There can be no justification for dishonesty in handling public funds; there should be no condoning such a crime; and yet when we think of what education in China meant until a few years ago, the frightful burden it put too often upon those who could hardly bear it, the sacrifices cheerfully borne by impoverished fathers or widowed mothers to gain for a son the education needed to pass the examinations, we can almost bring ourselves to look forgivingly upon the misappropriation, to requite those who suffered, as most of the Chinese do. Let us stop for a moment to consider what education sufficient to gain for a young man a position in the civil service meant, and in some cases entailed. We speak now, of course, of the old system; the new one that is gradually,

and it is believed successfully, supplanting it will be alluded to in the proper place hereafter. The merest outline must suffice here, because those who wish for full information will find it in almost any of the books that deal with Chinese sociology. There was, and there is, nothing exclusive about education in China; as the Chinese official, whose little volume of letters has been mentioned \* says: "In China, for many centuries past, there has been a class of men set apart from the first to the pursuit of liberal arts, and destined to the functions of government. These men form no hereditary caste; it is open to any one to join them who possessed the requisite talent and inclinations; and in this respect our society has long been the most democratic in the world. The education to which we subject this official class is a matter of frequent and adverse comment among you, and it is not my intention here to undertake their defence. What I wish to point out is the fact that, by virtue of this institution, we have inculcated and we maintain among our people of all classes a respect for the things of the mind and of the spirit, to which it would be hard to find a parallel in Europe, and of which, in particular, there is no trace in England." To every and any lad of respectable parentage, no matter what his social position or degradation might be, the opportunity was given freely to demand that his name be enrolled among the candidates for the first literary examination. But before doing this, he had, as a boy, to commit to memory, parrot-like, the whole of the Confucian Classics, and little but these classics with the commentaries and other

\* Footnote. See p. 32.

works upon them. At first this was simply a tremendous, and to our mind an appalling, feat of memory; because the meaning of the ideographs that were strung together in the text was not imparted to the boys by the teacher; this exposition, with appropriate discussion according to the master's ability, came later. When the young man was anywhere from sixteen years of age upwards, he might be expected to be prepared for the first examination, held in his own district. All who attained the standard fixed by the government examiners were given the first literary title, Hsiu-ts'ai, "Flourishing Talent," or "Budding Genius." The tests applied were: evidence of a thorough general knowledge of the Classics, an ability to discuss the given topic, which was almost invariably what we should call "a catch question," in a recondite manner; flowery language; pedantic rounding of periods; style; and beauty of the print-like penmanship. We might, in a rough sort of way, call this first title the equivalent of our Bachelor of Arts. It has been most appositely said that those former examinations in China were not very unlike the classical examinations at the English universities during a time not very far removed from our own days; only it must be said, to the credit of those older English universities, that there was at least a smattering of logic, philosophy, and mathematics in the examination papers; whereas in China there was absolutely nothing but the Classics, and even from these no practical deductions were drawn. A year or two later, usually in a provincial or prefectoral capital, these "Budding Geniuses" were permitted to enter for the next examination; the topic was even more

"catchy" than before; the tests were more strictly applied; and the few successful men were designated Chu-jen, "Selected Man," or Master of Arts. Next, at a place somewhat remote from home, the Chu-jen were examined and, if successful, became Chin-shih, "Entered Scholars," Doctors of Literature (?); they were now deemed ready to take upon themselves the duties of any official position which could be found or made for them; it might be at court, as civil magistrate and police judge in any part of the country, or as officers of the army! Technical ability was not considered essential; the judge might know nothing of law, the army officer be ignorant of tactics; these shortcomings were amply compensated for by ability to expound the Classics. These mandarins, using a popular word, although not Chinese, continued to study diligently, now devoting much time to the exegesis of the Confucian Classics; and they were, in due time, called to Peking, where they were examined, in fact or at least nominally, in the presence of the Emperor himself, and the few successful ones became Hsia Yüan, "Literary Chancellor (?)," and members of the famous Hanlin College. Once in three years these members of the Hanlin, "Forest of Pencils" (the pencil or brush which is used in writing Chinese being considered *the* mark of a scholar), were subjected to the most searching and rigorous examination that the wit, pedantry, and Classic-worship of the Chinese mind could devise, and to just one was given the title of Chuang Tuan, for which we simply have no English equivalent that conveys to our minds the precise meaning this superlative degree has in China:

it so completely embodies all that is lofty in mental attainment that just one man of the millions in China is found worthy to receive it, and that, too, but once in three years!

We should remember that many long years must have passed since the boy entered his first school, at five or six years of age, until he became a Chin-shih, when he might be given an official position which carried a small salary, if he were fortunate enough to find favour in the eyes of the government officials, or if exceptional influence could be exerted in his behalf; because there were never enough vacant offices to give all the "Entered Scholars" remunerative posts, and "pull" was quite as potent in China as anywhere else. During all this time the student's expenses were heavy, even in China where standards of living were, and are, almost ridiculously low and not exacting; but the boy, the lad, the young man, must eat and have a bed and a room to study in; he must have clothing suited to his position and aspirations, and must always present a respectable appearance; he required books, stationery, and many other things. If born in fortunate circumstances, the burden was not unbearable; but since it was the ambition of well-nigh every family in the land, even the beggars almost, to have a son among the literati, there are to be found in Chinese history and folk-lore tales of the most heart-breaking self-denial and privations, borne by sometimes one, sometimes by many, to let the lad of promising genius have the chance to pass the examinations. By the peculiar views of the Chinese as to relationship and ancestral connection, success, if it did not immediately

bring pecuniary reward, would reflect upon every member of the candidate's living family and upon all in the ancestral line back indefinitely. Failure very frequently brought crushing despair not only to the unsuccessful candidate, but to those who had helped him; and when the money was gone without hope of recovery from the salary that had been counted upon, too often the disappointed candidate and his whole family wiped themselves out of earthly existence, leaving their bodies to be cared for by — anybody! But suppose success came to a young man for whom a poor peasant father or a struggling artisan had slaved, while barely putting into his own mouth, and those of the rest of his family, sufficient food to keep them alive; or a widowed mother had struggled while starving herself; or brothers had given all the assistance they could; or — worst of all — a sister had sold herself into a life of shame (Confucianism demands even such a sacrifice)? Bearing in mind that the "Great Sage" taught ethics which we consider peculiar, if we say nothing worse of it, and that the moral point of view in China *was* adjusted at an angle somewhat different from our own, can we wonder that as soon as the young official found himself in a position to repay the kindness shown him, to make up somewhat of the sacrifices others had unselfishly made for him, he took his "squeeze"? For it may be taken for granted that the first official position did not carry with it a salary sufficient to do more than maintain himself. It was wrong, undoubtedly, but stop and think. Is there not something radically wrong in an ethical system which rarely condemns such act of misappropriation of entrusted

funds; in a code which seldom punishes for it? In a little book of Chinese stories\* there is one entitled "The Wonderful Man"; it tells of a widow who had an only son. To help him get an education, she did what was unpardonable; while the son was still so young that the deception could be successfully practised upon him, she concealed her identity from her child and made him think she was his father; she changed her dress, shaved her head all except the braided queue, and made herself as much like a man as possible. She did a man's work for more than a score of years, and her self-effacement and self-denial were successful; but with the son's success comes her own collapse and she dies when she hears the young man tell of his name being the very first in the list of those who had passed the examination. When the son prepares his "father's" dead body for burial, he learns the truth. In Chinese opinion that son was bound to requite his mother's devotion, by giving her body an appropriate burial, or by providing royally for her comfort, had she lived, no matter how he obtained the means to do so. It may interest the reader to know that outside one of the four gates of a prefectural city in the south of China, a city having a great reputation for learning and famous as the abode of scholars, on the main road leading northward towards the far-off capital, Peking, there stands an arch which bears nothing but this legend, "The Wonderful Man," carved deep in large ideographs on the central granite beam. There is no personal name and no eulogium; nothing to show in whose honour the arch was raised; but it is well known,

\* "Chinese Folk-Lore Tales," by Rev. J. Macgowan, D.D.



WATER BUFFALO AND BOY CARETAKER



WATER TORII, MIYAJIMA



by certain of the literati and in the legends of the town, that it is in memory of this faithful widowed mother.

He who reads Chinese history carefully will be surprised to find cropping up here and there expressions that indicate a sort of appreciation of the fact that there *were* things to be learned "beyond the four seas" that outlined the Middle Kingdom; and some of these have been already briefly alluded to. They are not of much importance, one way or the other, and we must hasten on to some discussion of what has been said by Chinese of recent or present times whose opinions are entitled to respectful consideration. Li Hung-chang, the faithful servant of the late and justly famous Empress Dowager, who was for a time held to be infamous, and not without reason, was known by the sobriquet of "The Bismarck of the East," and his iron hand — shall we say unscrupulous severity? — gave him a right to the title. He had won his title to greatness during the Taeping Rebellion, and for the services he rendered in finally crushing that trouble which so nearly overwhelmed China, and would have done so completely had it not been for the assistance rendered by "Chinese" Gordon, under whom Li learnt all that he knew of modern warfare. Li Hung-chang utilized for others what he refused for himself, that is the benefits to be derived by China from adopting and using Western education; for he employed an English teacher for his grandson. Li was the eldest and the leader of the statesmen with whom the Empress Dowager allied herself after the Boxer troubles in 1900. He with Chang Chih-tung, Yuan Shih-kai, Prince Chung, and a few others, all of whom will be mentioned, in ten years,

acting under the Empress' authority, put into operation all the reforms that the late Emperor Kuang Hsü, ill advised by certain over-zealous though right-purposed radical reformers, had attempted to force upon his country in a few weeks. Yet there was a time when Li's views as to the stern necessity for China to emerge from her exclusiveness and become a part of the great world brought him disgrace. After his return from that trip around the world in 1896 he was stripped of all his honours, and it was said in Peking at the time that only the intercession of the Empress Dowager saved him from actual imprisonment and further disgrace. He lived to overcome this and died as a champion of the Coming China. Sceptical about many things, at one time he was an apparent advocate of progress, and at another seemingly a firm obstructionist; professing to see danger to China from the opium curse, he was yet one of the greatest growers of the poppy in the land. From the time when he was made to see the superiority of Western methods in organization and military science, he worked with some foreigners to bring about general education, and called to his home the assistance of teachers, not for himself but for his children and grandchildren. His expressions of admiration for American missionary efforts were probably as sincere as anything he ever said; and his influence has been passed on to a large circle of his countrymen who are most friendly to us.

Of Chang Chih-tung, in connection with Liu Kun-yi and Wang Wen Shao, three great viceroys and grand secretaries, it is said, and quite truly, that the great Empress Dowager never allowed any one of them to be



LARGE STONE BRIDGE, NEAR SHANGHAI



BRONZE STATUE OF H. E. LI HUNG-CHANG IN THE GARDENS  
NAMED AFTER HIM, NEAR ZI-KA-WEI



without an important office, and that she never felt called upon to degrade any of them; but this basking in the bright light of Imperial favour did not persist uninterrupted; since the great Empress' demise there have been times when these three were not such brilliant luminaries as they were before. It is not difficult to find the reason for the great Empress' favour: these men were the most eminent progressive officials she had in her empire, but not one of them was great enough to be a menace to her dynasty or her personal power; and hence there was no necessity for her occasionally reminding them, even if there was no actual sign of restiveness, or overweening self-appreciation, that there was a power above them which by a stroke of the vermilion brush could transfer them "from stars in the official firmament to dandelions in the grass." Chang Chih-tung, called "China's Greatest Viceroy," wrote a small book entitled *Chuen Hioh Pien*, which has been translated into English and given an English title, "China's Only Hope," which is *not* a translation. The English text will be referred to very often in this book. It is said that the late Emperor Kwang Hsü encouraged high officials to read the book and the people to study it for themselves. One million copies were distributed, and to its influence are in great measure due the bloody *coup d'état* of the Empress Dowager, the overthrow of the young Emperor, the decapitation of the patriotic members of the reform party, and, indirectly, the Boxer Insurrection. The "clear out the foreigners" policy of Prince Tuan, which for a short time seemed to find favour with the people generally, may

possibly be an outcome of the doctrines advanced in this book. Yet Chang Chih-tung, although he died two years ago, lived to change his views very materially and recognized the fact that the United States of America is, all things considered, his country's most sympathetic friend, and he charged his people to act towards America accordingly.

Yuan Shih-kai is another of those whose pronouncements for the Coming China are entitled to consideration and respect. He is a remarkable man in every way, although he is now retired, feeling that the burden of years disqualifies him from further activities. He has never been abroad, yet he has a firmer grip on affairs in China than almost any other man, with the possible exception of the Prince Regent, Chun. He realizes that his country now offers for the consideration of the whole world one of the biggest and most bewildering problems. He is entirely a self-made man. His father was a soldier and from him the son inherited those tastes which have lately displayed themselves in the creation of a small army that has been praised by all foreigners who were invited to witness its manœuvres. While once, and perhaps always, a part of the absolutism of his country, and always obedient to the commands of his Mistress, the Empress Dowager, herself, possibly, the strangest compound of hide-bound conservatism and radical progress, he nevertheless worked himself up, rank by rank, until he gained the top and became a "red-button" mandarin and a viceroy; with a personality towering above a superstition- and tradition-ridden Court, and all the time sufficiently able and skilful to

know how to use that Court. In his own jurisdiction he absolutely curbed the Boxers and he has shown by his example what can be done to wipe out the opium curse, if sincerity in this cause is made to appear at the top. Yuan's earnestness in promoting the new education has been an example for others, and if he has — because of his military proclivities — turned rather to Germany for his foreign advisers, he has evinced his respect for American institutions and people in many ways. He had many Europeans in his employ, yet he always was perfectly frank in saying that he looks for the time to come when all such assistance can be dispensed with.

The Regent of China, Prince Chun, a brother of the late and most unfortunate Emperor, Kuang Hsü, is another of the leaders of China from whom the world expects great things, because of the opportunities which he has had to become acquainted with other countries and other peoples through travelling abroad, an experience which is absolutely unique in the experience of sovereigns or regents in China. The Prince has been too discreet at all times to commit himself in any way, yet there have not been wanting pleasing evidences of his appreciation of Americans' efforts in his country's behalf and it is reasonably certain that in him America has a friend at the Chinese Court.

The speeches and acts of Mr. Wu Ting-fang can never be taken seriously, for his flippancy is simply amusing; yet if there is anything serious in his character, it is probably that he sees in America's attitude the aid that may be most firmly relied upon. To go further in comment or criticism might seem in bad taste.

His Excellency, Tong Hsiao-i, possibly the greatest, most sincere, and most successful of the leaders in the crusade against opium, can not well be anything but friendly to America, because it is from this country that the staunchest aid is likely to come in pushing forward the movement to that success for which so many men in China are devoutly praying.

So through the whole list of reformers in China; they are with scarcely an exception frankly outspoken in their appreciation of what the United States has done in the past to help their country along and especially in the matter of recognizing China's rights to be given the fullest justice in the matter of restoring autonomous rights, as soon as she has given satisfactory evidence of her ability to use those rights to her own benefit and without prejudice to other peoples.

## CHAPTER III

### *PRESENT FEELING IN THE UNITED STATES*

IT is somewhat difficult to discuss this subject clearly and concisely, because there are two points of view and each is different in its basis and in its course of reasoning; on the one hand there is the government policy, and on the other there is the popular opinion that runs into various phases, social, industrial, financial, etc. As a matter of fact, the general sentiment of the American Government has always been kindly disposed towards China, and willing to treat the government of that country, as well as its people, with the consideration that has not been so marked a feature of the attitude of other powers towards China and the Chinese. It is practically indisputable that the Anglo-Saxons, if we may use that compound, rather non-descript adjective to describe the Britons and the Americans conjointly, evince a degree of race prejudice that is not equalled in any other of the peoples of Europe, those who arrogate to themselves a superiority in civilization and general parts. While we in America are not free from this characteristic, which stands as a barrier in the way of getting along in this wide world, we are, so to speak, more selfish about it in our own United States of America than are our British cousins; we display the trait in varying degrees of strength according

to locality; but away from the influence of home environment and especially when we are in Asia, we are not nearly so narrowed in our exclusiveness as are the English especially, who are decidedly worse in this respect than are their Scotch or Irish neighbours; and even the Britons display this race prejudice in very varying degree, according to circumstances. It is very noticeable that the manner of the Britons who arrive in China or Japan by way of India, and especially if they have stayed for any appreciable time in the British-Indian possessions, assumes a very different attitude towards the natives of China or Japan, than do their fellow-countrymen who make the journey westward across America and the Pacific Ocean; from the lips of the former the word "nigger" falls too readily when they speak of the natives and there is an offensive tone given to it which hurts the feelings most unnecessarily; while the latter appear disposed to recognize the right of even an eastern Asiatic to be considered "a man and a brother." Americans seem willing to set aside the statement in the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created free and equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," when they are at home and brought into personal contact with the negroes in the Southern states, or the Indians in various localities, or with the Asiatics along the Pacific Coast; yet inconsistently willing to live up to those principles when away from home; at least they appear to be less violent in their prejudices than are their British connections.

But all the peoples of the world must recognize the changes that have been wrought in various parts of the world during these beginning years of the present century. It is not so easy for the average American to get himself into touch with affairs in all quarters of the globe as it is for the Briton, because he is not so well supplied with general news as is the reader of any one of several great London dailies. There are very, very few daily journals in this land which collect information from every part of the globe, digest it wholesomely, and arrange it systematically and simultaneously so that the reader knows just where to look for that which interests him specially, and can thus be enabled to follow, day by day, the sequence of events. There is likely to be too much tendency to give undue importance to a local matter of unsavoury gossip in the columns to-day, where yesterday was a tantalizing scrap of information about an event of world-wide importance that he would like to follow to a conclusion. Yet we must recognize that anything which occurs in an out-of-the-way corner may have a bearing upon our own line of proper action. In Russia there is a slumbering volcano and it is well for us to watch it; the explosion may come at any time and the nature and extent of the catastrophe which must follow is of vital importance to us; will its results be simply an overthrow of shameful conditions and the beginning of something like that which our forefathers declared to be their convictions as to the rights of man in the matter of "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness"; or will it bring a bloody devastation by the side of which the events in France during the Reign

of Terror are almost colourless and insipid? These are questions that possess an absorbing and intense interest for us. Then, too, we cannot be indifferent to what has taken place in South Africa, nor can we ignore the developments there. If the results of the Russo-Japanese war were not absolutely decisive, yet its influence has been wide-spread; in Egypt, Northern Africa, India, China, almost everywhere, indeed, it is noticeable. In Egypt the Mussulmans are uneasy, for they appear to think that if the Japanese could do so much as against mighty Russia, they, too, may be able to throw off the British yoke; not that they do not recognize the benefits they themselves derive from England's wise and beneficent rule, but because of their conviction that they also have the "Unalienable Right" of self-government. It has been well said that if another "Holy War" should break out in North Africa, it is difficult even to surmise what would happen. Again, it seems as if the Turks must, ere long, cross the Bosphorus and leave Europe forever; what will follow then? Are not the administrative problems of British India of interest to all, and should we be indifferent to the outcome of that spirit of unrest in the brightest jewel of England's crown, which has shown marked recrudescence since the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905? So, too, we — perhaps more than all other people on earth — should be keenly alive to events in China, for a giant is truly awakening. He has not actually been sleeping dreamlessly, Napoleon the Great to the contrary notwithstanding; for his slumbers have always been more or less affected by what was happening near by; but there came a rude jar three

hundred years ago, and bitter lessons were taught in 1894, 1900, and again in 1904-1905. It is our manifest destiny to live up to the precedents established by our earliest representatives, a century or a little more ago.

Our intercourse with China actually began just seven weeks after the definitive treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain was ratified by Congress (January 4, 1784), for the first vessel — most appropriately named *The Empress of China* — sailed from New York on February 22d of that same year and arrived at Canton, after a fair voyage, in the summer, and her cargo, principally ginseng, found a ready market at good prices. The Chinese people were well pleased with the coming of these “New” people, and how strangely it contradicts the wide-spread notion of Chinese backwardness and indifference to all things beyond their own narrow horizon, to learn that some of the Cantonese people then already knew of our successful War of Independence. The commander of this ship was Captain Green; the supercargo was Samuel Shaw, who, according to custom in those days and for a long time afterwards, was vested with much discretionary power and was a far more important personage than his title, supercargo, now conveys to our minds. The vessel returned to America in May, 1785, and Mr. Shaw gave a full account of the crude life then led by the little foreign colony at Canton, to Chief Justice Jay; his journal was published in 1847, but it is one of the many books that found little favour at the time and it is now rarely seen; but the author’s narrative and comments are interesting, accurate, and illuminating. From this pleasant beginning

our trade steadily increased and always in ways that were mutually satisfactory; our government exerted its best efforts to prevent participation by its nationals in the opium trade, but at such a distance from home and with nothing, then, of judicial machinery to enforce its wishes and commands, it was impossible to prevent a certain class of adventurers taking their share in a business which, while extra hazardous, was so enormously profitable. The only event of an unpleasant nature that interrupted the friendly commercial intercourse between Americans and Chinese, causing an outburst of righteous indignation and the suspension of trade for a short while, occurred in 1821, when an Italian, a sailor on the American ship *Emily*, killed a Chinese, while the ship was moored off Whampao, near the mouth of the Canton River. The Chinese authorities, ignoring the fact that the crime was unpremeditated, demanded the surrender of the unfortunate man that he might be dealt with according to Chinese law. This demand was complied with, the American merchants who were present saying: "We are bound to submit to your laws while we are in your waters; be they ever so unjust, we will not resist them;" but every one protested against the unfair trial and the subsequent strangulation of Terranova, the unfortunate victim. Even the kindly disposed Dr. S. Wells Williams animadverts upon this weakness of the Americans in letting one who was entitled to protection be murdered in such a way, and contrasts the action unfavourably with the strenuous and successful opposition of the British officials the following year, when a somewhat similar episode led the Chinese authorities to



VIEW OF AMOY



FOREIGNER'S RESIDENCE, AMOY



demand the surrender of certain British subjects. Terra-nova was strangled at the public execution ground of Canton on October 25, 1821; his body was handed over to the Americans the next day, and thereupon trade, which had been suspended while the trial was in progress, was reopened; and continued pleasantly enough until the general break-up of 1842, when all intercourse with foreigners was suspended during the First War. The only thing approximating military operation, in which the Americans appeared actively and directly, was during the troubles incident upon the seizure of the opium-smuggling lorchha *Arrow* (one of the Chinese vessels, yet flying the British flag, of which Sir Robert Hart makes the Chinese complain so justly. See chapter I.) The Bogue (pronounced Bo-gi) forts at "Bocca Tigris," Chinese Chu Fu or "Tiger's Mouth," on the river below Canton fired upon a United States man-of-war, recognizing her to be a foreign vessel yet not distinguishing her flag; the forts were promptly silenced, and that was the only display of America's military strength until our participation in the Boxer episode of 1900. Our government consistently refused to be drawn into any of the "wars" (for it is a shame and a mistake to call such one-sided expeditions "wars") between the British first, and later the combined British and French forces, and the Chinese troops; going so far in this consistency as to administer a sharp snub to our diplomatic representative at the time of the Opium war, when Dr. Peter Parker, as charge d'affaires, suggested cooperation with the British in punishing the Chinese. "The British Government evidently has objects beyond those

contemplated by the United States and we ought not to be drawn along with it, however anxious it may be for our cooperation.” The United States Government soon after the announcement of success in negotiating a treaty with China, that made at Nanking in August, 1842, appointed a sort of minister extraordinary to the court of Peking, Caleb Cushing, who was appointed commissioner by President Tyler and given a letter addressed to the Emperor of China, then the famous Tao Kwang, a ruler and a statesman of no mean ability, even when compared with “enlightened” monarchs, and whose efforts in behalf of his suffering people to suppress the opium trade gained for him first, the hatred of the greedy importers; second, the distrust of some of his own people; and last, the cooperation of all — both foreigners and natives — who have since come to realize the imperative necessity for doing away with the pestilential drug. Cushing appears to have been accredited to the Grand Khan, as there was then manifest confusion of Tartary and China in the minds of our Washington officials. The extraordinary document is to be found — of course — in the files of the Department of State archives, but it is given in full in “The Middle Kingdom”; with this comment: “As an instance of the singular mixture of patronizing and deprecatory address then deemed suitable for the Grand Khan by Western nations;” and Capt. F. Brinkley, in his estimable compilation, “Oriental Series: Japan and China,” holds it up to ridicule not undeserved, it must be admitted, and yet the circumstances of the time, the limited knowledge of China then possessed, and many other things are

extenuating. The multiplication of states in the Federal Union, the comparison of sizes of China and the United States, the childish tone used in discussing desires and problems of trade, the odd mixture of "I" and "we," and other features make us smile, and would to-day surely result in having the documents handed back to the ambassador without comment and without audience or recognition for him in any way. Mr. Cushing, with other foreign representatives, concluded a treaty which was, however, signed upon what was considered Portuguese soil, at Wanghia, a suburb of Macao, on July 3, 1844. Yet this, which might have proved in different circumstances to be a fatal mistake, was permitted to pass without prejudice, and the treaty became the leading authority in settling disputes until 1860; its thirty-one clauses seemed to provide amply for all possible contingencies, especially in the matter of showing clearly the rights conceded by the Chinese Government to foreigners residing within China's borders. There was not yet, perhaps, that explicit extra-territorial clause of the future, but the document was admitted, even by the British themselves, to be decidedly an advance upon their own preceding effort; and what was most satisfactory to all concerned was the dignified and amicable way in which the negotiations were conducted.

The precedent established in the matter of the Bogue forts has been consistently followed by our government in matters relating to the Far East. This position was maintained even when, some years later, 1860, our minister plenipotentiary, W. B. Reed, suggested that the United States join with British and French forces in the

campaign which eventually resulted in the occupation of Peking and the dictation of terms even more onerous than had ever before been exacted; the legalized importation and sale of opium being unquestionably the most outrageous demand ever made by conscious strength upon conscious weakness. Another American, Dr. Bethune McCartee, who was a resident of many years' standing at that time, has expressed himself with most pleasing force against the attitude which Europeans then took with the Chinese. Lewis Cass, Secretary of State under President Buchanan, met Reed's suggestion with the statement that the President was unwilling to ask Congress to seek redress for wrongs, accidental, never really intended, done to American citizens, by resort to arms. The Government, however, by maintaining a diplomatic representative, did endorse the claim of the West for free intercourse with Chinese.

Lest it should be contended by some purists that the statement that the silencing of the Bogue forts by the guns of the *Portsmouth* was the only display of military force made by Americans in China until 1900, is not literally true, it is to be noted that during the second battle between the Chinese forts at Taku, at the mouth of the Peiho River, below Tientsin, and the combined British and French fleet, Commodore Tatnall opened fire when he saw some British boats in imminent danger. His remark, "Blood is thicker than water," has passed into history. The episode, however, was so insignificant that it does not actually invalidate what has been said.

J. E. Ward, our next minister, made his way to Peking, but refused to submit to the degradation of the *kaotao*,

although some of the Chinese statesmen made a good effort to convince him that they and their Emperor were asking nothing more than they themselves would expect to do when visiting Washington City, to be received in audience by the President of the United States, or if they stood before the portrait of George Washington at his former home. It was an amusing trick and yet the statement goes some way towards showing, again, that the alleged self-contained, ignorant superiority of the Chinese was not so colossal as it has been declared to be by some writers. Ward had arrived in November of the previous year and the circumstances of his coming, coupled with the friendly manner of the envoy, strengthened the good opinion of the Chinese for Americans generally. He concluded the first commercial treaty between ourselves and the Chinese, and lent his aid to suppress, if possible, the nefarious "coolie" traffic. In February, 1860, he allowed Chinese officials to search the American ship *Messenger*, upon their alleging that there were a number of coolies detained in her hold against their will. Three hundred and seventeen of these unfortunate creatures were found. "Every one of them declined to go back to the ship, but it was not proved how many had been beguiled away on false pretences, the usual mode of kidnapping. The report of the commission sent to Cuba a dozen years later asserts, as the result of careful inquiries, that a majority of the coolies in Cuba, 'were decoyed aboard, not legitimately induced to emigrate.'" \*

In the light of later information and better opportu-

\* "The Middle Kingdom," by S. Wells Williams.

nities for investigating native records, getting at the Chinese side of many questions which were presented to us in a very *ex parte* manner years ago, it is but just to the Chinese, although it seems rather presumptuous detraction from what has always been considered one of the few reliable books about China, to say that "The Middle Kingdom," while it is accurate when dates and facts could be verified from records kept by responsible foreigners, officials, missionaries, or merchants, yet the whole tone of the book now seems to be, and is, hardly fair to the Chinese. For a man who was connected with a Protestant Christian mission, who was one of the earliest in the field, and who in linguistic attainments is properly accorded a place in the front rank of Sinologues, to sneer at the ignorance, stupidity, and obstinacy of all Chinese, and to assume for his own countrymen and other foreigners a superiority in all things moral, ethical, industrial, commercial, over the Chinese, simply shows now how dense was the ignorance of even the well-intentioned foreigner in China half a century and more ago. Throughout the whole of "The Middle Kingdom" China is spoken of actually or alluded to confidently as if the Great Wall had been built along the outermost confines of the empire from time immemorial and had never been passed by Europeans until the coming of the Portuguese and Spaniards in the sixteenth century; whereas we now know that in the strict sense of words, China had not been a "closed" country at all, until the ill-behaved Europeans had disgusted the Chinese people, and almost compelled them to seek safety in seclusion.

In every way, the American official methods were,

certainly in those early days, pleasing to the Chinese, so far as it was possible for the officials of that empire to bring themselves to see anything bordering on the satisfactory in the presence of the "Men of the West." In the commercial world, of which Americans were now beginning to appropriate a considerable share, there was, too, less that was objectionable in our methods than in those of some of our fellow intruders. It was about the middle of the last century, or a little before that time, that the great American commercial firms established themselves in the Far East; the names of these houses for many years stood for all that was upright in the eyes of the Chinese, until the word of a "Taipan" of such an establishment was all the bond that a native merchant asked for, and there are many well known cases of extraordinary confidence being placed in the integrity of those American merchants. It is, unfortunately, a necessity that the fickle goddess Fortune has wrought havoc which compels the use of the past tense in writing of those great American mercantile houses in China for, alas! they have all disappeared; gone so completely that even the reputation which was theirs in the olden days does not survive among those who have fallen heir to their transactions. It is not intended to impute lack of commercial probity to even one of the existing firms; but times have changed and methods have changed with them, until nowadays business in China is, as it is in pretty much all the world, no longer a matter of gigantic enterprises, combining — to be sure — much risk with almost assuredly enormous profits when the risk was once safely passed, but rather a somewhat hazardous

brokerage with competition so keen as to reduce commission to the lowest point.

Continuing the consideration of the attitude of the American Government toward China, we should recall what William H. Seward said, more than fifty years ago: "The Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great Hereafter." But a very short time ago Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, while President, seizing upon the idea of another, as he is so fond of doing, and expanding it till it has almost the appearance of originality, said: "The Mediterranean era died with the discovery of America; the Atlantic era is now at the height of its development and must soon exhaust the resources at its command; the Pacific era, destined to be the greatest, is just at the dawn." Our own sea-frontage on the Pacific of nautical miles to be protected, patrolled, and lighted is about 12,500; that of Great Britain (*i.e.*, the British Empire) is 10,000; Russia has but a little over 6000; Japan less than 5000, although this includes both sides of her islands; China a little more than 3000. Adding to our own the island possessions of Hawaii, Wake, Guam, the Philippines, etc., for telegraphic connection, and we run far ahead of the others, almost in their aggregate. Thus we see what devolves upon us in the matter of responsibility, and we also grasp somewhat of the meaning of Japan's jealousy as to Hawaii; it is unwise to forecast, but possible it is that jealousy, which found vehement expression in the protest made at the time of annexation, that now threatens another act of crass stupidity on the part of the somewhat turbulent

Japanese. But with the United States on the east and China on the west facing each other, it is manifest that *et* destiny has drawn us into neighbourliness, although our hands grasp across a stretch of four or five thousand miles. Should we not, therefore, have more consideration than we have had for the natural and laudable ambitions of our Chinese friends?

The opening of the Panama Canal will cause a geographical change possibly greater even than that which followed the construction of the Suez Canal, for the latter merely supplied an easier method for accomplishing one stage of a journey from Europe to China, which had been constantly made for many years; whereas, save for occasional communication with the Pacific coast of North and South America, the Isthmus of Panama had figured but little in the world's affairs; but with the canal in operation and the voyage from our own Atlantic coast materially shortened, it becomes quite a different matter; hence it is that the Chinese look upon the construction of that waterway with almost as keen interest as we do ourselves. There is not yet, if ever there shall be, a marked desire on the part of the Chinese to achieve the supremacy of the Pacific, as this ambition has been formulated by Japanese for themselves in terms that are anything but friendly to us; that supremacy China gladly yields to America and probably will never contend for it, either belligerently or commercially, with us.

The name of Anson Burlingame is so closely connected with our own intercourse with China, and that of the world generally, as hardly to need more than mention

here; yet 1868, when he negotiated the treaty which has always borne his name, is so far from us now in time that a word or two may properly be said about it to preserve the sequence of this narrative. The conditions were: First, to recognize China's rights of eminent domain over all her territory, even when occupied by foreign traders; second, to concede to her the sole control over her own inland navigation; third, to give the Chinese Government the right to appoint consuls to American ports; fourth, that China should agree to grant protection to foreign religions and cemeteries wherein foreigners were buried; fifth, to endorse naturalization rights and forbid the coolie trade; sixth, to give reciprocal rights of travel and residence to citizens of each party in the country of the other; seventh, to open all schools in each country to children of either nationality; and eighth, to acknowledge the rights of the Emperor of China to make internal improvements unobstructed by foreign interference. This was, in some of its provisions, too radical and it was so amended by subsequent legislation as to become entirely inoperative.

In the year 1900, when all the world was watching the Legations in Peking and was filled with the warmest sympathy for the surviving relatives and friends of those in the out towns and villages who had lost their lives at the hands of the bloodthirsty Boxers, Mr. John Hay, Secretary of State, in his despatch of July 3d announcing the plans of the government, expressed the sentiments and wishes of all in somewhat this way: It is the accepted duty of the government promptly to effect the rescue of all American citizens who are in any danger, and then

to seek for a solution of the imminent problem which shall secure personal safety and also peace to China; preserving its territorial and administrative entity, while protecting all rights guaranteed by treaty and international law, and safeguard to the world the principles of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. Inasmuch as the outside world looked upon this Boxer Insurrection as something for which the government of China was, perhaps, not primarily or even incidentally responsible, it was felt that conditions were anomalous and that punishment should not follow the usual course; that there was a curious misapprehension and a most extraordinary complication, is something we now know very well; but a discussion of the Boxer trouble is not pertinent here.

When President Taft, at that time a member of the Cabinet, visited Shanghai in October, 1907, he spoke to a large and mixed audience, and in his speech expressed the following sentiments: "The United States and others who *sincerely* favour the open-door policy will, if they are wise, not only welcome, but will encourage the great Chinese Empire to take long strides in administrative and governmental reform, in the development of her *dt* great natural resources, and the improvement and welfare of her people. In this way she will add strength to her position as a self-respecting nation; may resent all foreign aggression, seeking undue exclusive or proprietary privileges in her territory, and *without foreign aid* enforce an open-door policy of equal opportunity to all."

The sentiment which led to the passage of the exclusion bills did not have its origin in views which any

administration held; but those bills were distinctly measures passed at the demand of a comparatively few men — many of whom had barely attained their citizenship — who held sufficient political power in their hands to dictate to the great political parties, as has been shown by the extract from the Right Honorable James Bryce's "The American Commonwealth." That the wishes of the Pacific Coast residents were not altogether those of the country at large, is demonstrable in many ways, and is conspicuously set forth in the following statement made by the American Asiatic Society, a group of men connected, some of them, with our government, as well as many others who are of more or less importance in financial, industrial, and commercial circles: "In the judgment of this delegation and the association which it represents, the treatment accorded by the officers of the government to the exempt classes of Chinese visiting our country is more oppressive than either the letter or the spirit of the law requires." Apropos of the boycott which was inaugurated at Shanghai, and carried on to a disconcerting semblance of success which caused consternation in the ranks of our merchants engaged in trade with China, Secretary (now President) Taft said in his speech at Shanghai which has been already mentioned: "I am not one of those who view with alarm the effect of a growth of China, with her teeming millions, into a great industrial empire. I think that this, instead of injuring foreign trade with China, would greatly increase it, and while it might change the character in some respects, it would not diminish its profit. A trade which depends for its profit on the



IDOL PROCESSION: NOT AN UNCOMMON SCENE IN SHANGHAI



"ON THE WAY TO A HEATHEN CEREMONY"



backwardness of a people in developing their own resources, and upon their inability to value at the proper relative prices that which they have to sell and that which they have to buy, is not one which can be counted upon as stable or permanent." "We have steadily refrained from coercing a helpless people ourselves, although we have not denied the right of others to defend commercial and political interests. We have accepted no accessions of territory, even at the treaty-ports. We have never menaced the territorial integrity of China and have been foremost in upholding her sovereign rights on her own soil. However fatuous and unfair treatment of Chinese in America has been, it cannot be denied that we have tried to treat the Chinese Empire as honourably as any other and have constantly desired to include men of every race and colour in the great family of nations so soon as they could prove their birth-right by the plain tests of morality and culture. We have declined at all times to force upon an unwilling people our scientific and economic methods of industry or transportation, or to take possession of their affairs in the proud and selfish conviction that we could manage their affairs better than they could themselves."

All of this shows pretty clearly that the feeling of the United States towards China is a friendly one, if we limit the expression to the Government, officials, statesmen, publicists, and the broad-minded merchants and individuals. It appears to be the opinion that just as we induced Japan by moral persuasion, not by strenuous measures or overawing military display, to open her doors to us, and then lent every assistance at our com-

mand to help her advance rapidly along the pathway of her new civilization, so, too, we stand ready to lend a similar helping hand to China; and that there are signs of willingness on the part of the Chinese to accept our kindly offices cannot be denied, only it must be done in their way, other things being equal. It is to be hoped and it is the expectation of all who know China and Japan equally well, that history may not repeat itself in a seeming display of unfriendliness in China, such as has furnished certain alarmists, newspaper correspondents, and other sensationalists to see in Japan's recent movements nothing save that which bodes ill for our future relations with that country. It is true that for a time many Chinese looked upon President Roosevelt's interference with the contending parties in the Russo-Japanese conflict as productive of no good for China, and that this suspicion has since deepened into conviction. China felt herself to be between the upper and the nether millstones and would doubtless at the time have preferred victory for Japan rather than for Russia; but there was, even in 1904-1905, a suspicion that Japan's assurances that she was influenced by altruistic motives only were anything but ingenuous, and now has come the indubitable demonstration of the correctness of that suspicion. Had there been even a semblance of truth in Japan's declarations that she went into the war to sustain her own position in Korea, over which she claimed — by a most mythical line of argument — a certain right of friendly suzerainty, and to drive the Russians from Manchuria mainly for China's sole benefit, then the Japanese flag would not fly over the Liao-

tung peninsula; the South Manchurian railway would not be a profitable adjunct to Japan's own system; and the administration of affairs throughout the whole of the three eastern provinces would be to-day exclusively in China's hands, just where it belongs.

It is hardly necessary to discuss seriously the feeling among the people of the United States in general towards China, since that is so distinctly a personal matter and opinions would, of course, be innumerable. In many places and with individuals of all callings, there is a certain apprehension that the Coming China may mean an unwelcome recrudescence of the "Yellow Peril"; possibly another warlike onslaught upon Europe of the "Awful Mongols." To the mind of the unprejudiced observer at close range, there is positively no indication of such a disaster, and this could easily be made patent to the most timid even among those who really know nothing of Chinese characteristics. In the Pacific region there is still some apprehension that the least relaxing of the present stringent exclusion laws would bring a further disastrous and overwhelming influx of Chinese labourers; and yet even in that part of the country there is a breach of consistency that is almost amusing. Since San Francisco has secured the coming International Exhibition in honor of the Panama Canal, it appears that a desire to secure the patronage of Japan, and by inference that of China as well, leads the citizens of California to lay aside some of their fierce antipathy to the Asiatics and this fact of itself rather tends to create a doubt as to the good faith and seriousness of that opposition which was so strong. It is well to sound

a word of warning as to the unadvisability of repeating the course of procedure at the time of the St. Louis Exposition, when a most gratuitous affront was put upon Asiatic exhibitors; the least intimation that there will be a repetition in connection with the San Francisco Exhibition will bring about positive refusal to participate in any way.

Among financiers there is a reasonable and natural desire to share in the profits which may accrue from the developing of China; but this meets with some obstacles because of the wish of the Chinese themselves to supervise the building operations when railways and the like are the object in view; the installing of industrial plants, and other establishments of a like nature; and the Chinese wish, too, to have the controlling voice in the management of all such undertakings, even when the whole or the bulk of the capital is supplied from abroad. This should cause little surprise and no great apprehension when we recall the episode of the Hankow-Canton Railway. This, it will be remembered, was granted to an American syndicate. The concession for the northern section of China's great trunk line, from Peking to Canton, had been given to a Belgian syndicate which was financed in France, the Russo-Chinese Bank (which is in reality a Russian state bank) was the banker for the enterprise and supplied the actual cash as it was required. This arrangement was not altogether pleasing to the Chinese, who were and are reluctant to have themselves in any way put into the hands of any Russo-French combination. The Chinese felt that if their good friends, the Americans, had the control of the

southern section they would be safe, because we had never displayed any ambition or design to acquire territorial rights in China. But when the American concessionaries sold out to Belgian capitalists, the Chinese were disgusted and decided to buy back the concession; but here a serious difficulty arose: neither the American-Belgian proprietors nor the Chinese seemed to be prepared to build, and when terms of purchase were discussed, it was found that a concession which was worth not more than two million dollars, even after making the most liberal allowance for investment in preliminary and final surveys, installation of plants, acquired material, and everything else was held at three and three quarter million dollars. This profit of over fifty per cent. may be considered a legitimate prize, but its exaction from the Chinese has called forth comment that is not flattering to Americans. Yet even so, there must be many other opportunities for profitable investment in China, and if the important question of security for capital loaned can be forthcoming, there is every reason to believe we shall still have preference with the Chinese; consequently, the feeling among the capitalists of the United States is decidedly favourable. Among commercial men there has never been anything serious to shake the confidence that has always been felt in the integrity of the Chinese merchant.

## CHAPTER IV

### *THE POSSIBILITIES OF A TRANSFORMED CHINA*

BEFORE venturing to make even a surmise as to what may be in that great empire of China, should the influence of modern thought and ways be rewarded and permitted to exert their full effect, we must try to consider in a certain way what has led up to the frame of mind which has hitherto influenced the Chinese in drawing their conclusions. Religion in China has a deeper, wider influence quite outside of the sphere which we are commonly disposed to associate with that word, because animism must always do this; and the principal religion of China is in reality nothing more than the baldest animism which has controlled the people even in matters of the most trifling importance. This characteristic is precisely the same as is found at the base of many primitive religions, and it is probably the same as that which some of our leading philosophers and sociologists, Herbert Spencer, for example, have considered to be the very foundation and beginning of all human religion, no matter how loftily that religion may subsequently develop.

There are really but three forms which may properly be called the religions of China, namely: Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism. It is not necessary to separate



CHINESE IN MANDARIN DRESS IN IDOL PROCESSION, SHANGHAI



ancestral worship from Confucianism, as some have done, because the very root of the doctrine taught by "The Master" (that is, Confucius himself) was the careful preservation of the memory of those in the male line only who had gone before (the women of the line passing out of existence physical and spiritual, as if they had never been) and the worship of their tablets, graves, or shrines, together with the offering of the fruits of the earth. Nor is it essential to consider Mahommedanism, because it is insignificant as a fact and immaterial in its influence. It is largely true, almost wholly so, that China, until a very few years ago, had adopted nothing from abroad for centuries; even the form of Buddhism introduced from India had to be so remodelled to suit its Chinese environment, as to be scarcely recognizable by the professor of the true doctrine taught in the birth-land of the religion. Considering the antiquity of the Chinese as a nation and the solidarity of their empire, it is a reasonable assumption that little necessity existed for going abroad for creeds or cults, and that little welcome would be given anything of the kind until it had undergone a transformation bringing it into harmony with the thoughts of the people; hence it is not surprising that the popular religion of China is a primitive form, evolved from primitive times, and closely allied to the cults which are found elsewhere in somewhat similar circumstances.

In China, animism "is based on an implicit belief in the animation of the universe, and of every being or thing which exists in it. The oldest and holiest books of the empire teach that the universe consists of two

souls or breaths called *Yang* and *Yin*; the *Yang* representing light, warmth, productivity, and life, also the heavens from which all these good things emanate; and the *Yin* being associated with darkness, cold, death, and the earth. The *Yang* is subdivided into an indefinite number of good souls or spirits, called *shen*, the *Yin* into particles or evil spirits, called *kwei*, spectres; it is these *shen* and *kwei* which animate every being and every thing. It is they also which constitute the soul of man. His *shen*, also called *hwun*, immaterial, ethereal, like heaven itself, from which it emanates, constitutes his intellect and the finer parts of his character, his virtues; while his *kwei*, or *poh*, is thought to represent less refined qualities, his passions, vices, they being borrowed from material earth. Birth consists in an infusion of these souls; death in their departure, the *shen* returning to the *Yang* or heaven, the *kwei* to the *Yin* or earth.”\*

This universalistic animism leads most naturally to a system that is thoroughly polytheistic and polydemonistic. There are gods for everything animate and inanimate, material and spiritual, even abstract ideas sometimes being considered as possessing a spirit, while the demon world is nowhere so populous as in China; they haunt every nook and corner, and no place is absolutely safe from them, so that man can never feel he is free from the power of malign spirits — not even when he is performing his devotions and within what should be the sacred precincts of his family temple, or before the shrines of his ancestors. It is, however, in China, as it is in all other parts of the world, that at night the

\* “The Religion of the Chinese,” De Groot.

gravest danger exists; there is a semblance of security when the man hides his head beneath the shelter of his own bedclothes; but the unfortunate wight who has to be abroad at night is truly in a parlous state. Ghosts, the spirits of the dead and especially those of the improperly buried dead, are the subject of many weird tales which give an inkling of what this fear of evil spirits is.

The belief in spectres and spectrophy dominates all but the most classical of the literature of China, and even from that it is not entirely absent; these stories are not mere myths or "Old Wives' Tales" in the opinion of the people, they are very truth itself. This belief, at first somewhat debased, speedily attains to a semblance of dignity when we find that Confucius himself, tacitly admitting his own firm belief in spectres, divided them into three classes: those living in mountains and forests, those abiding in water, and those that haunt the ground. He considered the first class to be the most dangerous; and among them the most parlous are spectres having but one eye, at the top of the head; these, by their presence merely, caused drought, and, as a consequence, destruction of crops, death, famine, — all of which mean in China destruction of thousands, yes, millions of lives. The greater part of the second class of spectres are souls of drowned men, unable to release themselves from their watery grave until they draw another human being into it. The third class, the demons who haunt the bowels of the earth, also dwell in objects firmly attached to the soil: in houses and heavy things. As the soil, if fecundated by the celestial sphere, is the productive part of the universe, which engenders all

sorts of living things, disturbance of such earth spirits, by digging in the ground or moving heavy objects, naturally, by the laws of sympathy and universalism, disturbs the repose and growth of the embryo in the womb of the woman.

Thus we might go on to great length in telling of the dread which the Chinese have for these evil spirits; and it is amazing to us that so much importance is attached to them in a system which exerts such tremendous influence as do the teachings of Confucius. If there is to be a change and a development in any way comparable with that of the West, there must be either a complete change in the Confucian Classics or a discarding of them completely; because even if the educated men of China, the statesmen and high-rank literati, disclaim a belief in these demons and spectres, which were sanctioned and firmly recognized by Confucius himself, there is little doubt that most of them are still under the full domination of the polydemonism. The exceptions are, for the most part, of two classes: those who have either honestly professed Christianity and replaced their Confucianism with something which forever dispels such childish fear; and those who have renounced Confucianism without replacing it with any belief at all—agnostics and atheists, of whom there are many among the “advanced thinkers” of China. The very inconsistency of a land fully equipped with universities, public schools, and all the paraphernalia of modern education, traversed in all directions with railways, and having factories of all kinds; using the post, the telegraph, and the telephone as if they were the most commonplace things

in the world; and yet where the people are so much afraid of the maleficent power of spirits of evil, or unwilling to adventure upon any enterprise without first propitiating the beneficent ones to secure their co-operation, must strike one as being the very acme of absurdity. Let all that is admirable, and there is much, in Confucian ethics remain; do not let us seek to destroy the influence of his teaching in the matter of respect for father and ancestors; but let us look for the new Chinese to include his womankind in this respect, and let us believe he will abandon the *worship* of all ancestors as if they were the actual vicegerents of the one God, in Whose hands alone is the control of the present and the future, and Who rules the darkness as He does the day. So, too, with the second form of religion existing in China, that of the Tao, the rationalism derived from Lao-tsz, who accordingly to the Chinese legends was born 604 B.C., bringing this very nearly the date assigned as the birth of Confucius, 550 B.C. and, indeed, the two were contemporaries, in a sense, for his historian Sz'ma Tsien tells of an interview which Confucius had with Lao-tsz when the former was thirty-four years old. The fable connected with his birth tells that he was carried in his mother's womb for eighty years, hence he was called Lao-tsz, the "old boy," and sometimes Lao-Kun, the "venerable prince." It is rather doubtful how much there is in Taoism that was original with any Chinese sage, and all Sinologues who have given any thought to matters relating to Chinese religions agree in saying that whether Lao-tsz's teachings were entirely his own or were, in part if not altogether, derived

from hints imported from India or Persia, cannot be decided. The unsatisfactory nature of this religion becomes apparent when we know that the founder, in his striving after the infinite, can describe *Tao* only by declaring what it is not, and define *Teh* as an ideal virtue which no man can attain. "The visible forms of the highest *Teh* proceed only from *Tao*; and *Tao* is a thing impalpable, indefinite. How indefinite? How impalpable? And yet therein are forms indefinite, impalpable; and yet therein are essences. These essences are profoundly real, and therein faith is found. From of old till now its name has never passed away. It gives issue to all existences at their beginning. How then can I know the manner of the beginning of all existences? I know it by this *Tao*."

If Confucianism seems to us utterly unsuited for those who intend to take a part in the vigorous, practical, hard-working life of the advanced world of to-day, because of its taint of polydemonism, its masculine selfishness, its weak agnosticism and general unfitness; how much less satisfactory must we pronounce a (mis-called) religion which teaches that we are to know the manner of the beginning of all existences by our knowledge of something which cannot be defined. Can the illogical go further in absurdity?

Of Chinese Buddism, little need be said. Recognizing cheerfully all that may be said in praise of the pure doctrine as taught by Shakyamuni himself, and as preserved for some time in India and Ceylon, we are forced to admit that this religion immediately began to undergo

a process of modification and adaptation to its strange surroundings; and this process went on for such a length of time that Indian Buddhists, who say they themselves do not now clearly understand the original teachings of the founder of their Church, declare that there is nothing in Chinese Buddhism which they can recognize or tolerate. In China, except among the priests and possibly a few of the laity, this creed is now openly reviled, and so totally unfitted is it for the religious needs of a citizen of the world in this twentieth century strenuousness, that even Japanese Buddhist priests are carrying on a vigorous propaganda in China in the hope of rescuing their brethren from mental, moral, and material destruction. From this exceedingly negative sketch of what the ethical schools and religions of China have done to qualify the people of that land for active participation in the affairs of the world, and yet leave them with some prospect of success when the whole empire becomes imbued with Western ideas of progress and internal improvement, it is not easy for the casual reader to make up his mind that the Chinese people, as a whole, are anywhere near fitted to take up the task and prosecute it to final success. China is unquestionably heavily handicapped in the race that her new leaders have entered, for there is this frightful incubus of a false religion and a defective ethical code to be thrown over. When such an intelligent man as Chang Chih-tung implores his countrymen of all ranks, the learned and the uneducated, the strong and the weak, to maintain the reigning dynasty which he declares is open and above board in its dealings, although we who are on the

outside and therefore see China from a vantage ground, are justified in entertaining some doubt on this score; when he beseeches the Chinese people to be earnest and thorough in their adherence to the true religion, that is, Confucianism; and when he demands that the Confucian Classics be made the basis of education, we cannot but feel apprehensive as to the wisdom of following such advice. Yet even here there is a gleam of hope; for, after he had written his famous book which is known by the title of "China's Only Hope," he himself amended his views as to the best course for modern education to take, as will be made clear when this subject of the new education for China shall engage our attention. If it were possible for the Chinese people to rid themselves of their existing burden of so many thousands of priests, Taoist and Buddhist, who are not even making an effort to adapt themselves to changed and changing conditions, by establishing schools and universities wherein are taught much of Western learning, while still preserving faithful allegiance to the Buddhist or Taoist doctrine; if these priests could but see the necessity to themselves as well as to their country of imitating in this respect the example set by the advanced Buddhists of Japan, particularly the Hongwanji — who are called the Protestant Buddhists of Japan because of their broad culture and wise adoption of methods until lately unknown to all Buddhists — there would be more hope for China than there is. These Hongwanji Buddhists in Japan have opened kindergartens, schools for boys and girls, hospitals for both sexes, lying-in homes for poor women, and all sorts of eleemosynary institutions;

but we should look over the whole of China in vain for anything of a kindred nature in that great empire, under management and maintenance of native priests of Confucianism, or Buddhism, or Taoism.

But there are other signs that are more hopeful, indications that give us some inkling of what the Coming China may be when the leaven now working shall have spread far and wide. It is but half a score of years back to 1900, and yet when we think of what has been done in those ten years, we must admit that the promise of greater things is good, indeed. Admitting that China was utterly apathetic, indifferent to all things outside of her own ways — ways that had crystallized into almost hopeless rigidity — a comparison of China to-day even with what that country was in 1894, after Japan had administered such a severe yet salutary lesson, shows us that the immobility has long since given way to an activity which is amazing.

It began, however, in a wrong way; such reforms as rulers conceive to be for the good of their subjects or nationals, cannot be accomplished by academic proclamation; and even in China, an imperial decree is nothing more than the paper on which it is written, if the officials ignore it or fail to give it support, and if the populace refuse to obey. Dr. Headland, in "Court Life in China," says: "I doubt if any Chinese monarch has ever had a more far-reaching influence over the minds of the young men of the empire than Kuang Hsü had from 1895 to 1898." During all that time the Emperor had been studying foreign books; by some it is declared he did this in the original language, when that was

English or German, while others insist that he could do nothing with anything but Chinese translations. But be the manner what it may, it is certain that the Emperor was absorbing much knowledge of a kind which had certainly never come within the education of any of his predecessors on the throne of China; the knowledge, however, was not properly assimilated, as results show, yet it was one link in a chain of events which connected old China with the new, and the fabric was something unique. The influence which Emperor Kuang Hsü was able to exert upon the young men of his country was much affected, and undoubtedly helped greatly, by the preparation which had been going on for nearly two-score years in the schools and colleges of the various Christian missions and those under the direct supervision of the Imperial Government. "From these schools there had gone out a great number of young men who had taken positions in all departments of business, and many of the departments of State Government, and revealed to the officials, as well as to many of the people, the power of foreign education."\*

One interesting evidence of the keen attention given at that time by these young Chinese students of Western education is indicated by a statement made to Dr. Headland, upon his asking the reason for a request to himself of a list of the best newspapers and periodicals published in both England and America. "The young Chinese reformers in Peking have organized a Reform Club. Some of them read and speak English, others French, others German, and still others Russian, and we

\* Headland, op. cit.



ATHLETES OF ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI



"THE MERCHANT OF VENICE," BY CHINESE STUDENTS AT ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI



are providing ourselves with all the leading periodicals of these various countries that we may read and study them. We have rented a building, prepared rooms, and propose to have a club where we can assemble, whenever we have leisure, for conversation, discussion, reading, lectures, or whatever will best contribute to the ends in view." On asking for information as to those ends, the reply was: "The bringing about of a new reign in China. Our recent defeat by the Japanese has shown us that unless some radical changes are made we must take a second place among the people of the Orient."

This movement had been started in the outer provinces some time before it appeared as a moving force in the capital. In many of these districts it was declared that all the literati, and it must be remembered that these were the only men, until that time, who were considered fitted for official positions of any kind whatsoever, judicial, civil, military; these scholars, except a few of the oldest, those who would naturally be ultra-conservative, were discarding their Confucian theories and reconstructing their ideas to conform with the new view of living problems affecting society and government.

The leader of this reform party was Kang Yu-wei. Like most of his class of those who are determined not only that China shall not be a second-rank nation of the Far East, but that she shall take her rightful place among the great Powers of the world, Kang was a pure Chinese, a native of the southern city, Canton. He had given special attention to the subject of government and social reforms, such as those which Peter the Great had wrought in Russia, and the then recent reorganization

of Japan's social system. He had written a history of the latter series of episodes, in two volumes, which he had been permitted to present to Emperor Kuang Hsü. Kang Yu-wei was a daring character, one possessing traits which appealed strongly to the Emperor, who granted him audience; and later he had a long interview with the official heads of the Chinese Foreign Office (Department of State), when he expressed himself in such a way as must have startled those ministers almost to the verge of dissolution. He insisted that China should imitate Japan in giving up the old, obsolete, cumbersome methods of administration; that the old conservative Minister of State and Viceroys, ruling provinces and prefectures with almost regal independence, should be replaced by young men imbued with Western ideas, who should be permitted to confer daily with the Emperor just as measures of administration or reform seemed to them to justify such consultation. Of course this suggestion was disapproved by the advisers of His Majesty, yet, nevertheless, Kang was asked to embody his plan in a memorial which reached the Emperor, who eventually called him to the palace to render assistance in carrying out reforms which the Emperor had undertaken.

Unfortunately for himself, for the Emperor, for all of China, Kang Yu-wei was not the statesman that he was reformer; had there been coupled with his enthusiasm a commensurate discretion, he might, thirteen years ago, have inaugurated the reform which shall ere long bring about "the Coming China"; he might have helped to change the current of thought so as to prevent

the horrors of the "Boxer" Insurrection and accompanying murder of innocent foreigners; and he might, perhaps, have guided the young Emperor so skilfully as to prevent his deposition, his humiliation, and his death in circumstances which must always remain doubtful. But enthusiasm carried away both would-be adviser and his Imperial pupil. The times, perhaps, were not yet ripe; certainly things moved too fast. On June 23, 1898, an edict was issued abolishing the literary essay of the old regime as a part of the government examination, and substituting therefor various branches of the new learning. It has already been told what were the standards for determining excellence in these essays: pedantic erudition, pureness of literary style, penmanship, and strict conforming with rules for mechanical arrangement; and how the "passing" determined the fitness of these literati to be officers of the army, or of the navy (when there was one), or magistrates. The Emperor accompanied the edict with a notice in the "Peking Gazette" (the official journal): "We have been compelled to issue this decree, because our examinations have reached the lowest ebb, and we see no remedy for these matters except to change entirely the old methods for a new course of competition."

This was declared by the conservatives, among whom the Manchus were the most outspoken, to be an outrageous, unwarranted, impossible onslaught upon the established system which had been found perfectly satisfactory for centuries; while the reformers said it was the greatest step forward that could have been taken. We should note carefully that this edict was promulgated

by Emperor Kuang Hsü, as of his own motion, in 1898. It was recalled speedily, of course, when the old Empress Dowager deposed the Emperor and took into her own hands the reins of government; but when the time seemed right for *her* to put forth the same command, she did so in nearly the identical language that Kuang Hsü had used; to the latter, then, really belongs the credit for initiating this reform; the greatest that has, as yet, been known in the Chinese Empire.

After that, these Imperial decrees, upsetting nearly everything which had been in government, in administration, in social organization, and substituting reforms which were so radical as almost to take away the breath of the leading reformers, came thick and fast. In about two months' time, twenty-seven appeared in the "Peking Gazette," and an epitome of these is given by Dr. Headland; from his list most of the following information is taken, but to the items of which certain additions have been made to give them their justly due full force.

*First.* The establishment of an imperial university at Peking, which was to be administered without prejudice in the matter of religion; in other words, to be non-sectarian, as nearly as possible.

*Second.* The sending of imperial clansmen to foreign countries to study the forms and conditions of European and American government, with the special object of qualifying these Manchus to be helpful in perpetuating the present dynasty; this was actually done in 1906.

*Third.* The encouragement of arts, sciences, and modern agriculture, almost wholly along Western lines.

*Fourth.* The Emperor expressed himself as willing to

hear the objections of the Conservatives to progress and reform.

*Fifth.* Abolished the literary essay as a prominent part of the government examination.

*Sixth.* Censured those who attempted to delay the establishment of the Peking Imperial University, because there had been, naturally, the most intense feeling of opposition to this extreme measure, which would destroy the whole educational structure based upon precedent.

*Seventh.* Urged that the Lu-Han (that is, the Peking-Hankow-Canton) railway should be prosecuted with more vigour and expedition. It is almost needless to say that the conservatives of China were and are opposed to railway development, and for just the same reasons that appeared in Europe to oppose general education, the power which comes with knowledge was deemed a dangerous thing to put into the hands of the masses: and railways are a wonderful educator.

*Eighth.* Advised the adoption of Western arms and drill for all the Tartar troops.

*Ninth.* Ordered the establishment of agricultural schools in all the provinces, to teach the farmers improved methods of agriculture. While it has always seemed as if the Chinese were exceptionally expert in cultivating their fields, yet we know that the returns are far below what they should be for the amount of labour bestowed.

*Tenth.* Ordered the introduction of patent and copyright laws. One of the very few reform measures that do not appeal to the advanced Chinese; for native

manufacturers — in China as in Japan — are shrewd in “pirating.”

*Eleventh.* The Board of War and the Foreign Office were ordered to report on the reform of the military examination.

*Twelfth.* Special rewards were to be offered to inventors and authors.

*Thirteenth.* The officials were ordered to encourage trade and to assist merchants.

*Fourteenth.* School boards were ordered to be established in every city in the empire; as a preliminary to a system of general and compulsory education which had never before been so much as dreamt of in China.

*Fifteenth.* Bureaus of Mines and of Railways were established.

*Sixteenth.* Journalists were encouraged to write on political subjects, and a certain “freedom of the press” was to be ensured.

*Seventeenth.* Naval academies and training ships were ordered; a new, modern Chinese Navy being one of the dreams of Emperor Kuang Hsü.

*Eighteenth.* The Ministers of State (*i.e.* the Cabinet Officers) and the provincial and prefectoral authorities were called upon to assist — yes, were begged to make some effort to understand what the Emperor was trying to do — and to help him in his efforts at reform.

*Nineteenth.* Schools were ordered in connection with all the Chinese Legations in foreign countries for the benefit of the children of Chinese in those places. This, it should be understood, was mainly to give those children instruction in the Chinese language and literature, for

it is not the intention of even the most extreme reformers to wipe out these, or even to lessen materially their influence when governed by modern principles. As to the language of the country in which was a particular Legation, it was hoped that ample facilities would be afforded by the public schools of the state.

*Twentieth.* Commercial bureaus were ordered in Shanghai for the encouragement of trade.

*Twenty-first.* Six useless Boards connected with the government in Peking were abolished; this measure caused a veritable storm of opposition as destructive of established precedent.

*Twenty-second.* The right to memorialize the throne in sealed memorials was granted to all who desired to do so. This was one of the most radical of measures. The right to address the Emperor had been most jealously guarded; no one might do so direct save His Majesty's ministers, or those who were specially ordered to do so. In the latter case, the document was opened and read by the particular minister within whose jurisdiction it came, and it was probably discussed in Council. It may be taken for granted that very few of these memorials ever reached the hands of the Emperor.

*Twenty-third.* Two presidents and four vice-presidents of the Board of Rites were dismissed for disobeying the Emperor's orders that memorials should be allowed to come to him unopened; and promptly reinstalled when the Empress Dowager took charge of affairs.

*Twenty-fourth.* The governorships of Hupeh, Kuang-tung, and Yunnan were abolished as being a useless expense to the country; the administration of affairs

in these important provinces being amply provided for through viceroys.

*Twenty-fifth.* Schools of instruction in the production of tea and silk were ordered established.

*Twenty-sixth.* The slow "courier" posts were abolished in favour of the Imperial Customs Post; this being merely a preliminary to what is now nearly an accomplished Imperial Post Office service.

*Twenty-seventh.* A system of budgets as in Western countries was approved; this centralizing of national income and expenditure was a measure of far greater importance in China than in other countries; for financial matters were largely entrusted to local viceroys or governors, appointed by the proper Board at Peking, and this interference with their prerogative was hotly resented.

This list is particularly interesting because it gives a clue to the character of what the Emperor had been studying, and indicates its influence upon his mind. That he was in too great haste to accomplish all this, was partly his own fault and partly that of his overzealous, too enthusiastic young advisers. Yet still it must be admitted by every careful student of the full text of the edicts themselves, and also it must be clear to those who read this synopsis only, that there is not one that would not have been of the greatest possible benefit to the country if it had been put into operation. "If the Emperor had been allowed to proceed making them all as effective as he did the Imperial University, and if the minister and provincial authorities had responded to his call, and had made 'some effort to under-

stand what he was trying to do,' China might by this time have been close upon the heels of Japan in the adoption of Western ideas." (Headland)

Between the date when the last of these admirable edicts was issued and the time when fierce opposition thereto asserted itself, and the taking back by the Empress Dowager into her own hands absolutely and openly the whole administration of the government, there are many interesting, exciting, and history-making incidents which must be passed over. Her Majesty, the Empress Dowager, had been spending the hot summer time at the summer palace, quietly watching affairs. When the time came for her to act, and she evinced no precipitancy, she did so without much bluster, without any apparent confusion, but with an effectiveness which was most startling. In September of the same year in which Kuang Hsü began what he sincerely believed was to be his great reform, the Empress Dowager took control of the affairs of state and put her nephew into prison, and he was never again to occupy the throne. His winter palace was his prison, and here, for many months, he was confined in a gilded cage of a house, until his health gave way, he sickened, and died; at least that is the story we were told.

The imprisoned Emperor read the "Peking Gazette," which, with a refinement of cruelty, was given him day by day that he might see how his proposed reforms were one by one swept out of existence by the command of his august aunt. No, they were not swept out of existence; they were merely laid aside, sometimes the rescinding edicts being signed with his own name; and in

due time they were revivified and made to appear as the gracious act of the Empress Dowager herself. That something had impressed Her Majesty with the necessity for doing something for China is now quite certain; the policy of seclusion had come to an end; there must be a recognition of the rest of the world, an assumption of responsibility towards other states.

When Emperor Kuang Hsü was brought — under guard of the Empress' trusted eunuchs — from his prison on the Chinese New Year's day of 1899, to receive the salutations and compliments of the foreign ministers accredited to his court, about all that remained of his reform were the Peking University and some provincial and other schools. It was not long after this New Year's audience that the Empress Dowager, who had never been seen by a foreigner and who, probably, had not herself looked upon one, decided to receive the wives of the foreign ministers. It was a successful experiment, let the motive for it be what it may; the foreign ladies were charmed with her manner, touched by the appearance of solicitude for their welfare that Her Majesty showed when she touched her own lips to each cup of tea presented to her guests (to show that it was not poisoned), and entertained in a way far exceeding their anticipations. She now assumed the role of reformer and friend of the foreigner, and so well did she play her part (if she really was deceiving everybody) that most of the foreign observers were led to credit her alone with the initiative in everything savouring of reform. Our own minister at the time, Colonel Denby, said: "It will not be denied by any one that the improvement and



MEMORIAL ARCH IN THE GROUNDS OF ONE OF THE LARGE  
MERCHANTS' GUILDS



MEMORIAL TO BARON VON KETTLER, PEKING



progress are mainly due to the will and power of the Empress Regent. To her own people, up to this period in her career, she was kind and merciful, and to foreigners she was just."

Then came a remarkable relapse, when the Empress Dowager turned against the foreigners, incited to do so by what causes we cannot know well, although we are justified in assuming that she listened to evil advisers, and misunderstood entirely the motives which influenced those who were really working for China's good. That she was indirectly, if not directly, responsible for the Boxer outrage, cannot be doubted; and the farce of the Chinese Government officials sending presents of fruit and food to the little band of foreigners penned up in the British Legation Compound, while the Boxers were acting like wild beasts outside the walls, with the solicitous inquiry, could they do nothing to alleviate the suffering of their unfortunate friends? now causes a smile; but at the time added much to the indignation of the victims. But from the time when the Empress returned with the Court from their flight in 1900, until her death, she became a great reformer; it cannot be strictly correct to call her "the greatest that ever sat upon the dragon throne," because, as a matter of fact, she was all the time merely carrying out plans which had been formulated by others, mainly her nephew, Emperor Kuang Hsü, and his advisers, upon some of whom she had wreaked her vengeance most brutally.

We must, however, briefly state the process and some of the details of the reforms which the Empress Dowager set on foot immediately upon her return to Peking in

1902, before we proceed to venture on a surmise as to what there may soon be as the possibilities for a transformed China. She began at home, with the customs of the Court, when she received the ladies of the diplomatic circle, and her remarkable personality asserted itself here, for most of those ladies went to the palace filled with indignation at their hostess for her inability (or was it unwillingness?) to protect themselves and their families during the Summer of 1900; but they came away in a very different frame of mind, entirely placated and ready to believe that Her Majesty was really in earnest in her effort to wipe out the past and "for all of us to be of one family."

Her next great move is said to have been suggested to her in a dream, that most potent method in China of teaching mortals what the gods wish and upon which they will bestow their favour. This dream was to change China from a despotic, irresponsible monarchy into a constitutional one; to grant to the people all the blessings which come with a constitution, as well as to teach them to bear the burdens of responsibility which this blessing carries with it. It must be remembered that this truly great woman, although she had been the concubine and afterwards the "first" wife of a Manchu emperor, and was herself of the Mongolian race, "was born in a small house, in a narrow street inside of the east gate of the Tartar city — the gate that was blown up by the Japanese when they entered Peking in 1900 — and her father's name was Chao, he was a petty military official who was afterwards beheaded for some neglect of duty." Therefore she was in no way of the blood royal, and her

place in the palace was secured through following the custom of registering *all* Manchu girls in order that, when it was so desired, the most attractive might be drafted into the palace. A certain complication, therefore, arose in this constitution-giving scheme. The gift would, of necessity, come from the Manchus, because they were in control of the government; while the Empress Dowager wished to have the honour of conferring the gift reflect upon herself alone. The conservatives, with whom she had associated herself when she dethroned Emperor Kuang Hsü, were furious and stood ready to do everything in their power to prevent this wild move; but the Empress called to her aid the greatest and most progressive of the Manchus, viceroy of Shensi, and appointed him head of a commission to be sent abroad to examine carefully the various forms of constitutional government. It will be recalled how some of the rabid conservatives tried to blow up this commission as it was entraining at Peking Palace Station, and how the attempt failed. The commission returned, made its report, and definite action on the matters was deferred "for several years."

Then came the Empress Dowager's crusade against opium, and this indicates no half-hearted measures. Her edict that "within a limit of ten years this injurious filth shall be completely swept away" has a true ring; and the action of provincial officials bears testimony to the conviction that the Chinese officials and people realize that this curse must be done away with if there is to be real progress of any kind. Next to China, Great Britain is the party most affected by this movement towards reform. When this edict was issued, Great

Britain was shipping annually fifty thousand chests of opium to the Chinese market, nearly five-sixths of the whole Indian output; but the British Government at once agreed that if China was sincere in her desire for reform, and cut off her own domestic productions at the rate of ten per cent per annum, she would decrease her trade at a similar rate. China has shown her sincerity. Has Great Britain?

These are the most important measures originated by the Empress Dowager, and in addition to these she has gone about carrying forward Emperor Kuang Hsü's efforts in her own way. A Railway Board, a Board of Mines, and other governmental establishments have been organized along the lines he sketched out; while educational institutions planned on those of the West were ordered. Her nephew's act of abolishing the old system of examinations, condemned so furiously for a while, was restored, but his glory was somewhat diminished by tacking onto it a new scheme whereby all those who have been graduated by reputable American or European colleges may obtain Chinese degrees and be entitled to hold office under the government, by passing satisfactory examinations, mainly as a matter of form, the diploma or diplomas they hold having the greatest possible bearing.

This, then, is the story of reform in China that really began less than ten years ago, and the continuation to that date should convince every one of the sincerity of that desire for change which shall make for good. For the material, industrial, and commercial progress has been simply astonishing. We may almost say that this

renaissance began at its earliest in 1894, after the defeat in war which China suffered at Japan's hands. Nearly all the world then thought that mighty China, with its unlimited resources in wealth, material, and men, would simply overwhelm little Japan; but not all people were so confident of this as scarcely to have a doubt as to the issue. China was in no condition to fight. She had refused to take lessons from those who were competent to teach her. Even the lesson of the Taiping Rebellion, which could not be put down until "Chinese" Gordon, an Englishman, came to her rescue, taught her "ever-victorious army" how to fight, and then personally led it to conquest, had been forgotten or ignored by the mandarin army officers. What might have been a very decent fleet of war-vessels, had they not been shamelessly neglected and badly equipped as to guns, and worse supplied with ammunition, was not properly officered by men who depended largely for their knowledge of naval tactics upon their attainments in the Confucian Classics. But the lesson of that defeat was taken to heart by some, for after that a small body of earnest Chinese, some of whom had been educated abroad, and others, open-minded younger men who had already begun to get away from the deadening influences of the old regime, were untiring in their efforts for the New China. In the reaction of September, 1898, which followed the young Emperor's premature reform decrees, six of these young men died as martyrs to the new cause, beheaded by command of the Empress Dowager, yet — like other martyrs in other lands — protesting to the last that by reason of their death the cause which they represented

was all the more certain of ultimate success, and that, although they might be slaughtered, multitudes of others would come to take their place. Again, after the apparent overthrow of Russia's land and naval forces in 1904-1905 by Japan, there was even greater impetus given to the forward movement in Chinese military matters. In the autumn of 1905 a great review of troops, drilled, armed, and commissioned in Western style, was held in the province of Chihli. This was the army of Viceroy Yuan Shih-kai, and it was considered worthy to be inspected and the manœuvres watched interestedly by foreign military attaches of the legations in Peking, by others from Tokyo and elsewhere, and by newspaper correspondents from all parts of the world. The testimony which all these foreigners bore to general effectiveness speaks well for the revolutionary change that has taken place in China's military departments. A year after that, similar manœuvres took place in the northern part of Honan province, just to the south of Chihli, in which Peking is, and the effect upon foreign observers was equally good. It is proposed to have such exhibitions annually, and to recruit a national army of half a million men. The progress which all this indicates is not so satisfactory to some of the sincere peace-lovers, yet it is one of the unmistakable signs of transformation.

Railways, as an indication of material progress, appeal more forcibly to all than does military display; and when we think of what a map of China to-day would show of lines stretching up and down the eastern and northern parts of the empire, as contrasted with another drawn twenty years ago, the advance is remarkable. Statistics

are not readily accessible to bring up a table of the Chinese railways to date; but a little may be said that is interesting:

The first railway built on Chinese soil was the short line, only eleven miles in length, to connect Shanghai, which is on the west bank of a small river, the Woosung, with the small port, Woosung Anchorage, on the Yangtze River. The trial trip was made on March 16, 1876; but the railway was strenuously opposed by the natives because of its pernicious influence upon Fung-Shui, literally "wind and water," the geomancy which determines everything that the old, true Chinese did, especially the proper location of graves, a number of which were disturbed by the new "fire-wagon road" of the then hated foreigners. The opposition was overcome, in a measure, and the line publicly opened on June 30, 1876. It was bought up by Chinese for the express purpose of putting a stop to its malign influences, on October 31, 1877; but resumed operations in December of that same year. In the following year the whole plant was removed to Formosa; but before long a new line was built over the same ground, and speedily became popular with the Chinese, who are now about the only passengers it carries. These details are given to make the contrast with what took place in the near future, and is of every-day occurrence now, all the more conspicuous. When the first short-line railway was constructed as an outlet for the K'ai-p'ing coal mines, it passed through a large native cemetery; the graves were removed to make way for it, just as they would have been in Europe or America, and nothing was said in opposition about

Fung-Shui. Geomantic superstitions, so far as concerns railways, are now quite inert. The next line was built to connect the city of Tientsin with the port of Taku, at the mouth of the Peiho River. A trunk line from Peking to Hankow was projected in 1889, but progress was postponed because of opposition in December of that year. For some time thereafter railway construction in China languished; but when once more it was resumed it went forward rapidly, and there are now over three thousand miles of railway in operation. These figures include some lines that are not under Chinese control, as the German line from Ts'ing Tao (Kiaochao) to Chi-nan fu, in Shantung province; the Manchurian line from Dalny (Port Arthur) to Harbin; the French lines in Yunnan province, only partly in Chinese territory.

Since the Chinese have asserted themselves very emphatically as to the right of construction, maintenance, etc., there has arisen a somewhat serious difficulty about raising the necessary capital to complete existing lines and to begin the many others which have been contemplated. It is almost impossible to get native engineers who are competent to lay out and build railways, although foreigners agree in saying that some of the work done by such men is entirely satisfactory. The lack of confidence on the part of American and European capitalists in the ability of the Chinese to operate their lines economically and honestly, is another bar to development. But the development must come, and it is the intention of the people to buy all rights now held by foreigners; the fact that native capital has been forthcoming when confidence was assured, justifies the

expectation that railway development in China will progress rapidly.

In the matter of a general postal system, although this is something which, in China, is not much more than ten years old, yet the development has been remarkable. There are now upwards of four thousand "Post and Telegraph Offices" fully equipped in the matter of registration, money-order business, and all else, and it is estimated that the expansion is progressing at the rate of almost one a day.

The industrial development is another feature of modern China which has important bearings. Many different arts and crafts are now taught which were unknown only a few years ago, and the wages given to operators have a marked effect in diminishing the number of beggars. Enterprises which enable the hitherto helpless, the lame, the blind, the deaf, to support themselves, have appeared in various provinces, especially in the lower end of the great Yang-tze Valley. These are a veritable revelation to the ordinary Chinese, who had before looked upon these unfortunates as beyond hope. As for instruction given to prisoners in common jails, this is a reform that is now so well-rooted as to be permanent, and the fact marks a progress which is astonishing to the Chinese themselves and most gratifying to their foreign friends.

The most important advance of all, the *one* thing which marks a new China, education in ways that conform admirably to the highest standards of Europe and America, that is a subject of such great importance that it must be discussed in a chapter by itself.

But from all that has been said, it must be manifest, even to the most casual reader, that the possibilities in a China imbued with Western ideas of progress and internal improvement are enormous. Such a vast empire, with a population so great and composed of such varieties of peoples differing in tastes and needs according to locality and inherited taste; a country so rich in raw material, and so abundantly supplied with intelligent labour, must ere long take a prominent place in the world. Are we of the West justified in looking with apprehension upon this possible advance? Not so. The development, if intelligently made along our own methods, must of necessity conform to our standards. If China is to be like America in certain ways, how can she avoid approximating us in all? If there are to be railways, inland navigation, post-offices, factories, and all the concomitants of advanced life, the blessings must be paid for; the standards of living must be raised, so that the dreaded competition either disappears entirely or fades away into a dim future, when China has raised herself at home quite up to our standard. To oppose China's progress because of apprehended danger to our industries and our own people who depend upon them for living and luxuries, seems to be needless borrowing of trouble.

## CHAPTER V

### *CHINA'S ATTITUDE IN THE PAST TOWARDS THE "FOREIGN DEVILS"*

PRECISELY when the eighteen provinces of true China coalesced into a unit of government is not of special importance here. During the reign of the Chou Dynasty, 1122 to 255 B.C., there was a tributary state, Ts'in, on the northwest frontier of what was at that time recognized as the Imperial possessions of the Middle Kingdom. A chief of that state, Chao Hsiang Wang, overstepped the prerogatives of a subordinate and deposed the last Emperor of the Chou Dynasty, Tung Chou Chiin. For himself Chao Hsiang Wang did not assume the title of Emperor, although he is given in all Chinese records as the first one of the Ch'in, or Ts'in Dynasty. It was his son, Hsiao Wên Wang (Prince Chêng) — now given as the second ruler in the dynasty, of whom we have already written at some length — who took to himself the arrogant title of Chi Hwangti (*The First Emperor*) and set himself to the task of consolidating the whole empire. This he divided into thirty-six provinces, over which he placed governors, and himself made "progresses" through the whole country to see that no injustice was done. These tours were made with the greatest possible display; the Emperor was attended by Court officials of the highest rank and pro-

tected by a large body of troops. He was very astute in calling officials and soldiers from all parts of his realm, because in doing this he made the people of the different provinces known to each other; and this acquaintance contributed much to strengthen his own hand.

The Huns, along the northern border of the then China, were exceedingly troublesome, but Chuang succeeded in stopping their raids and drove these "Outer Barbarians," or "Foreign Devils," into the wilds of Mongolia. It was he who conceived the idea of extending the numerous short sections of wall that had been built by some of the northern feudal states as barriers against the unwelcomed intruders, and under him was begun "The Great Wall of China," *Wan-li-Chang Ching* (*i.e.* "Myriad-mile Wall"), which was not completed until the year 204 B.C., or seven years after Chuang's death. It extends from the sea at Shanhaikwan, on the Gulf of Pechele, to Kiayü Pass (near the city, Suh-chau, in Kansuh province), a distance of  $22\frac{1}{2}$  degree of latitude, or 1255 miles in a straight line, but fully 1500 miles with all the doublings and twisting. "It would stretch from Philadelphia to Topeka, or from Portugal to Naples, in nearly the same latitude."\* Some idea of the feelings of the Chinese at that time towards "Foreign Devils" may be gathered from this stupendous undertaking to keep them out twenty-two centuries ago. Well known to everybody as one of the wonders of the world, this wall is likely to disappear before the encroachments of modern civilization and because it can no longer serve its purpose. Hence, if

\* "The Middle Kingdom."

it is desired to see this remarkable evidence of ability of a particular kind in people who lived so long ago, it is well to do so before it is levelled to make use of the material, to give place for that which is useful, to make way for progress.

The thirty-six provinces of Emperor Hsiao Wêng Wang were reduced in number, but not in area, to eighteen, which included, with some insignificant additions, the country so easily conquered by the Manchus in 1664. The ruling dynasty had much extended the limits of the empire until it greatly exceeded the territory ruled by the Mings, the last true Chinese dynasty, and approximated in area even to the vast dominions ruled by the Mongol, Kublai Khan, in 1290 A.D. Williams ("The Middle Kingdom") says that in 1840 the borders of the "Chinese Empire were well defined, reaching from the island of Saghalien on the northeast to Hainan Island on the south, and westward to Belur-tag, enclosing, it was estimated, 5,300,000 square miles." This estimate, of course, includes Korea and the whole of Manchuria as far as the Amur River and the Usuri River; and the Mongolian territory as well as Ili (composing Sungaria, and Eastern Turkestan), Kokonor, and Tibet. Since that time, however, a steady process of disintegration has been going on — Great Britain has appropriated Hongkong and its dependencies as well as Weihaiwei; Russia took huge slices off the northern frontier; Japan has acquired the Loochoo Islands, Formosa, the Pesca-dores, Korea, Liaotung, and assumes possessory rights in Southern Manchuria, which Russia caps by exerting influence in the northern part of that territory; Ger-

many has taken Tsintau, (Kiaochou), and that really means a good deal more; France has encroached in the south; Portugal has a little; until to-day the five million square miles must be largely reduced. It is scarcely to be wondered at that the Chinese look upon all these people of Europe and upon their one-time pupils, the Japanese, as being barbarous in their actions and uncivilized in their demands.

Just who the Chinese are and where they came from is one of the interesting problems that will always entertain ethnologists. That the people whom we know as Chinese—*Li Min*, “Black-haired Race,” is a common appellation for themselves—are not in any sense aborigines, or autochthonous, is evident from the fact that there are so many tribes in the mountainous regions of the southwest, Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kweichao provinces, who are called *Miaotsz*, “children of the soil.” They are certainly not of the same race as the Chinese, and some of them have maintained their independence remarkably, those who have actually submitted to Chinese rule are called *Shuh Miaotsz*, “subdued”; those who declare they have not submitted, are styled *Sang Miaotsz*, “wild.” These southwestern non-Chinese tribes (for we hesitate to use the term “aboriginal” even for them) show a strong affinity with the hill tribes of upper Burma. In other places, here and there over the empire, are other small groups of people who display characteristics differentiating them from the Chinese, and probably these, too, were in possession before the Chinese came. The Mongols and Manchus are not far removed from the Chinese in ethnic affinity;

OLD WOMAN ON A FARM NEAR THE  
NATIVE CITY WALL.



WIDOW'S MEMORIAL ARCH, NEAR SHANGHAI





their habits of life have developed characteristics somewhat different, although it is probably correct to say that the Chinese lost their nomadic tendencies long before the Manchus did, and that these latter gave up their wanderings before the Mongols. But in some physical characteristics there are differences in all three, Chinese, Manchu, Mongol.

These Chinese came from the west of Asia, along the valley of the Yellow River, and the territory they occupied was but a fraction of what is now China proper; their coming was resented, of course, for there is no possible reason to suppose that history in Central Asia, eight thousand or even ten thousand years ago, did not pursue the same course that it has always followed; but the intruders drove back those whom they encountered and, with the exceptions which have been noted, assimilated them. One marked trait of this Chinese people is to be noted here, that of assimilation. When they conquered they absorbed those whom they subdued; but when they were in their turn conquered; as by the Mongols and afterwards by the Manchus, it was the conquerors who, socially, were conquered; for both the Mongols and Manchus adopted the civilization of the Chinese, save in unimportant details. After that first occupation of territory in the northwest, the expansion was as normal as that of the English in America; when the native's maps of the Chinese Empire at the different stages of its slow growth are examined, its historic evolution during the last three thousand years becomes, by a similar representation, as clear as that of the United States since the adoption of the Constitu-

tution. The boundaries of the empire were pushed onward and outward until at certain periods it has been coextensive with the greater part of the continent of Asia, stretching from India and Persia, on the south and west, northward to the Siberian frontier, and eastward to the sea, and including many islands as integral parts or controlling others and exacting tribute. Ch'ien Lung died in 1799; he had abdicated three years before because of superstitious respect for the memory of his grandfather K'ang Hsi, who had reigned for sixty years (from 1661-1662 to 1722-1723), and the grandson thought it would be disrespectful to hold the throne longer than his revered ancestor. At that time "from the steppes of Mongolia on the north to Cochin China on the south, from Formosa on the east to Nepaul on the west, the Chinese armies had everywhere been victorious. It was not a happy omen that this military glory coincided with the period during which the presence of the untamable European in China began to be most irksome."\*

The earliest rulers were undoubtedly patriarchs, who developed into military chiefs of no mean prowess because of their struggle with their neighbours. Success in these conflicts naturally brought with it a feeling of superiority over their neighbours, and we begin to see how there followed a feeling very much like contempt for the absolute inferiority by which they were surrounded. Then, too, the early attainments in writing must have added to the sense of superiority, for history shows us that the Chinese had felt themselves to be surrounded by that conspicuous inferiority.

\* Smith, op. cit.

They thus had been flattered in the most dangerous way, because it was entirely plausible, and from the very first they used the ideograph, which means "barbarian," when writing of all the people who surrounded them; even the inhabitants of India, Persia, and other states (whom we should hesitate to call "barbarians") were thus stigmatized, and we may properly assume that those people were spoken of in the same contemptuous way.

It is quite true that the Chinese in times past evinced considerable ability as warriors; this must be true or else they could not have done what they did. But it was not long until the necessity for providing the means of living transformed the greater part of them into peaceful agriculturists, and, along the coast, into hardy fishermen who were brave enough in facing the dangers of the sea, yet loath to turn towards feats of war. Now it must be remembered that the incursion of the Mongols was by no means unresisted by the Chinese. The place in which these Mongols had their beginning is the narrow strip of country lying between the Onon and Kerulen Rivers, tributaries or upper courses of the Amur. Immediately upon leaving their own home, in the ninth century, these people attracted attention by their courage and strength, gaining then, or perhaps in some of their earlier raids against their neighbours, the title of *Mongol*, or "the brave." They had been included in the list of "barbarians" by the Chinese, and for a long time were among the tribute-paying clans beyond the northern confines of the empire. It is possible that, at some remote time, the Mongols were merely a

section of the Hiongnou, or Huns, and Genghis Khan claimed descent from that celebrated people. It is not at all impossible, therefore, that Attila and Genghis, the two great conquerors specially known as the "Scourges of God," came of the same stock, and represented one of those races which had been cast out by the civilization and millions of China. This is the opinion of French writers with whom Boulger, from whose "History of China" the data for this paragraph has been taken, is inclined to agree. The Mongol legend was that this Royal house came through Tibet from Hindustan.\* "The Mongols owed their military success to their admirable discipline, and to their close study of the art of war. Their military supremacy arose from their superiority in all essentials as a fighting power to their neighbours. Much of their knowledge was borrowed from China, where the art of disciplining a large army and manoeuvring it in the field had been brought to a high state of perfection many centuries before the time of Genghis. But the Mongols carried the teaching of the past to a further point than any of the former or contemporary Chinese commanders, indeed than any in the whole world would have done; and the revolution which they effected in tactics was not less remarkable, and did not leave a smaller impression upon the age, than the improvement made in military science by Frederick the Great and Napoleon did in their day. The Mongols played in a large way in Asia the part which the Normans on a smaller scale played in Europe. Although the land-

\* Howorth's "History of the Mongols."

marks of their triumph have now almost wholly vanished, they were for two centuries the dominant caste in most of the states of Asia." (Boulger.)

Had not the attractions of the palace in its worst phases of sensuousness, gluttony, and debauchery proved stronger for the Mongol emperors than did their appreciation of their Imperial responsibilities, it is not improbable that their reign over the Chinese Empire might have continued; for with all their overweening fondness for overeating and furious drinking, they preserved, almost to the last, their ability as leaders of men and military commanders. The prowess of the Chinese reasserted itself after eighty-nine years of this Mongol rule, when, disgusted with the conduct of those "barbarians," their outrageous dividing of the possessions of the Chinese among themselves and their clan adherents, with their flooding of the country with paper money, which at last became worthless, they gathered around the standard of one Chu Yuen-chang, a plebeian by birth and at one time a common priest, and expelled the Mongols. The Ming, the last one — as yet — of the native dynasties, had but a short rule, and was easily displaced by the Manchus, they who established the present *Tsing*, or "Pure Dynasty." This account is interesting as showing that even towards their conquerors, notwithstanding that those conquerors ruled them, the Chinese have held themselves to be superior.

Leading Chinese, as well as Japanese, have scouted the idea of the "Yellow Peril," and the latter smile superciliously at the suggestion that China can ever be a


nation great in war. While it is true that her present military power may be safely ignored, it is not so much because of inability to fight, if need be, as it is because of a reassuring ambition on the part of her wisest leaders to be great in peaceful ways. Those who profess to see in the Chinese warlike possibilities, which must not be overlooked, contend that China's suzerainty over such warlike people as the Tibetans and the fierce Ghoorkhas came by right of conquest, and claim that her empire extends as far as Turkestan by the same right. If the opposing contention is correct, that it was not the Chinese themselves who effected these conquests, but the Manchus, who, until they were in a measure absorbed by the Chinese, spoke a different language and wrote a different character, the fact still remains that the Chinese assumed an attitude of superiority over these people who were classed as "outer barbarians." It was in 1792 only that the Chinese, under one of their own generals, defeated the Ghoorkhas, and it must be admitted that in Gordon's "Ever-victorious Army" and among the "Boxers" of 1900 there were a goodly number of true Chinese. Whether there is to be or is not to be a Chinese army organized, armed, and drilled in the best way that America or Europe can teach, it is surely one which, because of the instincts of the people, will make for the peace of the Far East, assuming that the argument of the militarists, "the best way of maintaining peace is always to be prepared for war," is to be tolerated.

Thus, then, we see that from a time in the past so remote that we cannot establish it definitely, because

TEACHERS OF ENGLISH AT ST. JOHN'S  
UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI



CHINESE OFFICERS WITH FOREIGN MAJOR OF  
BATTALION AT ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI





it coincides with the very beginning of the Chinese nation, the people of that land were so convinced of their superiority as to look upon *all* who were not of themselves as "outer barbarians." When the Europeans appeared among them in the sixteenth century, we have already learned enough of their deportment to make us lenient when passing judgment on the Chinese for giving emphasis to that title by calling the strangers "Foreign Devils"; and such we were, in their estimation, until they were first compelled by force to alter their contemptuous designation, and afterwards convinced by our consideration for them that we were not to be considered so totally different from themselves as to justify that contempt. But it might as well be admitted that in the interior of China, where there are yet many places and probably millions of people who know nothing of the Western people through personal intercourse, we are still "Foreign Devils" to the natives; and, too, at the open ports when, too often, the examples of "Western civilization" are the kind that we ourselves condemn, this is the term by which we are designated. It was quite within the memory of living men that the degrading term of "tribute bearers" was used in the official despatches and memorials purposed to impart to "The Son of Heaven" information concerning the movements of the Europeans; and it was only in 1858 that the obloquious "I" (barbarian) was discontinued in all official documents.

We have already considered something of the reason which led the Chinese to realize that these people from Europe were not precisely the same as the inferior tribes

by whom they had hitherto been surrounded, and with whom they had, always with more or less reluctance, been compelled to have intercourse; we must now give this subject some further consideration, and somewhat in detail, in order that we may clearly understand the troubled course along which events flowed until the peaceful and satisfactory conditions of the present time were accomplished. But first, let us go back to a remote past and take note of the fact that official history in China is accomplished and written in a somewhat peculiar way; it is, primarily, the record of the Court and has to deal almost solely with the doings of the Emperor. It was not considered proper, indeed, by some it is declared to have been forbidden, for the Court historiographers to divulge anything that they had just put into the official annals; when a dynasty passed, and a new line of rulers took possession of the throne, then the record of the last dynasty was published. It is claimed that this plan was adopted to protect the historiographer from punishment, if the monarch, or any of his favourites, or the important statesmen were offended at the criticism upon their acts recorded by the official scribes. This was undoubtedly a wise plan, and because it was pursued fearlessly, we have records of ancient China which have commanded the respect of the very best Sinologues. If there is just ground for complaint that this ancient native history of China is wofully deficient in matters that are far more interesting to us now than the daily, almost hourly, record of the acts and words of a monarch, for we should prefer to be told what the people did, we must remember that

somewhat the same objection may be raised to history in Europe of not many centuries ago. Still, when, in times two thousand years past, there came from the West caravans of merchants from Persia, let us say, there was not infrequently sufficient importance attached to the event to entitle it to be brought to the sovereign's notice and to make record of what His Majesty said about it. In these earliest records, when we do find anything said of the coming of such strangers, they are usually called "tribute bearers," not always or often "barbarians."

We would note here a mild protest against the too commonly accepted idea that our knowledge of China practically begins with Marco Polo's account (as recorded by outside observers and not drawn from native records) of his visit to the Court of Kublai Khan in the thirteenth century. There are other accounts of visits to that country which are older; and of one of them, that by the priest Rubruquis telling of his journey in the same thirteenth century, but a little earlier than Polo, Colonel Yule, admitted to be our greatest authority, says: "It has never had justice done it for it has few superiors in the whole library of travel." Now, Marco Polo does not write in such a way as to impress us with the fact that the Chinese Court officials and people assumed such an offensive superiority over all strangers as to lump them into one group of outlandish barbarians. It is true that the Chinese Empire was then under the dominion of the Mongols, but their sway was so complete that the Emperor could appoint this Italian stranger a prefect, or governor of an important

city, and he was, seemingly, respected and obeyed as such.

The whole record of the intercourse between Chinese and foreigners during the thirty years from 1834 to 1861, when we may say that China had at last learnt her lesson and gave up the struggle in opposition to the unwelcomed intruders, is not at all flattering to the "civilized" Europeans in contrast with the "heathen" Chinese. We have already given sufficient attention to the behaviour of the Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch, and will merely add here that the reputation these had established must have operated greatly to the prejudice of the later comers, the British, and still later the French, when the latter sought intercourse for other purposes than Christian propaganda. It was solely with a view of teaching the Christian religion that the French entered China in 1288; and they are credited with being the first of the modern Europeans to have arrived. They did not remain long as missionaries, but the influence they exerted was, on the whole, for good, although in material rather than spiritual ways.

Before the intercourse between foreigners and Chinese assumed something of permanency and had attained to considerable proportions in the matter of trade, there were numerous petty quarrels due to the ignorance of each party of the language and customs of the other; besides there were many squabbles brought about by the turbulent conduct of sailors. "The French and English seamen at Whampoa, in 1754, carried their national hatred to such a degree that they could not pursue their trade without quarrelling; and a Frenchman

having killed an English sailor, the Chinese stopped the trade of the former nation until the person was given up, though he was subsequently liberated. The Chinese allotted two different islands in the river at Whampoa for the recreation of the seamen of each nation, in order that such troubles might be avoided in future. A similar case occurred at Canton in 1780, when a Frenchman killed a Portuguese sailor at night in one of the merchants' houses and fled to the consul's for refuge." (There were, it must be noted, at that time no such thing as properly appointed foreign consuls who received *exequatur* from the Chinese Government authorizing them to discharge their official duties; so that it was manifestly impossible for a French consul to grant extra-territorial protection to this criminal.) "The Chinese demanded the criminal, and after some days he was given up to them and publicly strangled; this punishment he no doubt merited, although it was the first case in which they had interfered where the matter was altogether among foreigners. In 1784 a native was killed by a ball left in a gun when firing a salute, and the Chinese, on the principle of requiring life for life, demanded the man who had fired the gun. Knowing that the English were not likely to give him up, the police seized Mr. Smith, the supercargo of the vessel, and carried him a prisoner into the city (Canton). On the seizure of this gentleman the ship's boats were ordered up from Whampoa with armed crews to defend the factories. A messenger from the Chinese, however, declared that their purpose in seizing Smith was simply to examine him on the affair, to which statement

the captive himself added a request that the gunner should be sent up to the authorities and submit to their questions. Trusting too much to their promises, the man was allowed to go alone before the officials within the city wall, when Mr. Smith was immediately liberated and the unhappy gunner strangled after some six weeks' confinement, by direct orders of the Emperor. The man, probably, underwent no form of trial intelligible to himself, and his condemnation was the more unjust, as by Section CCXCII of the Chinese code he was allowed to ransom himself by a fine of twenty dollars. As a counterpart of this tragedy, the Chinese stated (and there was reason for believing them) that a native who had accidentally killed a British seaman about the same time was executed for the casualty.”\*

Many other cases similar to this occurred from time to time, and always they involved a conflict of authority between the native officials and the foreigners; the latter usually carrying their point of high-handed disregard of local law and custom, although, as has already been stated, the Europeans were within Chinese jurisdictions by their own motion. They had not come at the invitation of the Chinese, who gave no guarantee of protection in any way, and certainly had not waived any rights. The foreigners voluntarily accepted the risk which their presence in Chinese territory involved, being willing to do this because of the profits which the trade brought to themselves; they were absolutely and unquestionably amenable to Chinese law, and had the situation been transferred to European soil, with national-

\* Williams, *op. cit.*



CHINESE PRISONER: PUNISHMENT WITH  
THE CANGUE



WOMEN PUNISHED BY BEING PUT IN THE STOCKS



ity of the parties criminal and judicial reversed, there is no question as to the assertion of rights of jurisdiction, no matter what penalty followed. There has never been justice done to the Chinese in this matter of jurisdiction. Granted that the foreigners in those early days at Canton constituted a community unto themselves, subject wholly to what they chose to consider their duty as between themselves and as towards the Chinese, yet it is incontestable that they were intruders in a country which had an organized government and a civilization which was entitled to respectful consideration. It has always seemed to many students that the charge of being overbearing, cruel, and uncivilized lies rather at the door of the Europeans than with the Chinese.

In 1834 there came a clash between the armed forces of the two countries, Great Britain and China. The select Committee of the East India Company respected its notice, given in 1831, that its ships would no longer go to China, but that a King's Officer would be sent out as chief to manage the affairs of British trade. The Chinese authorities naturally associated this officer with the traders they already knew and expected him to deport himself accordingly. The very different views of the British Government of course led to further misunderstanding. The British authority was supported by the presence of men-of-war, and two of these, in that same year, had a fight with several native craft and several Chinese were killed. In November the disastrous dispute about the opium trade began, and in January of the next year the *Argyle* was seized and her crew imprisoned. Then, in February, the first lot

of confiscated opium was burnt at Canton. Lin Tseh-sü had been made Governor-General of the two Kwang provinces by Imperial appointment made at a special audience in 1838, and given commission to put down the opium trade. Of this man's character no writer of recognized authority has aught to say but good; while the fact that he was exceptionally open-minded and progressive for his time would seem to be indicated by his having prepared, in 1841, a partial translation of Murray's "Cyclopædia of Geography," in twenty volumes. He arrived at Canton in 1839 and at once ordered the opium to be seized. To enforce his act, he forbade the British and other foreign merchants leaving Canton; the factories were surrounded and several outrages committed. Captain Elliott, the chief British trade commissioner, requested the British subjects to surrender all their opium and promised that full value should be paid for it. Half of the holdings was given up as contraband to the Chinese, and the remainder (20,283 chests — from 116 lbs. per chest to 140 lbs. per chest according to brand, and worth then over \$400 per chest). In May, Elliott and the British merchants were permitted to leave Canton and very soon afterward the opium was destroyed. As a punitive measure, in part, but also that there might be some sort of residential place not quite so completely under the control of Chinese inimical authorities as was Canton, Hongkong was seized in August, 1839. At that same time the British gunboat *Black Jack* was attacked and the crew murdered. Then the British merchants who had been living at Macao, with others

who had gone there from Canton, withdrew to Hong-kong. The Chinese became extremely bold and offensive towards the end of 1839, and near the end of that year, twenty-eight armed junks made a combined attack upon the British warships, *Volage* and *Hyacinth*; it was entirely unsuccessful and several of the junks were blown up. In the next May, 1840, the ship "Hellas" was attacked, and the patience of the Britons became exhausted; a blockade of Canton was ordered by the commander of the fleet, Sir Gordon Bremer, and this was virtually the beginning of armed hostilities. The Chinese knew nothing of the etiquette of a flag of truce, and when the gunboat "Blonde" approached Amoy in July, 1840, flying such a flag and desiring to make a friendly communication, the effort was misunderstood and she was fired upon. The Chusan Archipelago, off the mouth of the Yangtze River, was attacked and Ting-hai, the capital, surrendered. By the middle of July, 1840, a fairly effective blockade had been established all along the China coast by British ships. Commissioner Lin was degraded in September, 1840, and Keshin appointed in his place; but the foreigners declined to continue negotiations for peace and a renewal of trade, because of alleged breaches of faith on the part of the Chinese Emperor. In the early part of 1841 several coast cities and towns of considerable importance surrendered to the British, and a number of cannon were captured; some of these were sent as trophies to London. Keshin negotiated a treaty whereby Hongkong Island was ceded to Great Britain and an indemnity of six million dollars was agreed

to be paid within ten days to the British authorities; it was done in January, 1841, but the news of the rejection of this treaty by the Emperor was received in February, and forthwith hostilities were resumed; the British left the Chusan Archipelago the next day. Immediately, in Canton, a reward was offered for the bodies of Englishmen, dead or alive, and fifty thousand dollars were promised to any one who should deliver the head of a British "chief." The fleet, under command of Sir Gordon Bremer, captured the Bogue Forts and proceeded on to Canton. A brief respite of hostilities was had in March, 1841, but speedily they were resumed, whereupon Keshin was degraded for his inefficiency, Canton was threatened and soon entered, the heights behind the city were successfully assaulted in May, and the city ransomed for six million dollars, whereupon hostilities were declared to have ceased; but this was mere verbiage on the part of the British, for, on some flimsy pretext, Amoy was taken in August of that same year, while in September the Bogue Forts were again destroyed. In the autumn of that year the Archipelago of Chusan was once more reoccupied by the British and the capital, Ting-hai, was taken. The British fleet passed on to Chinhae (Chehkiang), Ningpo, and many other places near the mouth of the Yangtze. In March of the following year the Chinese attacked the British at Ningpo and Chinhae but were, of course, repulsed with great loss; at Tsz-ki, near the former place, eight thousand of them were routed with heavy loss. In January, 1842, the British squadron entered the Yangtze, captured Woosung, and proceeded up the Woo-

sung River to Shanghai. In July it anchored near "Golden Isle" up the great river; Chinkiang was taken, the Tartar general and many of the garrison committed suicide, partly to escape falling into the hands of their captors, but mainly to escape the disgrace and punishment that their Emperor would surely inflict. In August, 1842, the fleet arrived off Nanking and troops were disembarked on the ninth. Keshin, restored to Imperial favour and given full plenipotentiary powers, arrived at Nanking on August 12. A treaty of peace was signed on board the frigate *Cornwallis*, off Ningpo, by Sir Henry Pottinger, for Great Britain, and Keshin and Ilipu, for China. As an example of the giddy height to which broad farce can soar, the terms of this treaty — it is to be found in many books, "The Middle Kingdom," for example — are to be commended, considering the time, the circumstances, the principals thereto and their agents, the blending of the nauseous "there shall be lasting peace between the two nations" with six million dollars to be paid as the value of the opium which was delivered up "as a ransom for the lives of H. B. M.'s Superintendent and subjects," three million dollars for debts due British merchants, twelve million dollars for the expenses incurred in the expedition sent out "to obtain redress for the violent and unjust proceedings of the Chinese high authorities"; these were enough to make the Chinese wish they had never laid eyes on this new type of "Foreign Devil." Five ports were opened for trade and foreign residence — Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, Shanghai; while "it being obviously necessary and desirable that Brit-

ish subjects should have some port whereat they may careen and refit their ships when required," the Island of Hongkong was ceded to Her Majesty. Ratifications signed by Queen Victoria and Emperor Tao Kuang were formally exchanged July 24, 1843. But after all, in April, 1847, the Bogue Forts were again captured by the British for some little slip that would scarcely need the exchange of notes to-day. Emperor Tao Kuang died February 25, 1850, six months before the dreadful Taeping Rebellion broke out; he was a man who was ahead of his time; he was liberal in his views, keen for the introduction of European arts, and could he have carried his countrymen with him, probably the awakening of China would not have been deferred half a century. His son was weak and foolish; he turned back the wheels of progress, and gave opportunity for a plebeian, Tien-teh ("Celestial Virtue"), to start an internal war which was not suppressed until Ward and Gordon came to the rescue of China some ten years later. In October, 1856, came the episode of the lorcha *Arrow*, a Chinese pirate and smuggler, yet by reason of the provisions against which Sir Robert Hart, an Englishman, inveighs, registered as a British vessel and "flying the British colours to-day and the Chinese to-morrow, as suited the convenience of her disreputable owners." This episode is referred to in some works of reference as "the outrage committed upon the British lorcha *Arrow* in Canton River." (Haydn's Dictionary of Dates.)

Again hostilities were renewed, forts burnt, Chinese fleets destroyed, Canton bombarded and taken by the

combined English and French forces in 1857. The next year these allies moved to the north and arrived at the Peiho River, Tientsin, on their way to Peking. The new treaty "of peace and friendship," signed in June, 1858, was excellent in its terms, since it provided for diplomatic representatives, recognized and tolerated Christianity, provided for a revised custom tariff, and forbade the use of the term "barbarian" when speaking of foreigners; but it also provided for "legalized opium"; of course all expenses of the expedition were to be borne by China. But even this treaty was not lasting, for in October, 1859, a combined British and French expedition against China fitted out and war began again in 1860. After vain negotiations, the allies advanced upon and occupied Peking, defeating the Chinese at several places between Tientsin and the capital. It is but right to mention a piece of treachery on the part of the Chinese, which has never been condoned by anyone. A company of English and French officials, correspondents, and guards advanced to Tung-chow to arrange conditions for a meeting of ministers; they were taken prisoners, two were beheaded, and the rest so brutally treated that two more died. In October, 1860, a convention was signed, the treaty of Tientsin ratified, apology made, another large indemnity exacted, Kow-loon ceded to Great Britain in exchange for Chusan, and a promise made that the treaty and convention should be published throughout the empire. The allies left Peking in November, 1860; Canton was restored to the Chinese in October, 1861; and this is the end of the story of China's wars with foreigners up to the pres-

ent time. The short and decisive war with Japan in 1894-1895 comes in quite a different category, and has no bearing upon this story, save in that it emphasized China's military weakness.

The British and French assisted the Chinese Government in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion, and through their efforts Ningpo was retaken in May, 1862, and not long after that the Rebellion was totally suppressed.

It is unnecessary to discuss the fact that the American Government has always set its face against armed demonstrations. There have been times, to be sure, when unwillingness to show its strength has operated to the disadvantage of citizens, yet those were in days now long past and the effect of our sustained peaceful attitude has since been altogether for good. The Chinese eventually learnt their own weakness in war, and came to see that it was impossible for them to maintain their exclusiveness; that policy was abandoned some time ago, and we have no reason to believe that there will ever be a revival of it. That weakness has recently been brought out by the unjust demand of Russia being granted. That China is right in the position she took this year (1911) against Russia, admits of no doubt; but the wisdom for which in the past she has paid so dearly in money and in territory, taught her to submit to further humiliation for the time being; and to bide her time until by diplomacy — perhaps supported by a properly organized and well equipped army — she can recover her rights. If that time comes, it is possible that the effort to recover rights may go further than the mere asserting of a determination to sustain then existing autonomous rights.

## CHAPTER VI

### *POSSIBILITY OF DYNASTIC CHANGE*

UNTIL within a comparatively short time, Dr. S. Wells Williams' statement,\* that the history of the Chinese people has appealed with less force than it richly deserves to Western scholars, would have been literally true; not that there has ever been a time since the twelfth or thirteenth century when there were no accounts of the Chinese nation and people at the disposal of the Europeans, but that this available material was looked upon as appealing specially to a particular class of students, and not as possessing interest for the general reader. Coming down to the time in the early sixteenth century when renewed interest in China was aroused as offering most attractive opportunities for the commercial adventurer, we find a good deal of literature at our disposal; yet it still is rather special than general; or what may be said to appeal to the general reader is rather in the line of the quaint and legendary, with somewhat of the social and descriptive. There seemed to be a consensus of opinion that China was an impossible sort of a country and that, therefore, its history should not be taken seriously. One must, of course, accept — perhaps not as fact, but as a basis — the statement of the native historians when beginning the study of the his-

\* "The Middle Kingdom," Chap. XVII.

tory of any new country; and the startling declarations made as to Chinese cosmogony at once repelled the serious student, while its mixture of sense and nonsense could serve only to amuse the dabbler in folklore tales and inconsequent mythology.

There is no serious student who denies to the Chinese people an antiquity and a consecutive history that are almost without parallel in the records of this world. Like all other people, the Chinese have their mythological history and one that is so plausible, at least so appealing to the mind undeveloped by the precision of modern science, as to have gained the endorsement of imitation; because when we examine Japanese records carefully, the Kojiki and the Nihongi, we, who are familiar with cognate literature in China, are at once struck with a resemblance, or, if that word is a little too strong, let us say we are led to suspect that the compilers of those early Japanese records certainly knew something about the Chinese Yik-King, "Book of Records," and other literature of the same sort. The temptation to follow the parallel, which certainly seems to exist, between that which is distinctly original in China and that which is suspiciously imitative in Japan, is very strong; but, as a matter of fact, originality is almost absolutely a negative quantity in Japan, although the natural gift which enables the Japanese to add much to that which they borrow, to improve it oftentimes and in many ways and with great success, is thoroughly admirable; the temptation must be resisted here. Williams' remark would apply even now, if we mean the study of an ancient history that is well worthy to receive


careful attention, for no Bancroft, Gibbon, or Niebuhr has yet devoted his genius to China. What has been somewhat conspicuous in literature devoted to China, of recent years, let us say the last quarter of a century, is the fact that while it has been very slightly historic, it has been mainly political and sociological; oftentimes foolishly sensational. Even in what we have had that was new, there have been some curious and instructive changes: a bibliography would be highly interesting, but it is not necessary here; just a few titles will serve to illustrate the point that it is desired to make. A little over twenty-five years ago the author of "The Far Eastern Question" wrote of China's condition, social, industrial, financial, political, as if it were hopeless; as if the people were so indifferent to their own well-being and progress as to be helpless. Then, after China's easy defeat by Japan in the short, sharp, and decisive campaign of 1894-1895, only seventeen years ago, the tone of Western opinion, discouragingly pessimistic it must have seemed to the loyal Chinese, was clearly indicated by the titles of the books about China then prepared for us: "The Break-up of China," "The Partition of China"; the writers rarely seeming to give due weight to the fact that from 1868, or the latest, 1872, Japan had been sedulously preparing herself for that very conflict, zealously studying European methods of war, and straining her resources to develop an army and a navy; while China (as a nation) had absolutely refused to do anything of the kind. The nineteenth century had not closed, however, before even stagnant old China began to show some qualities of resistance; just before and

immediately after the "Boxer" insurrection of 1900, it was clear that the lethargy had been overcome, and this fact was reflected in the tone which Western writers, most of them Americans, adopted, recognizing this change; "The Awakening of China," or "The Reconstruction of China," was the theme. Still later, within a year or two, with the deepening confidence in the permanency of this change, the titles are "China and America To-day," "Changing China," "The Educational Conquest of China." China has now thrown off so much of her ten thousand years' accumulated stagnation and lethargy as to entitle her name to be coupled with the active, progressive, "hustling" America; the unchangeable has been transformed into the changing; it is no longer military effort to force open doors that the keepers would still bar and bolt — or punitive missions of allies to extort compensation for alleged outrage; but the conquest is now to be one in which the Chinese themselves are to be as active in overthrowing their own obsolescent institutions as are the one-time "outer barbarians"; the old forms of government are to be changed, it may be; the rigid, useless, educational methods must be completely wiped out.

It is almost an affront to the intelligence of the observers to say that changes of the most stupendous import, and almost cataclysmic in their effects, are manifestly to take place in China before long; the changes which the past ten years have wrought were radical, it cannot be denied, yet they were but suggestions of what is likely to be. When Her Majesty, the late Empress Dowager, on September 2, 1906, issued that decree:



PAPER MONEY USED AS OFFERINGS FOR THE DEAD



ELECTRIC CARS ON THE GARDEN BRIDGE, SHANGHAI



"Let there be no delay in making China a Constitutional Government," she was — as we know — merely giving executive force to what her nephew, the late Emperor Kuang Hsü, had attempted some eight years before. Next to that other edict which abolished the old-time competitive examination for official preferment, declared to be the most radical step ever taken by a Chinese sovereign, this order, which contemplated such a change in the governmental system, was one to shake the empire to its very foundation; and certainly neither Her Majesty nor her advisers realized what a possible Pandora-box she was opening. For the Chinese, with all their seeming stolid indifference to changes or improvements, have at all times evinced a singular disposition to have their own way. Never in the course of their history have they been known tamely to submit to an Imperial decree which was distasteful to them or which they conceived to be subversive of their independence. In a way, they have displayed a truly remarkable democratic spirit, quite the reverse from what the casual reader or the superficial observer at close range would naturally be led to expect; even an Imperial decree has not infrequently been made utterly inoperative by the quiet, passive opposition of the dwellers in a city, or the peasants of a district; and repeatedly that democratic spirit has verged upon rebellion when the people have declared: "We will not have this man to rule over us." Time and again officials sent from Peking, bearing Imperial commissions, even viceroys of the highest rank, have been compelled to ask for transfer, when by word or deed they have incurred the disfavour

of the people they were sent to govern; and rarely has this exhibition of dissatisfaction been calmly or violently ignored.

This fact makes us think seriously of what may easily happen after 1916, when it is now expected this Constitutional Government experiment may attain to the dignity of actual operation. If the isolated groups that have from time to time asserted themselves in opposition to the wish of "The Son of Heaven" shall be united into one mass of representatives who may take counsel together for all, it is not indiscreet prophecy to say that it may easily happen that this united voice may declare that it will not let this man rule over us; that is to say, there may come a demand for dynastic change which cannot be ignored; to go beyond that and say this voice may call, not only for representative government, but for a representative head of that government, is decidedly premature, to say no more for it. That a change in the central government is necessary to satisfy the growing strength of the reformers, outside of the officials who now form parties at and near the Court, is not to read inaccurately the signs of the times. There is nothing surprising in the present signs of internal trouble in the Chinese Empire; those who have watched events carefully have been rather astonished that it has not come sooner. There are now so many newspapers published in China, and facilities for sending them to every nook and corner of the realm are now so adequate, that the power which comes with knowledge has attained proportions that surprise Chinese leaders themselves and would amaze all foreigners who were

accustomed to conditions of a score of years ago. The experiment of Provincial Assemblies was not a failure, simply it was insufficiently carried out; the desire for these is growing stronger all the time and is likely to win the day. This desire, if gratified, will — of course — bring trouble; but China has no reason to expect that her own experience shall go contrary to the record of history, and such a stupendous transformation as representative Provincial Assemblies would mean to the enormous population of China, will be measured in trouble of its kind, directly as the huge proportions of those affected. There are no disturbing signs of a revolution — China's history is singularly free from records of such internal disasters; indeed, we believe there is but one recorded, although there have been numerous rebellions. If this Provincial Assembly of 1909 accomplished nothing, and if the attempt to hold a National Parliament in 1910 was declared by some, not all, to be a failure, it was because conditions were not yet properly adjusted; not because of any local or national defect.

Before hazarding an opinion as to which direction the choice will take, if the change is to be dynastic merely, it is well to know something of those dynasties which preceded the present one, Ts'ing — known to foreigners as the "Manchu." The reader need not be apprehensive of tedious details; the long list of main dynasties and subdivisions; the string of names, difficult to read; and dates that are so often merely fanciful, will all be omitted, and nothing but a few general remarks that are of wider bearing will be introduced here; a synoptical table will be found as an appendix; this is taken from

Prof. Herbert A. Giles' Chinese-English Dictionary, and is considered the best condensed record of the Chinese dynasties. To explain what may seem a little puzzling under "The Three Kingdoms," "Division into North and South," and "The Five Dynasties," it is well to condense from Williams' "The Middle Kingdom," and Boulger's "History of China." When the powerful Han Dynasty lost its hold and disappeared in the masses of the people, China was split up into three independent kingdoms. Subsequent historians, feeling that this rather reflected on the national honour, have put these three states together and treat them as one kingdom; although there is no doubting the fact that there were, at that period, three distinct governments in China. Next, when Liu Yu assumed the Imperial dignity in the year 420 A.D. and proclaimed himself Emperor by the name of "Kautson," the founder of the Sung Dynasty, China was still a house divided against itself. Six kingdoms had been established within the borders of the Northern provinces, and each aspired to bring its neighbours to its feet and to figure as the regenerator of the empire.

The Sungs were never more than one ruler among many; and their government, always that of only a small section of the Chinese nation, was in reality but one added to the other six. The period of the Five Small Dynasties is the least satisfactory and interesting in the whole length of Chinese history; it is passed over by native historians with very brief mention, the very short reigns of the thirteen emperors being without event of importance. Under the Liao rulers the empire was

reunited, but with the advent of the later Sung came the weakening of the Imperial power which soon left the empire an easy prey for the intruding and usurping Mongols, the Yuan Dynasty.

The Chinese claim for themselves an antiquity which is simply extravagant. Back of the period known to their historians as the "Highest Antiquity," beginning with a date 2852 or 3322 B.C., stretches the mythological era for anywhere from twenty thousand to five hundred thousand years, and the accounts which they give of the creation are just as laughable as any other fanciful cosmogonies. Theirs, however, has received the endorsement of imitation by their pupils in this as in many other respects, the Japanese, for there is more than accidental resemblance between the performances of the Japanese creator and creatress and those of China's Pwanku, labouring under the inspiration or with the cooperation of Yang and Yin. With the pushing back of the world's history by the efforts of scientific and Christian explorers, we are no longer bound and tied down by what was given as precise dates in our Bible margins; so that twenty or thirty thousand years, or even more, to the time when this earth became a fit residence for human beings, no longer appalls us. There were certainly people on the earth five or six thousand years ago, and very much longer than that, and if we feel that we cannot exactly allow that the present Chinese were in China as long ago as five thousand years, we may generously admit that they have a continuous history by the side of which nothing else that we know can stand for a moment.

We need not, for the present purposes, give ourselves concern about the mythical dynasties; nor is it pertinent to consider the earliest which belongs in a history that has been accepted and approved by such students as Legge, Maillu, and many others. With the beginning of the Christian era we are on firm ground and within the record of the dynasties whose influence may have extended itself to modern times. In the days when the later Han or Eastern Han reigned over the whole of China (25–221 A.D.) we discern a condition that did much to mould the Chinese character and to give permanency to the polity and institutions which governed the people for nearly 2000 years. If we include the former, or Western Han, who began to reign 206–2 B.C., “an instructive parallel can be drawn between the character and acts of the emperors who reigned four hundred years in China and the numerous consuls, dictators, and emperors who governed the Roman Empire for the same period from the time of Scipio Africanus to Helogabalus;” but if we pursue the parallel, the descent in Europe to the darkness and ignorance of the Middle Ages, and the persistence in China of what was already a high degree of civilization, is not perhaps so flattering to our Western pride as might be. The Chinese of the old school — speaking as of to-day — hold in the highest esteem the founder of this Han Dynasty (Kao Ti or Kao Tsu) because he instituted the system of competitive examination for all comers who sought appointment in the ranks of government officials; his successors, Wen Ti, Wu Ti, and Kuang Wu Ti, are all almost equally famous for the encouragement they gave to letters, com-



ZI-KA-WEI: NATIVE HOUSEBOATS



WALL AT SOOCHOW



merce, arts, and good government, until in these matters there was nothing comparable in any other part of Asia. But it was the great T'ai Tsung (627-650 A.D.), of the T'ang Dynasty, who gave the greatest incentive to these literary examinations, establishing the system which was followed — practically without deviation — until 1906. In the West the power of Rome had brought its own influence; then came the faith of Christ, and the influence of His teaching within the borders of that Roman Empire made the period during which the Hans ruled in China the more remarkable as a parallel. Between the time when the later or Eastern Han was overthrown, 221 A.D., and the establishment of the Eastern Tsin, 317, one of the most interesting periods of Chinese history, considered from the standpoint of literature, was developed; the moulding of character is recorded in the history of the Three Kingdoms; but it reads more like an historical novel, and does not appeal to Chinese scholars. The various native dynasties down to that of the great T'ang (618-907) are not important for our present purpose; but in the T'angs we have something admirable. Williams' opinion of this remarkable dynasty has been so often quoted and so warmly endorsed that it is well known; it is a just and scholarly estimate; but there are others who have a like meed of praise; indeed, no European writer has ever said anything to detract from the lofty reputation of the T'angs, especially T'ai Tsung, the second emperor in the line, who reigned from 627-650. One very remarkable thing about him was that he used but a single eponym for his entire reign; usually the Chinese emperors vary the style of

their reign because of some "lucky" event, or to avert some threatened evil, or for some geomantic whims, but T'ai Tsung pursued the even tenor of his way so calmly that there was no need for change in name. "Kao Tsu, the founder of the T'ang Dynasty, wearying of the burden of his office and knowing that in his son he had a more than worthy successor, for that son had long been the real head of the state, determined to seek the charm and relaxation of private life; his son T'ai Tsung, by the voluntary retirement of his father, assumed the position to which his personal qualities gave him every right. The first acts of the new ruler showed that he would rest satisfied with no partial degree of success in the task he had set himself to accomplish. It was his first and principal object to give the Chinese the benefit of a government which was national in its sympathy and in its aims. He had to revive the sentiment that the Chinese were one people and that the prosperity of the realm and the ability of the ruling powers depended equally on the tranquillity and sense of security which should generally prevail. To him also it seemed a matter of first importance to extend the influence of the Chinese among the neighbouring states, for he knew that by so doing he should alone succeed in preserving what he had won."

Running down through several other native dynasties, not one of which possesses for us sufficient interest to hold our attention, we come to the Yuan (Mongol), the first foreign sway to which the Chinese had submitted; "their resistance to the army which gradually overran the country was weakened, however, by treachery and desultory tactics, until the national spirit was frittered

away." During the interval between the capture of Peking by Genghis Khan, and the final extinction of the Sung Dynasty, the whole population had become somewhat accustomed to Mongol rule. Having no organized government of their own, these Khans were content to allow the Chinese the full exercise of their own laws, if peace and taxation were duly upheld. Kublai had ample opportunity to learn the character of his new subjects, and after the death of Mangu Khan, in 1260, and his own establishment at Peking, in 1264, he in fifteen years brought his vast dominions under a methodical sway and developed their resources more than ever. Though failing in his attempt to conquer Japan, he enlarged elsewhere his vanishing frontiers during his life till they could neither be defined nor governed.

Following the Yuan, or Mongol, Dynasty came the Ming, and to this we must give some careful attention, in order to arrive at something like an opinion as to the probability or unlikelihood of that house being restored in the event of the reigning dynasty being dethroned. Tug Timor, the thirteenth emperor of the Mongol Dynasty (his Chinese title is Wenti), did nothing of especial importance — the only notable event of his reign was the reception he gave the Grand Lama of Tibet, who visited Peking in 1329. As Wenti had always been a devoted and enthusiastic Buddhist, he was in the greatest state of excitement and commanded all his courtiers to bend the knee whenever they addressed the Lama. This order incensed the Mongol soldiers, and even the Chinese at Court were indignant at being compelled to make obeisance to the representative of a

religion which most of them despised. The President of the Hanlin College positively refused to show this honour and said, when speaking to the Lama: "You are the disciple of Fō, and the master of all the bonzes; and I am the disciple of Confucius, the head of all the literati of this empire. Confucius is not one whit less illustrious than Fō; therefore there is no need for so many ceremonies between us." The Grand Lama showed his tact by smiling and placing himself in the same position as that of the Chinese President (Mailla).

Wenti's death in 1332, after only three years' reign, appears to have had no influence in checking the downfall of the Mongols, who were very near the end of their rule. A mere child, Illechepen, or Ning Tsung, a son of Hochila, an elder brother of Wenti, was proclaimed emperor, but he lived only a few months and then Tohan Timor, the eldest son of Hochila, was placed on the throne in spite of an effort on the part of an intriguing minister to prevent, taking the name of Shun Ti or Hui Tsung, and his regime, marked by a succession of misfortunes, began the final, rapid decadence and fall of the Mongol power. The most disastrous calamity which befell China at that time was a famine in which some thirteen million persons are said to have died, and this dreadful catastrophe was, by the Chinese people, of course attributed to the personal defect of the Emperor in having displeased the gods. The first distinct rising of the Chinese occurred in 1337, when Chu Kwang, a native of Kwang Tung, raised a force and proclaimed that the Mongols had ceased to reign. From this beginning the defection of the Chinese progressed rap-

idly, and when a young man named Choo Yuen-Chang gave up the priesthood, and entered the army as a subaltern, the right man to head the revolt of the Chinese had appeared. In Emperor Keen Lung's history of the Mings, it is declared that when this man was born the room was several times filled with a bright light, although he was the son of obscure parents. He is said to have been of fine presence, courageous, and apt in his studies. Once in the army his promotion was rapid and ere long he was at the head of the Chinese. Late in the year 1367 Peking was captured and Shunti fled across the border. The war with the Mongols still continued but China was emancipated from the Tartar yoke. Choo Yuen-Chang mounted the throne and assumed the name of Yuan Chang (T'ai Tsu), the first emperor of the Ming Dynasty. After him, although there were several emperors of more or less importance, and the era is considered somewhat brilliant, yet there was deterioration continuously until the reign of Yu Chien (Chuang Lieh Ti) brought the dynasty to a close, and the Manchus had little difficulty in obtaining possession of the empire. It must be noted that the Chinese did not submit altogether complacently to the rule of the Ming Dynasty. Emperor Yuan Chang was able, principally because of his own personality and power, to hold the throne, although even in his case dissatisfaction asserted itself towards the end of his reign when a mutiny of a part of the army, led by an ambitious officer, who himself had Imperial aspirations, threatened serious trouble for a time. The mutiny was nipped in the bud, the leader was punished with death, implicating in a cowardly

manner a number of other officers and soldiers whose guilt was not clearly proved, but who were punished with the actual leader. Yuan Chang closed his reign tranquilly; his will (given in full by Amiot, "Mémoires sur les Chinois") is an interesting document, displaying much learning, and expressing sentiments which are commendable for their patriotism and their generosity. The early rulers of this dynasty, those who followed immediately after Yuang Chang, continued to display more or less of his ability; yet, there never was that perfect tranquillity which has rather marked the rule of the Manchus; for Yi Chün (the thirteenth in the line) found himself so much embarrassed by the renewal of hostilities and acts of open rebellion within the empire that he was advised to withdraw to the south and submit to a division of the state; to this he refused to listen, but was overcome and supplanted by his uncle. Later rulers, too, displayed discretion in many ways, yet the whole of the Ming domination was marked by internal trouble, plots of various kinds, and many things for which Chinese historians hold the Emperor personally responsible. In the long reign of Yi Chün (1573-1620) the Chinese troops, in an effort to maintain China's supremacy in Korea, came into conflict with the Japanese. Hideyoshi Toyotomi, perhaps better known as Taiko Sama, having organized an expedition ostensibly to punish the Koreans for alleged affronts, but in reality because of a desire "to make the glory of Japan's arm shine beyond the sea," ordered an invasion. The result of this war, if it may be dignified with that appellation, while not actually decisive, was certainly not in Japan's

favour — their account of it to the contrary notwithstanding — although this may possibly be due to the fact that Hideyoshi died when the struggle was at its height, and thus the controlling spirit of the expedition was lost.

Near the end of Yi Chün's reign there was remarkable development in the intercourse between China and the nations of the West. The coming of the Portuguese and Spaniards has been noted and the unsatisfactory impression which they made commented upon. "The Chinese authorities seem to have regarded with blunt and half-amused curiosity the attempts of the Christian missionaries to convert them, but, although two high officials were at least christened, and extended their protection to the foreign priests, very little progress could be reported in the work they had undertaken. On the other hand, the missionaries were, in a worldly sense, most useful. They reformed — on the recommendation of a Chinese official, Li Chitsao or Peter, President of the Tribunal of Rites at Nanking — the Chinese calendar and corrected several astronomical errors. The Imperial Observatory flourished under their direction and more correct maps of the provinces were drawn under their supervision; in short, they placed at the disposal of the Peking ministers their superior information, and, in return for the practical benefits they were able to confer, they received the rights of residency and fair treatment. But the Chinese remained cold in any advances towards Christianity." (Boulger.) The petty risings in various parts of the empire indicate the utter lack of satisfaction with the Ming rule; but these were as

nothing when compared with what was threatening along the northeastern borders, and before the Manchu Tartars the Ming Dynasty went down in disgrace in the eyes of the Chinese, so that its influence can hardly be called so satisfactory as to justify the suggestion of the propriety of recalling the line in the event of dynastic change.

With these facts before us, it seems unlikely that the Chinese would seek for a descendant of this Ming Dynasty to resume the throne should they effectively rid themselves of the reigning house. It must be remembered that the true Chinese have never had any love for the intruding and usurping Manchus, and very little respect for them; but then they have always shown a remarkable indifference about who really did reign over them; their vision not seeming to be strong enough to see just who is sitting on the throne far away in the capital. They are far more concerned about the personal character and attainments of those who govern them near at hand. If the truth were known, it would probably appear that the Manchus have little respect for the Chinese; that they have never got over the apprehension which affected them years ago, when the application of the Europeans for permission to trade with their Chinese subjects was laid before them.

There remain somewhere in China, probably, surviving branches of other dynasties, which have left pleasing records in Chinese history, the Sung, or, far better, the T'ang. Of the latter Sungs, the record is not so brilliant as to make it likely that the Chinese of to-day would ever think of hunting up a surviving descendant to put him upon the throne, if they were seeking a new emperor and one

who should be truly of themselves; besides, the origin of those Sungs was not any more illustrious than is that of thousands of families in the South of China, while the Kin Dynasty that was contemporary, ruling in the north, possessed no stronger claim upon the people generally. As to the great T'ang Dynasty, its glory shone out so brilliantly at the very beginning that when Tai Tsong's name is mentioned it seems as if those of all the other twenty-one monarchs in the line are dimmed into obscurity.

Thus it comes about that there seems to be no Chinese line from which to choose an emperor, if the necessity for doing so should arrive, and this fact makes the situation all the more grave. Should there come a peaceful uprising and a downfall of the Manchus, a successor would of necessity either be chosen by the officials or people, or some one would seize the throne through success or intrigue; but the latter alternative precludes, almost, the possibility of a peaceful change. It would be almost inevitable that such a revolution is to be a bloody one and therefore it is not surprising that when a dynastic change is mentioned the best Chinese look grave and are inclined to endorse the opinion of Chang Chih-Tung, "China's greatest Viceroy," himself a true Chinese, who stands firmly for the support of the reigning dynasty. But should the choice of a new line be the expression of the popular wish, what is that but a form of republic? And for such a government, even the most enthusiastic of China's friends are not yet prepared; while the suggestion itself comes from those only who are stamped as over-zealous by natives and foreigners alike. Imperialism in China has almost been

more a name than a reality, and not one of the dynastic changes has been accomplished without the shedding of rivers of blood; and the leading Chinese are now strongly for internal peace. External peace, then, they must have for many years to come, if the faint track toward national greatness which has been merely blazed out becomes a broad road leading to a newer form of greatness than China has ever before attained; but one which, indubitably, her past record has shown she is thoroughly competent to tread.

The wonderful shrewdness of the late Empress Dowager showed itself in many ways; all of them indicating a desire to strengthen the position of the dynasty with which she was allied, and yet an equal desire to help the forward movement of Great China. This was — it hardly need be said — after her temporary aberration connected with the Boxer uprising and the influence upon her of Prince Tuan's cry for the expulsion of the foreigners. For this strange reaction even, we can almost find extenuating circumstances when we recall that between November 1, 1897, and April 16, 1898, Germany, Russia, France, and England had taken from China, because of Emperor Kuang Hsü's weakness, the four best ports, probably, in China: Kiaochou, Port Arthur, Tonquin, and Weihaiwei. When Her Majesty was preparing for her *coup d'état*, she displayed statesmanship worthy of the shrewdest masculine head in any country of the world; one single example is sufficient to illustrate. When Emperor Kuang Hsü heard that the extreme conservative members of the government were complaining to his aunt of what the "boy Emperor"



FOREIGN GARDENS ON THE BUND, SHANGHAI



was doing, he summoned Yuan Shih-kai to the palace and then ordered him to return to Tientsin, his headquarters, dispose of (that is, kill) Governor-General Jung Lu, an obstructionist in the Emperor's opinion, and then bring his (Yuan's) army corps to Peking, surround the summer palace, and thus make his aunt a prisoner. But the Empress Dowager had known too well what she was about when she put Yuan Shih-kai, a known Liberal, and a Chinese, at the head of the army and made Jung Lu, a Manchu, his superior civil officer, without whose authority Yuan himself could not move. Of course, Kuang Hsü's plans were promptly made known to the Empress Dowager. She had already scented danger and had prepared for all possible contingencies: Li Hung-Chang she had appointed Viceroy of Kuang Tung; Yuan Shih-kai, governor of Shantung and the head of the army; Tuan Fang, governor of Shensi; Liu Kun-Yi, Chang Chih-tung, and Kuei Chun were kept readily available, and thus Her Majesty had the greatest men of all shades of political opinion in her service. How she planned the final moves of her famous *coup d'état* is another story. When once recovered from her unfortunate defection, she rapidly made amends, and if a change now comes and the dynasty, of which she was unquestionably the most remarkable member, goes down, it will not be because the late Empress Dowager did not try to strengthen the position of her house in China itself and to raise it out of the mire, in foreigners' opinion, into which it was for a time sinking. Whether she alone is responsible for the choice of Prince Chun to be Regent for the young, reigning Emperor, or whether

this was the result of combined judgment, does not matter in the least; the Prince is a man who has had an opportunity to see something of the world beyond the borders of his own land, for he was sent to Germany to convey the apologies of the Chinese Government to Emperor William after the murder of Baron von Kettler. He is a brother of Emperor Kuang Hsü and, being himself progressive, he will undoubtedly have the support of the Reform party, and because he was approved of by the Great Empress Dowager, if not actually selected by her, he should command the respect of those who were staunchest in their allegiance to her. It is certain that in Peking to-day there is little left of that old spirit of opposition to all things progressive; not one of the real leaders would now turn back to China as it was a century ago, even if he were assured there would be no objectionable "Foreign Devils" knocking persistently at the door; and it is true that China has entered upon a new course from which no one in the land itself or anywhere else would have her turn back. It seems, however, almost impossible for the maximum of good to be achieved so long as there is on the Dragon throne a representative of a race of alien conquerors whom the true Chinese have always despised; the feeling which asserted itself so successfully in the fourteenth century, when the Mongols were expelled, is precisely the same as that which has existed ever since the return of the usurpers in 1644 — because, as a matter of fact, the Eastern Manchus are sprung from the same stock as the Western or Northern Mongols; indeed, it is declared by some that in 1368, when the Chinese succeeded in

defeating the Mongol army and driving out the whole lot of them, a good many fled eastward and established themselves in Manchuria, and that it is from this stock the Manchu invaders came in the seventeenth century. Yet, admitting all this, there still persists the unanswerable question: Will there be a change of dynasty, and if so, will there be a new Chinese dynasty; or will there be an attempt to inaugurate a representative form of government, approximating a republic in form if not bearing that name? To only one part of this question is it safe to hazard an answer: China is not yet prepared to become a republic.

It may be mentioned here that Japan is alleged to have offered to supply China with an emperor; to have signified that the head of one of the collateral, cadet branches of Japan's Imperial house be placed upon the throne of China. This is not the place to discuss this subject fully because it comes in the chapter which will be devoted to a consideration of Japan's present influence upon China; only it may be said that the suggestion cannot be entertained for a moment by any Chinese leaders, since to accept it would mean to make China merely an appanage of Japan, and this could not be tolerated. If the apparent feeling in China is in the least sincere, and there is a wish to do away with all semblance of foreign rule, such a change would be simply inoperative. Japan's suggestion may be passed with a smile at the complaisant condescension it betokens, and a note of protest against its arrogance; for, if the Chinese dislike the idea of being ruled by Manchus, they would not tolerate the rule of those whom they cordially hate.

## CHAPTER VII

### *ENTRANCE OF THE UNITED STATES INTO THE FAR EASTERN ARENA*

THE fashion of going to wonderful old China to discover pretty nearly everything, from gunpowder and the mariner's compass to motor cars and aeroplanes, has been faithfully followed in the matter of America; for a little book, "Fusang," tells of the discovery of the far-distant Eastern continent by some Chinese Buddhist priests at a remote date which corresponds with the fifth century of the Christian era. That was, probably, during the time of the Sung Dynasty (the House of Liu); and the claim may not be so ridiculous as it seems to be at first glance; certainly there is enough truth in it to make the ever-jealous Japanese dispute with the Chinese the honour of this discovery. At any rate, some ethnologists pretend to have found certain points of resemblance between peoples and institutions which suggest intercourse; and the learned writer of the article "America" in the Encyclopædia Britannica says: "To us it appears most probable that the legislators of Peru were either Chinese or persons who had received at second hand a knowledge of the arts and institutions of China; and our opinion is grounded on traits of the two nations, which, in our opinion, are too numerous, striking,

and peculiar to be the effect of chance." But this excursion into the realms of what is very like romance has little bearing upon "The Coming China." It is, however, quite certain that in the most natural way the Chinese knew of this continent long before they formed the acquaintance of travellers from the new nation, the United States of America, towards the end of the eighteenth century.

As has been said here, and the statement is confirmed by all observers and unprejudiced writers about China, the impression made by the newcomers in 1784 was a favourable one, and the intercourse then established was maintained with satisfaction on both sides, and with exceptionally little friction — the peculiar circumstances being duly considered. Trading operations grew in volume until after the breaking out of our Civil War, 1861–1865, when there came the almost complete disappearance of our flag from the ocean; this fact was commented upon by the Chinese, who naturally thought that it meant an actual diminution of trade between themselves and Americans, until they were enlightened as to true conditions, learning that American merchants in China could export and import in ships of other nations practically as well as in American vessels.

But what went further towards creating a friendly feeling among the Chinese for Americans, was the generous way in which our earliest representatives and, for the most part, our commercial men behaved towards themselves. Our government promptly refused to take any part in the punitive measures which, doubtless after serious provocation and reasonable consideration of their

grievances, some of the European Powers undertook against China; while our merchants, as has been shown, declared that they were amenable to Chinese law, because they were on Chinese soil by their own act, without invitation and without any assurance of exemption from punishment or extraordinary protection at any time. These conditions were dispelled, or seriously shaken, at least, by subsequent acts of what the Chinese people justly considered unfair discrimination against themselves; but even this matter was so explained to the Chinese Government as to satisfy it of our continued good-will as a nation; and, while that explanation was sufficient in the opinion of the people themselves to place the responsibility where it belonged, it should always be borne in mind that the Chinese Government never did give its official consent to the indiscriminate emigration of its subjects; nor did it ever approve of Chinese coolies going abroad in large numbers.

It seems rather strange that the Chinese had given so little attention to the Philippine Islands, as they had done prior to the seizing of the Archipelago by the Spaniards in 1543, when Admiral Legazpi effected a very easy conquest. The Chinese had evinced no marked indisposition to go far away from home across the seas, partly for maritime commerce, but also on piratical venture, it is to be feared; for the notions of international law and the rights of others were exceedingly hazy in those days; might was always right, it would seem. We hear of the Chinese being in the Moluccas when the Europeans first visited those Islands after the Cape of Good Hope had been conquered; but they appear to have given

little thought to intercourse with the Filipinos until after the Spaniards had established themselves in the Islands and founded the city of Manila. The Spaniards had not been long in possession, however, before they made the acquaintance of the Chinese, who at first went to the Philippines as traders. The first of these carried back such favourable accounts of the possibilities of large profits, through catering to the wants of the Europeans, that a great many merchants, artisans, gardeners, and labourers went there, until their number had so increased as to throw the Spaniards into a panic, who, upon a most flimsy pretext, turned upon the inoffensive Chinese and slaughtered them mercilessly. This brutal act and a repetition thereof some years later have already been mentioned; but it should be noted here that had certain Chinese mandarins who visited Manila in 1602 been less secretive as to the object of what they alleged was a mission from their Emperor, the suspicions of the Spaniards might not have been aroused to the pitch they were. However, it may safely be said that in the end the Spaniards were themselves the greatest sufferers, for their own acts very nearly caused the ruin of the Island capital, Manila, and operated as a serious bar to the development of commercial and industrial intercourse.

In the official reports made by the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, from the date when Europeans took charge of this service, in the year 1853, and statistics first became available, until the transfer of the Archipelago to the United States, in 1898 — forty-five years — the amount of trade between the Chinese and the neighbouring Spanish possessions was never great, and

was almost wholly in articles of personal use and adornment; the Chinese in the Islands, as is the custom of these exclusive people all the world over, drew supplies of food even, from the home land; the Spaniards imported silk and the like. Altogether, the trade never did attain very great dimensions, even after the colony of Europeans had greatly increased in size; for there was always a lurking dread in the Chinese mind that there might at any time be a recurrence of the sanguinary deeds of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When the Islands were transferred to the United States in 1898, probably the largest item in the list of imports into China was Manila cigars, always immensely popular with the Americans and Europeans in China and Japan from the time when they were first obtainable.\*

It will be remembered that when war was declared by the United States against Spain in 1898, the small fleet of American men-of-war, transports, colliers, etc., under Commodore Dewey was in Hongkong harbour. We may safely assume that he was fitting out his ships for what was then felt to be an inevitable conflict; but as soon as Great Britain had given notice of her neutrality, it became incumbent upon the colonial authorities to compel Commodore Dewey either to dismantle his ships or to withdraw from the port. He did the latter, but inasmuch as his preparations were not yet completed, he went to Mirs Bay, just beyond Great Britain's jurisdiction up the coast of China, and from that place even-

\* For interesting and accurate information concerning the intercourse between China and the Philippines in pre-American days, the reader is referred to "The Philippine Islands," Blair and Robertson, which contains the Spaniards' views and fairly complete statistics.

tually took his departure in obedience to the instructions from our navy department to destroy the Spanish fleet in Philippine waters. It has always been suspected that the British authorities at Hongkong refused deliberately to see what was going on at Mirs Bay, because, as a matter of fact, Commodore Dewey kept up communication with the city; and we may also more than suspect that the Chinese Government, which must have been informed of the Commodore's proceedings, with similar deliberation turned its back and refused to take cognizance, for had there been a keen desire on the latter's part to preserve a strict neutrality, it would have been necessary for China to serve the same notice upon the belligerent American war-ships as to being in Mirs Bay as Great Britain had done at Hongkong. That no such thing was done may not necessarily indicate a friendly disposition on the part of the Chinese authorities to facilitate the movements of the Americans against the Spaniards, and not to place in their way an obstacle which would have been simply insurmountable, because to have finished coaling in the China Sea, three marine leagues off shore, and to have made the fleet ready for an engagement, were things which could not have been done at that time; but it was certainly very convenient indifference for Americans.

It is, of course, incorrect to assume that China then even suspected the United States of an intention to supplant Spain in the Philippines; to do so would have been to go just opposite to what China was justified in accepting as a declaration of America's policy in opposing all over-seas expansion; but it is not impossible

that China did scent in the coming conflict what to her seemed to be a salutary lesson for those who, in the past, had displayed anything but friendliness for her nationals. The opportunity then afforded to display good-will towards the United States, should never be forgotten, although it has too frequently been treated as a matter of trifling importance. When the war between Spain and America ended with the former utterly routed, the Chinese were most favourably impressed by the magnanimity of the United States in not seizing the Philippines outright, as a prize of war, which incontestably it might have done, but was willing to buy them for the enormous sum of twenty-five million dollars, American gold, not the cheap Mexican dollars current in the Far East, then worth only about forty cents in our money. The Chinese gave a hearty welcome to the newcomers. The word now indicating to them something more tangible than it had done a century before, when these people from the Kingdom of the Flowery Flag had followed the commercial adventurers from Europe, so soon after having established their own independence.

That welcome was thoroughly sincere, as a matter of sentiment; because the Chinese Government had never had any reason to doubt the friendliness of our own; and it was assumed that if there were American officials so close to their own shores as just across the narrow sea, which separates Luzon from the China coast, it would necessarily mean a closer acquaintance on our part with events in the Far East than had ever been known before, and the comforting assurance of having a good friend where the hand could be laid upon him in case of need.

Among the common people there was rejoicing, in fact, because it was taken for granted that there would be no opposition raised to Chinese merchants and labourers going to the Islands in unlimited numbers; and this privilege was granted for some time, or until the opposition which found expression in the exclusion bills, passed by Congress at the command of Pacific Coast White Labour Societies, had gained a place in the Island possessions. The restrictions placed upon the immigration, so far as relates to the Philippines, have not been so strictly enforced at Manila and other ports of entry in the Archipelago as in the United States proper, and consequently there are proportionately many more Chinese there than in the States; a fact that has contributed much to the comforts of life in those of our colonial possessions, and has also brought satisfaction to the privileged Chinese.

While it is undoubtedly true that thirteen years ago there were fewer Chinese statesmen and publicists who gave attention to such a question as the influence which the United States in the Philippines was likely to exert than there are to-day, yet the expressions of satisfaction made in the native journals — then already coming to be somewhat of an important factor in the daily life of the Northern Chinese especially — and translated by the English papers, or for transmission to this country as material for information, were emphatic and had a ring of sincerity about them which was pleasing. This statement about Northern China does not mean that there was less satisfaction in the south, or that there was less expression of this contented feeling there than

in the north; it merely indicates that there are fewer Chinese newspapers in that part of the country; also it shows, what is perfectly natural, that the reformers and those who would be likely to give expression to such sentiments, or the reverse if they existed, would naturally be found near the capital and the centres of Chinese progressive thought. In passing, it may be noted that the general tone of the English press in China was one of welcome, although — as was quite to be expected — there were many sly allusions to the breach made deliberately by ourselves in the Monroe Doctrine, and sometimes there was a tartness about these which was not entirely unwarranted; in journals printed in other than the English language, these expressions had a severe tone that was quite to be looked for. Japan, of course, resented our intrusion, although the conventions of diplomatic etiquette forbade the expression of anything of the sort in journals that were in even a remote way connected with the government; something of the feelings of many Japanese may be gathered from various communications translated from the leading journals of Tokyo at that time; there were expressions to the effect that it might become necessary for Japan to give the United States a lesson in manners and to show her that it was not polite to intrude where she was not wanted, also that it was quite time for the United States to understand that "what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," and if there was to be a Monroe Doctrine in America there would have to be something of the same sort, *vis-à-vis* the United States, in the Far East.

The first Protestant Christian missionary to China

was the Rev. Robert Morrison, of Morpeth, England, who was sent out by the London Missionary Society. Because of some difficulty in getting passage direct — so far as we may use the expression apropos of that time, because “direct” meant by ships around the Cape of Good Hope — Morrison came to New York and then took vessel, arriving at Canton in September, 1807. An amusing allegation is that no European ship would at that time carry so foolish and dangerous a cargo as a Gospel Light-bearer, and his impedimenta of evangelistic literature as it was assumed this missionary would take with him. The American Protestant missionaries did not enter the Chinese field until 1830, nearly fifty years after the first trading venture had been made, when the Rev. E. C. Bridgman was sent out by the American Board of Foreign Missions. To those who are not directly connected with missionary enterprise but who are heartily in favour of Christian propaganda and sympathetic with evangelistic methods, it has always seemed a serious misfortune that, by treaty stipulation, the legalized importation of opium — which the Chinese had tried so hard to keep out of their country — and the permission to teach Christianity without prejudice to either propagandist or convert, should have been linked together. To ourselves, perhaps, the connection is not of vital importance, but in the eyes of the Chinese, especially those who have had little opportunity to know the sincerity of the Christian missionary’s opposition to the bringing in and sale of the accursed stuff, it is difficult to recognize the teaching of some foreigners with the practice of others. Yet the sincerity of the

missionary has gone a great way in strengthening the feeling of gratitude for disinterested effort when prejudice has not blinded or conflicting influence destroyed the good effort; and in this connection it is well to make a frank confession which must be admitted to reflect somewhat seriously upon the Christian missions in China. When first the Chinese were compelled by superior force at arms to grant residential rights to foreigners, the native plenipotentiary expressly stipulated that there should be no distinction in the matter of nationality, all should be treated alike, and there was no such thing as the "most favoured nation" clause that crept into the treaties later. At that time, too, the right to teach Christianity had not been granted; whatever was done in that way was, strictly speaking, surreptitious; consequently missionaries — if they were in China — were just the same as any other foreigners, hampered by the same restrictions, granted just the same privileges only. To-day no foreigner has the right to travel freely in the interior of China, without a passport, or to reside off the "foreign concessions" at the treaty-ports, except missionaries. Why this distinction, or preference? The answer is an interesting bit of history; when the French representatives were preparing their treaty — one of four, that is, with Russia, the United States of America, Great Britain, and France, at Tientsin in 1858 — it was stipulated that the Chinese Government restore and repair the Roman Catholic mission property which had been destroyed, damaged, or sequestered. The French Minister did not understand the Chinese language, and therefore he had entrusted the

wording of the Chinese version of the treaty entirely to his interpreter, a thorough Chinese scholar and, almost as a matter of course, it hardly need be said, a zealous Roman Catholic missionary. This subordinate diplomat insisted upon incorporating two additional clauses which had not been originally contemplated; one was that Christians — to be sure, that meant in his mind the Roman Catholics only — should have the right to practise and preach their religion freely in all parts of the empire without molestation, be they foreigners or natives: the other surreptitious clause was that French missionaries should have the right to rent land in all provinces of the empire and in any part of those provinces, to build houses wherever they chose to do so, to travel freely throughout the length and breadth of the land, and to reside wherever they liked. The Chinese ambassadors were then in no position to contest this sweeping demand, and when "this pious fraud" was discovered, the French ambassador very generously decided that he would not humiliate the good priest by exposing his deceit to the Chinese, and then either gain their consent before signing the treaty (and this would have been an exceedingly difficult thing to do) or expunge the undiscussed additions; so the treaty as thus expanded was declared to be the French demand and there was no alternative for the Chinese but to acquiesce and affix their signatures. Americans and all other peoples profit by this deception because of that "most favoured nation clause" and our missionaries can go all over China as they like, and do things that are denied the rest of us, whether we are merchants or tourists. The Chinese,

so far as we Americans are concerned, bore us no ill-will for taking advantage of this opportunity, although many of the best of them unhesitatingly aver that to their minds it was an act which does not conform to what they have been led to assume were the fundamental principles of Christianity; they say, with Confucius, "Do not do unto others what you would not have others do to you." In this particular instance, the Chinese version of the Golden Rule is more apposite than the positive form in the New Testament.

With the advent of the United States into the Far Eastern arena, the relations of the two peoples have become more friendly than ever before. The word "friendly" is here used with certain limitations; for in its strict sense it can hardly yet be applied to the intercourse between the Chinese and any other people, not excepting even the Japanese, with whom they must be reckoned as being ethnically related. The expansion of our enterprises in the Philippines has brought about an astonishing increase in the number of Americans who travel along the China Coast and, many of them at any rate, find their way into the interior; it is not always fortunate for the people of China that these travellers gather impressions at treaty-ports, and such who do this only, neither gain in wider view nor add to the kindly interest of the Chinese. China is *not* an attractive country for the tourist; her best friends will not object to that statement. To one who reaches the China Coast towns after having passed through India and the Straits Settlements, conditions are not so bad, perhaps, as they might be, although even when compared with those

WALL OF THE NATIVE CITY, SHANGHAI



ASSOCIATED WHARVES, SHANGHAI





places, China suffers; but to one who first gains his impressions of the Far East from a visit to Japan, where there is at least a semblance of cleanliness; where there is within easy reach most charming scenery, hill, valley, lake, seashore, the stench, the squalor, the obtrusive wretchedness of China are truly discouraging. As to the inherent politeness of the two peoples, although diametrically opposed to the statements of so many, we do not hesitate to award the palm to the Chinese; mannerisms, rules of etiquette, insincere protestations, do not make politeness. The stolid indifference of the Chinese is rarely rude; indeed we affirm that our experience recalls but few instances of deliberate rudeness from Chinese, while the same cannot be said of the Japanese. Until less than twenty years ago, there had been much of the Shylock in the Chinese character; he was willing to buy from us and sell to us — not anxious to eat with us and, speaking of him as representing his whole nation, violently opposed to praying with us. If there was a business transaction to carry out, it was approached with a promptness that was refreshing and indicative of sincerity; there were no preliminary feasts with *geisha* attendants; in a few minutes a decision was made and that decision was, other things being equal, final. There is no substantial change in business methods now, but there is a very great and pleasing change in the deportment of the Chinese — outside of their offices and after the cares and duties of the day have been set aside, there is now plenty of friendly intercourse. We can hardly call it social intercourse, because that word properly connotes to us the commingling of sexes in our society,

a thing unknown and abhorrent in China as yet, and not likely to develop rapidly in that soil.

In diplomatic matters a competent authority has said that the frankness and limpid sincerity of the American Ministers was, for a long time, something inexplicable to the Chinese statesmen in the early days of our intercourse. There was really so little for our representatives to do along these devious and bewildering lines that there was nothing which could be identified as American diplomacy; and the demands of the British, later joined by the French, were beyond the comprehension of the natives, whose conception of the art of government and of treaty was based upon the simple, straightforward methods of such men as Tai Tsong, of whom Mailla speaks so highly. That strangers, even from such a distance as Western Europe, should wish to come as tribute bearers to the Ruler of Great China and should seek permission to engage in trade with the people of his country, was something quite intelligible and altogether natural; but that those same "barbarians" should demand these things as a right, and should add to that demand another to the effect that the Chinese Ruler must acknowledge them as representatives of emperors and kings fully equal in rank, dignity, and power with the Son of Heaven, who must receive and treat them accordingly, was something incredible. Such was not the tone taken by our representatives. It is true that we asserted and sustained our right to be received as equals, refused to *kaotao*, and insisted upon sharing the benefits which the Europeans' course of procedure had wrung from the unwilling Chinese; but

they themselves had come very near establishing a precedent when Kiying, Governor-General of Nanking and treaty commissioner, declared that all foreigners should share alike in whatever benefits the treaties conferred in business, religion, residence, or privilege. Therefore we entered upon our relations with less embarrassment than others; we established and pursued a more liberal course than some others, and when the time came for us to sit down as a neighbour of China, we were cordially welcomed. It cannot be said that there has never been any friction in our diplomatic relations, because the Chinese Government has, at times, expressed dissatisfaction with our treatment of Chinese subjects; still this has never been of an alarming nature, because that government from the earliest times has taken the stand that if a subject saw fit to leave his native country, he did so at his own risk, expatriated himself, and forfeited the protection of his Emperor. This position, reaffirmed in several instances — notably that of certain Chinese who long ago died in French territory and whose bodies were denied the right of return — made it less difficult for us to secure a sort of official recognition of our right to put in force the exclusion Bills. One statement may be of interest to readers who are not familiar with diplomatic conditions: our position at Peking has sometimes suffered a little because of our unwillingness to surround it with the pomp and dignity which other governments give to their legation. For a long time we refused to own our legation and other official residences, we did not supply a staff commensurate with our dignity, we did not sanction the wearing of Court dress or embellish-

ment of any kind; our Minister and his secretary of legation were notoriously underpaid, as compared with the salaries and emoluments supplied to the representatives of other Powers, and there was never any provision made for the perfunctory, official entertainments. These matters may seem of trifling importance to many; and when applied to any countries except China and Japan would be so, because in all the courts of Europe the ruler and the statesmen look past the person of the ambassador or minister to that which he represents; whereas in China and Japan it is foolishly true that the gold lace, the equipage, the pretentious edifice, and the numerous staff do exert considerable influence.

In matters of trade there is much to be said for and against the way the Chinese accepted us as newcomers with proprietary rights in the Far East. In their own land they are still controlled as to customs revenue by the conventions and treaties of long ago. With but few exceptions the maximum duty levied on imports is five per cent. Knowing that our views on tariff exactions were widely different from what they were allowed to do in their own case — it must not be assumed that they will let this matter remain unadjusted should they ever regain tariff autonomy — it was but natural that the Chinese should expect from us something of sympathy in this particular matter — possibly consideration in the Philippines because of their own helpless condition at home. Needless to say they have been disappointed. Again, it was but natural for the Chinese to expect us to adapt ourselves to conditions existing in the Far East and beyond our power to alter, even if we had the desire

to do so; being now a part of the Orient, an expansion of trade comes almost as a matter of course. This expansion most properly should extend to the Chinese markets because the going to and fro of merchants would familiarize them with the requirements of their Chinese neighbours, and, in a way, the expectation has been realized; yet the lessons which others have taken seriously to heart and by which they have profited, are too often ignored by the American merchant who, notwithstanding this, thinks his share in the China trade is not what it ought to be. The reason is not difficult to find; the expansion of his operations, which success in exploiting the Chinese business might bring to the typical American manufacturer and merchant, is too often looked upon as an ornamental appanage, not as a fundamental feature of his legitimate business. Having a large market at home to supply and having the most ample facilities for reaching almost every nook and corner of his own land, he prepares his products in that way which suits his own ideas of packing and shipping. If his case or his bale satisfies the Chinese methods of carriage, well and good; he will fill orders as fast as they are received, always, however, giving precedence to his home and regular customers. It seems to be no part of the American manufacturer's duty to send his agents right away into the heart of China, there to study the language so that he may deal direct with native purchasers, ascertain just how the things to be sold should be packed to suit the peculiar conditions of the case, and what deviation from established form may stimulate consumption; as a consequence there is less expansion of our trade than

there might be; because our European competitors *are* pursuing precisely that line of tactics which, it has been more than intimated here, will and do ensure expansion and great results. When contemplating this phase of their feeling towards the newcomers, ourselves, the Chinese are too often dissatisfied, and one reason for this brings back a topic that was briefly touched upon in the Introduction to this book.

In commenting upon business methods of the Far East a number of authors of books, writers of magazine articles, and newspaper correspondents have referred to the lordly "Taipan" as conducting all his operations through his "Compradore" and entrusting to his "Shroff" the entire duty of receiving and disbursing cash — some going so far as to let this latter native employee deposit his surplus receipts at the end of the day to the credit of the firm's account in bank. The system, and it is here made to include both Compradore and Shroff, is a pernicious one which began centuries ago because then the merchants had no special desire or incentive to learn the Chinese language, and it has been kept up ever since, largely because of sheer laziness which prevents a change, and a feeling that the time given to the study of the language can be spent more pleasantly and more profitably (that is, selfish profit) in the club, on the river, at the race course, or anywhere else that health-giving exercises may be had or health-sapping dissipation pursued. The Chinese themselves despise this phase of the foreign business which necessitates the Compradore and Shroff; the merchants always have done so, when they have not had a command of colloquial English or a

smattering of that atrocious "Pidgin English" which is the *lingua franca* of the treaty-ports of China. To-day very few of the leading native merchants trouble themselves to learn English, because they are discouraged from doing so by the Compradore of the American or English house who wishes to keep the control of business in his own hands as much as possible; and this, of course, means an illegitimate commission for those native employees in some way. Those merchants, for a long time, rather preferred *not* to have any personal dealings with the foreigners; they knew nothing of each other's ways; there was an offensive air of patronizing superiority about the foreigner that the native properly resented. That air still breathes in far too many American and European "hong" offices; but it is not nearly so noticeable in the German commercial establishments. Nowadays, the average Chinese merchant would like nothing better than to extend the time given to his purely buying or selling transactions, with a little conversation about business affairs in the West; the kind that expands the horizons of both participants, not the senseless gossip that often wastes time and brings no good results. That so few American merchants can speak Chinese, much, very much, less read it, and that so many Germans can do both, is probably a greater reason than all others for the expansion of Germany's trade in the Far East; and the disappearance of the Compradore or Shroff from some of the German offices, or the abridgment of his duties to the possible minimum, is another reason for it. If American merchants would insist upon every new clerk taking a thorough course in Chinese, vernacular

and written, for from two to three years, and then require him to keep up his practice so that in a short time the coming Taipans may be able to negotiate direct with their customers, eliminating the Compradore, it would go a great way towards deepening the friendly feeling that the Chinese have for us. There is among them, as among all Asiatics (the few "swell-head" Japanese excepted), a feeling, firmly based upon experience, that there is more disposition among Americans to let them have a fair chance to get along in the world than some other nations show them; and it will be our own fault entirely if this feeling does not increase; only it is depending mainly upon ourselves to decide how this shall be brought about, and it is our personal conviction that our financiers, industrialists, and merchants who go to China must do more with the language. It is supposed to be one of the most difficult to learn — perhaps it would be nearer the truth to say that all Americans who have not tried, are convinced that it is *the* most difficult, but this is not so. As a matter of fact it is much easier to learn to speak Chinese well than it is to do the same thing with the Japanese language. Where there is one American who can talk freely with a Japanese upon any subject, and carry on a general conversation that switches from one topic to another — just as we go from one thing to another as we chat with an acquaintance — there are a score who speak Chinese so well as to be mistaken for a native, if they cannot be seen. With Chinese the difficulty comes at the very first — to catch the intonation, to divide up the torrent of sound which pours from Chinese lips into the component parts; after that

difficulty disappears, because the locution is regular and the grammatical construction simplicity itself. With Japanese there is no initial difficulty, the spoken language is so vocalic as to seem alluringly simple, but the trouble soon begins and never is wholly overcome; locution is as varying as is the topic, grammar is as whimsical as is the nature of those who speak this language, and the good Francis Xavier was quite correct when he avowed that the Japanese language was an invention of the Evil One.

The effect upon China of our entrance into the Far Eastern arena has been a good one; for the doubtful friendship of the Spaniards has been substituted a confidence and sympathy that are inspiring; instead of sloth has come activity; instead of oppression has come encouragement; and an example of oppression, which had sunk deep in the Chinese mind, has been replaced with one that encouraged those people to claim their place among the Powers, to be again the first in the Far East and to be not only in the world but of it. The linking up of West and East — the neighbourliness of the youngest, strongest, and wealthiest nation with the oldest and (for a time, certainly) the weakest, has brought much of hope to the Chinese and they look to us to "make good." If the Pacific Ocean is to be the centre around which are to be the greatest of the world's population, commerce, wealth, and power, it is likely to be the arena where the great issues of the future will settle forever the questions of free institutions or the supremacy of free man. That America now occupies important territory on both sides of this arena, with possession of

the "Key of the Pacific," *i.e.* the Hawaiian Islands, is not in our opinion a mere accident, and the thoughtful Chinese statesmen, the open-eyed publicist, and the aspiring captains of industry accept this theory without, as yet, showing a spark of jealousy. It was a mistake, in our opinion, for the United States ever to take up the burden of managing the Philippines, but the mistake does not now justify our abandoning the task to which we put our hands. We are in the archipelago to stay until we are convinced ourselves, and have demonstrated to the rest of the world, that we have educated the native population to the point where they can be entrusted with the solemn duty of governing themselves and taking their place in the comity of nations. It is a tremendous task, for — with many other difficulties — it presents the supremest one of welding into a homogeneous mass a number of units that are so dissimilar as the peoples, tribes, and sub-tribes of the Philippine Archipelago. China, just across the narrow sea, looks on with sympathy and yet with confidence. She, too, has her task to perform; institutions of hoary antiquity must either be thrown down altogether or so remodelled to meet the requirements of New China as to be unrecognizable; there must be either a blending of peoples into a closer union than has ever yet been, or a separation which will bring results that cannot now be even vaguely surmised. China expects our sympathy and our support and the expectation must not be disappointed.

The attitude which China has always assumed towards her smaller and less powerful neighbours is somewhat analogous to our own Monroe Doctrine, a certain domin-

ion has been claimed, a moral superiority asserted, and a right of control, which could be exercised or evaded at her own pleasure, has been insisted upon. But our Monroe Doctrine had always been brought forward in a way which seemed to have been deliberately controverted by America's assuming possession of the Philippines. After warning off European Powers from the American continent, to establish a sphere of influence by right of possession through purchase in the extreme East, was astonishing. There was no thought of resenting the seeming stultification; the coming was welcomed, the experiment watched with the keenest interest. The United States, from the outset, declared its intention to maintain supervisory rights in the spirit of brotherhood, not as harsh conquerors. When the impatient Filipinos resented an attempt at government and demanded absolute independence forthwith, without any pretence at recompensation, the firmness of our government in suppressing the insurrection met with approval among the Chinese. Since the progress of education and civilization has been uninterrupted, it is but natural that China has felt disposed to look for sympathy in her effort at progress and, if it is to be, reorganization which may lead to independence. This does not imply any disposition to lend assistance to the violent extremists in China, those semi-anarchists who would overthrow without being competent to set up; while we are more firmly convinced than ever of the success and permanency of our own institutions, our forms of government, central and state, our independent democracy, there has never been any disposition on our part to incite revolution in

countries where established monarchy has been reasonable and just; nor have we ever encouraged revolution even where the absolute monarch has been oppressive. We were not responsible at all for the outbreaking of the French Revolution; nor for the Cuban Revolt. Our government must not be made to stand responsible for the acts of individuals or even political parties; it has always given support to organized government elsewhere. Therefore it was not we who brought about the Spanish-American War and the consequent displacing of Spanish Government in the Philippines; yet when the Fates decreed that we should take Spain's place we did so in our own way and that way has been absorbingly interesting to many Chinese. Possibly there may be Chinese who are reasoning that if the experiment which we are making in the Philippines results satisfactorily in qualifying the Filipinos for absolute independence, it will not be unreasonable for us to render assistance to a revolutionary party in China, which aims at a republic instead of the Imperial form that has existed so long. The reasoning, if it exists, may not be altogether illogical, because the civilization of China has been quite sufficiently permanent to forbid comparison with the development in the Philippines, prior to 1898 — for Spain's effort, beyond a very trifling success in evangelization, is a negligible quantity. Besides, the feeble, tentative experiments of the Chinese at local government, if not successful in appreciable measure, have suggested a capacity for republican institutions which might, if properly fostered, be brought up to a standard which would make for permanency and good. During the past

ten years such radicals as Kang Yu-wei was, have expressed gratification at the proximity of American republican institutions as offering encouragement to their ambitions and as being a good object lesson for the people of China. This is extremely visionary, to be sure, but it is one of the phases of China's contemplation of the United States' incursion into Asiatic regions.

Before closing this chapter, it will be interesting and instructive to give some information condensed from the observations of Mr. John Foreman, who has lived long in the Philippines, and has known conditions there, both under Spanish jurisdiction and since the United States acquired possession. Under Spanish rules, the Chinese were very different from the often troublesome coolie of such semi-foreign places as Hongkong or Singapore. "In Manila, he was drilled past docility—in six months he became even fawning, cringing, and servile, until goaded into open rebellion. Whatever position he might attain to, he was never addressed (as in the British colonies) as 'Mr.,' or 'Esqre.,' or the equivalent, 'Señor D.'; but always 'Chinaman —,' ('Chino —')." There was no Chinese consul in the days of Spain, but one of their countrymen was a sort of protector or dictator during the last decade or so of Spanish rule. At the present time there is a Chinese consul whose responsibilities are far more paternal than we are accustomed to expect in such officials; he has taught his nationals that their position is much improved from what it was under the old regime. The Chinese now bear themselves with a pleasing self-respect, never—save in those individual cases which find their parallel in

every country and among all classes — with an offensive equality or worse superiority. "They mix freely with the whites in public places with an air of social equality, and occupy stalls in the theatre which they would not have dared enter in pre-American times. The Chinese chamber of commerce is also of recent foundation, and its status is so far recognized by the Americans that it was invited to express an opinion on the Internal Revenue Bill." The Chinese in the Philippines greatly ease the difficulties of solving the labour problems, for no one has a good word to say for the faithfulness, diligence, or reliability of the Filipino; and if the Chinese were allowed free entry, they would, through intermarriage — for the Filipino women take kindly to their Chinese lords and masters — "perpetuate the smartest pure Oriental mixed class in the Islands." If, however, their exclusion should be maintained, although there are now upwards of fifty thousand in the whole archipelago, there will be a markedly adverse effect upon many lines of development. On the whole, it must be manifest that China — the government, the progressive officials, and the people at large — looks with satisfaction upon the entry of the United States into the Far Eastern arena.



THE BUND, SHANGHAI



## CHAPTER VIII

### *MISSIONARY EFFORT AS A FACTOR IN CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT\**

THE Manichean heresy is alleged to have found its way into China about the year 276 A.D., but this is something that possesses no sufficient interest to give space to its consideration here.

If we were to discuss the topic suggested by the title of this chapter in its fullest sense, we should, of course, include the efforts of Jews, Buddhists, Moslems, and all other representatives of foreign faith who sought to convert the Chinese from their native superstitions to a belief in the doctrines held by those different strangers themselves; but that subject passes too far beyond the scope of this volume; so, also, we could dwell upon another aspect of that remarkable power of assimilation which has been noted. There are certainly some Mahomedans still in China, but their number is not now comparable with what it was at one time, and their tenets have almost succumbed to the influence of surroundings; and the Jews, in other parts of the world conspicuous for their absolute invulnerable alle-

\* For some of the facts upon which the story of the new educational scheme is based, the writer has drawn upon "China and America To-day," Smith; "Changing China," Cecil; "The Educational Conquest of China," Stothill.

giance to their doctrines, have simply disappeared in the assimilation of the Chinese; they have sold their sacred scriptures and their synagogues, and with only a sad memory of a long, silent struggle, the Jews in the Chinese Empire are at the point of extinction.

As to the very first effort of Christian missionaries to carry the knowledge of their God and the teachings of His Son to the people of China, we cannot go wrong if we accept the statement of Williams. It cannot now be proved, nor so far as we can see can it be absolutely disproved, that the apostle Thomas was the first to impart to the Chinese a knowledge of Christianity. Whether the legend connected with Emperor Ming-ti's dream and the prophecy of Confucius be accepted as relating to a rumour about the new religion of Christ, or not, is not of much importance; yet, convinced as we are that at the time of Christ's life and teachings the Chinese were having intercourse with the people of the extreme southwestern parts of Asia, including the Holy Land, it seems entirely reasonable to assume that they *did* hear of the faith which was certainly stirring up the peoples all around the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Arnobius, 300 A.D., speaks of the Christian deeds done in India, and among the Seres, Persians, and Medes; these Seres were, of course, the people of the silk-producing country, that is, China.

By all authorities it is said that the Nestorian missionaries arrived in China very early in the sixth century of our era, probably in 505 A.D. The "Nestorian Tablet" at Si-ngan fu, a city in Shensi province, is considered authentic, and the date affixed thereto, corre-

sponding to 781 A.D., is accepted as genuine. The text of the tablet, which was discovered in 1625, is a lengthy eulogium of "The Illustrious Religion in China," and its matter indicates that the doctrine had been preached for many years before the tablet was prepared. It furnishes evidence that Christianity had made great progress in China, but we know that during the reign of the Yuen (Mongol) Dynasty the Nestorians suffered much and were eventually driven out; although the foreign priests, if any remained, and their converts had already ceased to preserve the purity of the Christian faith.

The Roman Catholic missionaries began active work in China in the thirteenth century, although it is undoubtedly true that individual priests had made their way into that country before them. The first attempt at what may be called a settled mission was that of John of Montecorvino, sent out by Pope Nicholas IV, in 1288. The Nestorian converts opposed these newcomers, and little progress was made for some years, but eventually great success was gained, so that by the time of Emperor Jên Tsung (Ayuli Palapta reigned 1312-1321) there were many flourishing Christian communities in Northern China. Then there appears a gap; but with the sending of Matteo Ricci, in 1552, began the second period in the history of Romish missions in China. The Government was now opposed to the residence of these foreign missionaries and to their teachings, but the Jesuits were not expelled until 1724-1732. The missionaries had, however, many friends in the noble and influential families, and certainly accomplished

much in their propaganda; the consideration of their work is most interesting and instructive, yet — as has been the case in other mission fields — the quarrels between sects brought the whole class into disrepute and eventually disaster; the persecution which followed upon the edict for their expulsion was most severe. In material matters, the influence of many of the early Roman Catholics was almost wholly for good; they are properly credited with having taught the Chinese many useful things about science, particularly mathematics; but Protestants find it difficult to discover really salutary effects from their religious teachings.

The enthusiasm and zeal, in what they rightly believed to be their Master's cause, almost naturally led the first Protestant missionaries to devote themselves more or less exclusively to dogmatic Christian propaganda. To do this it was, of course, first necessary to get some command of the language, if they were to reach the people, and to this object Morrison, the eminent pioneer, gave his whole attention for a while. He was so successful that before long he was employed by the East India Company as its official interpreter. Odd as it may seem — but it is only fair to give even the devil his due — this Company furnished great assistance to the missionaries, although it was all the time working most assiduously, and all too effectively, to debauch the people of China by smuggling opium and encouraging the natives, in direct violation of their country's laws, to increase their consumption of the drug. Although Morrison's Chinese-English dictionary has long since been superseded by others that are more compreh-


hensive, more accurate, and more satisfactory in every way, yet it is still entitled to and receives the respectful attention of every Sinologue. The literature put out by the earliest Protestant missionaries, when they were so far advanced in their linguistic attainments as to be able to supply themselves with the needed printing apparatus, was almost entirely in the nature of tracts inveighing against the pernicious doctrines which they found to prevail; translations of parts of the Holy Scriptures — the New Testament portions dealing with the life of Christ and the founding of His Church, and expositions of the superiority of their creed. All this was very well in its way, but ere long the missionaries discovered that the most effective form of procedure was to minister to the physical ailments of the people in the best way that medical science then put at their disposal, if they wished to reach their spiritual wants satisfactorily. Their success, nearly a hundred years ago, won for them the gratitude and admiration of men of all classes; even the mandarins, who were zealously striving to curb the pretentious demands of the traders, speedily came to differentiate between those who were determined to supply opium and those who were striving to ameliorate the pitiful condition of the suffering. Among the native merchants there were amazement and incredulity; they were disposed to render every assistance in their power to further the efforts of the missionary doctors, even going so far as to contribute money towards the equipment and maintenance of hospitals, and raising no objections to the physicians' efforts to convert their patients; but with all this there was a

strange scepticism; such disinterestedness was something new to them and inexplicable, from their point of view. Consequently, we find that the very men who were giving material aid were at the same time employing spies to see what the doctors were trying to do that must be prejudicial to their own private interests or harmful to society and the national government. In Williams' "Middle Kingdom" there are several translations of letters and poems from those who had themselves been relieved by the foreign doctors, or whose relatives and friends had been cured of some organic weakness — of the eyes, especially — or wasting disease.

It was a very long time before any of the Protestant missionaries came to realize properly the necessity for pursuing a definite course in their efforts to teach Christianity and one quite different from the dogmatic way that has been concisely, though somewhat roughly, expressed thus: "You are heathen. You have no true religion; that which you call religion is but a snare of the Devil to lure you on to eternal spiritual damnation. Burn your idols, tear down your temples, and give up your evil superstitions; then take this true doctrine I have to give you, and be saved." But the time came when good Christians began to see that there was another and a better way to carry forward their work with a reasonable assurance of success. When comparative religion came to be recognized as a science, and men were made to see that in what they had scornfully called "the heathen religions" there might be, indeed, usually is, a germ of truth which has been diverted from true, beneficent development by improper environment,



GEOMETRY AT ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI



IN THE SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI



by superstition, or by some other cause; then the tone assumed by the Christian missionaries — not only in China, but all the world over — underwent a change. Now the argument was: "You have been taught to believe certain statements which you think are religious truths. Have these always satisfied your highest spiritual aspirations? Has not your Confucianism given you entire confidence that your paths here on earth are beset by evil spirits? Does your Buddhism help you to look upon death calmly in the expectation of a glorious hereafter, if you have tried to live aright and according to Buddha's teachings? Does your Taoism really teach you anything at all? We shall be glad to listen to all you have to say in support of your religion; provided you will afterwards also listen to what we have to say of the religion of Jesus Christ. If we make out a stronger case for our religion than you can for yours, will you not agree to study ours carefully?"

From this, it was but natural that progress should go on to general education. To qualify a man clearly to understand and sincerely to believe the truths of the Christian religion, he must of necessity know something of the world, unless, perchance, he has been born in an atmosphere so filled with that faith that even by the most ignorant mentally it is taken as a matter of course; and then it is anything but satisfactory, being conducive to bigotry. Hence into the mission schools which were soon established came courses of general education, and very often such a broadening of the conception of duty as led the principals to relieve their pupils from obligation to take, as part of their edu-

cation, lessons in the Bible and on the Christian faith; leaving these more or less to the option of the pupil, yet always striving to exert such influence by precept and practice as to make the faith for which the teachers stood attractive. This is the method that has made the efforts of Protestant Christian missionaries in China so potent a factor in development along all lines. Missionaries are only human beings, after all; among us Protestants there are no longer saints and even the blessed ones who are canonized gained their saintship because of thoroughly human deeds done in the flesh. All missionaries are not perfect examples of what they profess to teach; there are jealousies, weaknesses of all kinds among them, and a few have not these weaknesses under control; but as a rule the Chinese find that there is a consistency among the Christian missionaries; that they do try to practise what they preach. Granting that there is a substratum of truth in what Sir Robert Hart puts into the mouth of the supposititious Chinese speaker who says that when his government is called upon to pay indemnity for damage done to mission property, it finds itself, to its amazement, asked to satisfy the demands of would-be millionaires; it is manifest that there is somewhat of hyperbole about this, for, as a rule, these claims have not been more than is needed to restore and re-equip the missions. For, while possibly complaining of the amount of the bills for damage done by mobs, or Boxers, or the like (we pass without comment one flagrant exception which has been condemned by all save most of the people of that country which improperly benefited thereby), that very same govern-

ment has called upon missionaries to take the lead in organizing its own public educational schemes.

The plan of the late Emperor Kuang Hsü for an educational system, which was to abandon entirely the old methods and strike out upon a course as nearly as possible parallel with that of schools and colleges in America and England, was magnificent and, but for the disastrous *coup d'état* of the Empress Dowager, would have been successfully inaugurated as long ago as 1898. Although Chang Chih-tung has been deservedly called "China's Greatest Viceroy," it cannot be forgotten that it was his teachings, given in the little volume, "China's Only Hope," that has already been mentioned, which in large measure brought about that bloody coup, caused the overthrow of the enthusiastic young Emperor, the decapitation of the patriotic members of the Reform party, and, indirectly perhaps, the "Boxer Insurrection." Not only this, but the "Clear out all the foreigners" policy advocated by Prince Tuan, and which for a time seemed to be a popular slogan throughout the whole of China, was but another phase of the ideas advocated in Chang Chih-tung's book. This influence and its resulting movement has, in great measure if not wholly, disappeared, and the cry of "China for the Chinese" assumes a different aspect. For in the revived plan for the Peking University the assistance and co-operation of foreigners, including missionaries, were asked for by the Imperial Government and granted with good results.

We cannot possibly give credit to the foreign captains of industry or the merchants from America and Europe

for all the success that has been achieved in establishing modern schools in China, although we cheerfully acknowledge that many of these men have contributed generously to the support of such institutions under mission control. Nor is it right to say that the results so far achieved have been due to the knowledge gained by the commissions sent abroad by the Chinese Government to investigate educational systems of the West. The main inspiration has been the mission school and the methods followed there. The greatest change that has as yet come to pass in China was the definite abolition of the old-style examination for qualification to enter the civil service. It was the Empress Dowager's edict of September, 1905, which brought this about, yet we know her action was only the giving of effect to that which her nephew had decided upon years before. The first of these new examinations, that are destined to cause an upheaval, was held in October, 1906. It took up parts of two days (these were not consecutive, however), and fifty-three candidates were examined by the new Board of Education for the highest degree provided in the Chinese Civil Service. There was no restriction as to rank, age (although the average was about twenty-four), or religious belief. Twenty-three of the number had studied in Japanese universities, colleges, or schools; sixteen had been in the United States; two in England; and one in Germany. Twelve of the candidates were given first rank, and with the exception of one who had studied at Trinity Hall, England, all of these were graduates of American colleges. Three questions were given for the first day's

examination: First, Define philosophy and distinguish it from science and ethics. Explain the following systems of philosophical thought: Dualism, Theism, Idealism, Materialism, Pantheism, Agnosticism. How would you classify, according to Western methods, the following-named Chinese philosophers: Chuang Tzü, Chang Tsai, Chü Tzü, Lu Tzü, and Wang Yang-ming? Second, Explain why philosophy developed earliest in Greece. What are the leading thoughts in the teaching of Heraclitus? Why will his system, at one time almost obsolete, again become popular? Third, Expound fully Mill's four methods of induction, and mention some of the scientific discoveries and inventions which may be directly traced to them. On the second day of the examination the theme for the required essay was: Will it be expedient for China to adopt the system of compulsory education?

Compare these questions, bearing in mind that exposition, according to the candidate's own views, was the one thing demanded, and that identification, by chapter and verse as one might say, was not even contemplated, with this "catch" question which Williams tells us was put at the co-ordinate examination in 1853 (and the same sort of thing was done right down into the twentieth century): "He acts as he ought, both to the common people and official men, receives his revenue from heaven, and by it is protected and highly esteemed." Precise identification was of prime importance and any variation from the literal text of the original had to be noted to secure approval. Or compare the new questions with these which were considered "practical":

"Fire-arms began with the use of rockets in the Chau Dynasty; in what books do we first meet with the word for 'cannon'? Is the defence of Kai-fung fu its first recorded use? Kublai Khan, it is said, obtained cannon of a new kind; from whom did he obtain them? When the Ming emperors in the reign of Yung Loh invaded Cochin China, they obtained a kind of cannon called the weapon of the gods; can you give an account of their origin?" It at once becomes manifest that the departure from the old system is a veritable right-about, and the consternation caused in the ranks of the conservative *literati* was such as to convince them that China was plunging headlong to inevitable ruin. No longer was it necessary to memorize the Confucian Classics; the pure literary style of two thousand years was wiped out, and for them was substituted a something new with which China had formed its first acquaintance in the mission schools of recent times.

In determining the attainments of those who were qualified to pass, these conditions were given importance in the order named: First, the foreign university or college that had conferred a degree on the candidate — and much incisive discrimination was shown; second, the character and scope of work done since graduation; third, the merit of the examination papers themselves. Those who were marked eighty or over, out of a possible one hundred, were given the first degree (Chin Shih, Member of the Hanlin College), and eight were successful; those who reached seventy obtained a first-class second degree (Chu jen); those who reached sixty, a second class of the same rank; while those who were

marked fifty received merely a certificate that they had attended the examination. The candidates were allowed to write their papers either in Chinese or any Western language they chose; and all those who had studied in America or England decided to use English. This permission itself shows, as one of the ablest of the successful men (Dr. W. W. Yen) says that "at last the barriers in the way of Western knowledge have been battered down, and the new education in China will become something real and thorough." Contrary to all previous experience, no one was given an official position simply because he had passed the examination, no matter what his grading, that being left to be determined by other considerations. This wipes out the superstition that every man able to satisfy literary examiners is therefore fitted to hold office and must necessarily forthwith be provided with a post at government expense.

No religious test whatever was applied to the candidates, and what was most important of all, no distinction was made between Christians and non-Christians. It had been declared for many years that this freedom as to religion had obtained at these literary examinations, and perhaps the statement was true; but it is also certainly true that not many years ago the professing Christian found it impossible to pass any but the very lowest of such examinations, and that even in that grade his religion was a serious obstacle. Nine of the successful candidates were Christians; eight were Protestants, and one was a Roman Catholic; and if all those are included who had pursued their studies in Christian

institutions, the number would be even larger. As a matter of fact, all save some of those who had studied in Japan had been under Christian influence. That the missionaries in China may claim that what they have done along educational lines formed the basis upon which this new superstructure has been, or is to be, raised, can hardly be denied.\*

What a marvellous change this shows! We can easily recall the time when the Chinese who knew anything of literature, outside that of his own Classics, was a phenomenon. It is only about forty years ago, that Yih, the Governor-General of the two Kuang provinces, was seized by the British when they captured the city of Canton. He was taken on board a man-of-war and carried a prisoner and hostage to Calcutta. On the long voyage his apathy and idleness led one of the officers to ask if he never read anything, and his reply was that there was nothing for him to read, because the contents of all the books in the world were already "in his stomach." Then, about the same time, or a little earlier, the fact that a Chinese translation of a part of one of the Gospels was found among the possessions of the captain of a captured war-junk caused the greatest astonishment to his countrymen.

This attempt to introduce Western learning may justly

\* "Among those who took degrees at this examination was a graduate of an American Dental College, and another whose forte was engineering. The delicious absurdity of bestowing the stately title of 'Entered Scholar' (Chin-shih) upon students of this type was not lost upon the reactionary party. Even more open to criticism was the entire absence of any requirements as to attainments in the native language of the candidates, one of whom, according to Dr. Yen, could not write his own name decently in Chinese!" Smith, op. cit.

be called the most remarkable and decisive intellectual revolution in the history of mankind; it is so, whether we think of it as casting aside the precedence of twenty centuries or more and the millions whom its affects, by making the pursuit of learning a joy from its very beginning, or contemplate the future results when the present plans, even, are carried out into general operation. Even in this beginning, so quickly did the enthusiasm take possession of the people, that absolute confusion came. It was impossible for missionaries, clergy and laity, to respond to the calls made upon them to organize schools, to make out courses of study and schedules of lessons, to render assistance as teachers in private or prefectual schools, and anybody who professed to be able to teach was plumped into the master's chair. Half-baked Japanese students, with the merest smattering of Western knowledge, were called in by the hundreds, while many more came of their own motion, and set up private schools that were worse than nothing. In this mad rush for improved educational methods, as in some other respects, the old-time teacher, China, was more than ready to sit at the feet of her former pupil, Japan; but quickly the superficiality of the would-be teacher was detected, and if there seemed to be for a time strong probability of China becoming wholly Japanized, that soon passed away, and now if competent teachers from America or Europe cannot be had, the Chinese are content to wait until they are available. The normal schools — or the institutions which fill the same place as the normal schools do in our scheme of education — will begin to supply material before long

and the Chinese will assert themselves in educational matters as they always have done in other ways, and they will come to manage their own affairs, as they are abundantly able to do.

It is not alone in the department of education, or in the study of Western literature, that the influence of the missionaries has been exerted for good. Probably the best instruction they have received has been in the refinements of Western civilization. The idea of "home" was a very crude one in the Chinese mind; the position of woman was positively degrading, as must be the case when Confucianism and Buddhism hold sway; but read the chapter, "The Princesses—Their Schools," in Headland's "Court Life in China," and see if there has not been a marked improvement at the top of the social scale during the last ten years or so. According to Chinese notions this sort of thing always begins at the top and works its way downwards and outwards: "When the upper classes are really virtuous, the common people will inevitably become so" is their way of expressing the conviction that reforms must begin in the social superiors and extend their influence downwards to the inferiors. Now, perhaps, it is too much to say that the education, which the Manchu princesses and the Chinese ladies of higher rank in and near the Imperial Court are acquiring, and the knowledge of Western etiquette, which gives them a better position than they had, are directly the effect of missionary teaching; yet it cannot be denied that it evinces an imitation of that which the Manchus more than any others disliked. In many other matters the influence



HILL TEMPLE, AMOY



WHITE STAG TEMPLE, AMOY



of the faithful missionary has been productive of good; it is something to know that many Chinese mothers who were never accustomed to give attention to sanitation, personal care of their children, and many other cognate matters, owe the first suggestion of these things to the direct teaching of American women connected with our missions; or at least that they heard of them from what those Western mothers do, and now they themselves pay the flattery of imitation.

In a memorial submitted to the Emperor in 1906 by Yuan Shih-k'ai, Governor-General of the Province of Chihli, in which is the capital, Peking, and which therefore is necessarily the meeting-ground of inertia and progress, ultra-conservatism and radicalism, that official gave a list of educational institutions within his jurisdiction that were all conducted according to Western methods:

The Imperial Pei Yang University at Tientsin.

The Higher School (College) at Pao-ting fu; this being organized as is its congener, the Koto Gakko (Higher Schools) of Japan. These schools are sometimes called "High" Schools; but that is not strictly correct; they are at least one grade in advance of the American "High Schools," and they are not at all comparable with the German "Hochschule." They are essentially collegiate in their organization and methods.

The Imperial Army Medical College.

The Industrial High School and the Agricultural High Schools; besides Agricultural and Industrial Primary Schools to the number of twenty-one.

The Telegraph Higher School (College).

The School of Drawing (Mechanical and Artistic).

The Higher Normal Schools, Ordinary Normal Schools, and other training schools, eighty-nine in number. This arrangement is intended to provide a supply of competent native teachers for all parts of the empire as schools are opened and a requisition made for teachers: first, for the primary schools of general course; and, second, for the advanced schools and colleges providing special or technical courses.

Middle Schools, twenty-seven: a grade corresponding to the last years of our public schools and our grammar schools.

Advanced Schools, coordinate with our High Schools, one hundred and eighty-two in number.

Primary Schools, four thousand one hundred and sixty-two.

The Women's Normal School.

Girls' Schools, forty.

Yamun-runners' Schools, fifteen. The Yamun is the official residence of a district magistrate (Tao-tai) and his messengers ("runners," because they are always assumed to be sent out on urgent business and therefore "to run," which they usually do literally). It is important that they should have a fair education; but this school contemplates something more than the rudiments of Chinese; for example, something of English.

There are two kindergartens in Tientsin; nineteen schools giving a half-day course, of these, ten are official, and nine private; fifteen night schools, with an average of two teachers and twenty-five pupils each; one Chinese-German school; one school for the secretaries of officials; one for "domestic servants," giving

instruction in English and in “foreign ways”; one commercial school; and a general educational association.

The number of pupils in attendance at all these schools, colleges, etc., exclusive of those in the half-day and in the night schools, was about 87,000. Including the military and police schools, the total was upwards of 100,000.

The educational museum, founded by order of the Industrial Bureau in 1905, is another very useful institution; it provides apparatus for experiments in physics and science, and furnishes instruments required in properly teaching other branches. There is an Industrial Training Institute, which gives gratuitous instruction to poor pupils and trains them to become skilful workers and artisans; there were one thousand, five years ago, who were taught by fifteen skilful instructors, three of whom were foreign experts.

The desire to secure this “new learning” has spread into rural districts far from the centres, like Peking, Tientsin, and Pao-ting fu; in a village thirty-five miles from Tientsin there was a flourishing girls’ school, where, in addition to the Chinese written language and literature, arithmetic (Western), geography, elementary science, sewing, drawing, calisthenics, music (Western), and etiquette were taught. The school-room was arranged in somewhat the same manner as those of America and Europe. There were charts hanging on the walls to give suggestions in biology, zoölogy, and physical culture. The room was also equipped with Western maps (drawn to a scale) and blackboards. The pupils were taught to sing to the accompaniment of an organ. This was a free school, supported by a wealthy family of the

place, one of whom gave her services as the head teacher. In many outlying places of the province there are similar schools and from these statements the influences operating in the Coming China may be estimated.

Chihli is divided into one hundred and twenty-four magisterial districts, in each of which there were about twenty primary schools, having on an average an attendance of thirty boys; besides, here and there, were schools for girls; in all of them the course was upon the national plan provided by the new education, and quite different from the old method. Each district has one "lower-primary" and one "higher-primary" school, in each of which about fifty boys were studying their Chinese book and were also given a start in modern history, geography, arithmetic, and simple science. In each of the sixteen prefectoral cities (the larger divisions of a province are called "prefectures") there was one Middle School where the study of English was begun; and in these schools the courses in arithmetic and mathematics were more advanced. Much attention was given to national sentiment and to military drill, physical culture being made an important feature. In the lower grade schools there was a crude military drill; but the pupils in the higher schools were uniformed and drilled with rifles, and were taught proper field operations. Much emphasis was laid upon the duty of developing China in ways comparable with that which Japan has followed. "Nationalism" was a conspicuous feature.

In the whole of this scheme of local and national education there was noticeable after the war between Japan and Russia a marked tendency to follow Japanese ter-

minology, but experience has since taught the weakness of the Japanese educational system. The Chinese have been prompt to note the difference between themselves and their island neighbours: if the former are stolid and inert, they are thorough; if the latter have seemed to evince remarkable capacity to adopt, they have never overcome their innate lack of thoroughness; they are inherently superficial, and this weakness the Chinese now seek to avoid in their educational system. While the methods of distinguishing the different grades of schools, colleges, and other educational institutions, originally adopted from Japan, will probably continue, since there is nothing positively objectionable therein, it is becoming clear that there will be a marked difference in results achieved in Chinese schools giving modern education, as compared with Japan. It would not be correct to say that the Christian missionaries have been called upon to organize this reform in China's educational methods, which really amounts to a creation of something entirely new for that country; but it is cheerfully admitted by the Chinese themselves that their advice and assistance have been called for and promptly given; wherever it was possible to do so, they have willingly given time as teachers and they have constantly been called upon for suggestions as to textbooks, curricula, and so forth. The founding of the Imperial University in Shansi, the hot-bed of the Boxer insurrection, had much influence upon the late Empress Dowager; one hundred and thirty-nine Protestant missionaries, including women and children, had been massacred in that province. When the question of in-

demnity was discussed, the societies to which those victims had belonged refused to accept compensation for property destroyed; but Dr. Timothy Richard induced Prince Ch'ing and Li Hung-Chang, instead of giving a money indemnity to the foreigners, to grant the same fund for modern educational institutions in this backward province. To this they agreed and made Dr. Richard director for ten years. Seven months after that the Empress issued her famous decree.

In certain features, the influence of Christianity — through the effort and example of the missionaries — has been conspicuous; for example, their original opposition to the "foot-binding" cruelty of the Chinese. In this they found, but of course this was not intentional, coöperation and strong support from the late Empress Dowager. The Manchus have been, and are now, opposed to this Chinese fashion; but custom proved too strong for them, because the Chinese have always retorted to any command to do away with the practice of binding a girl-child's feet with their obedience in adopting the queue, and the argument has proved to be unanswerable. But since there has come a relaxing of the compulsion for men to shave the head, all but the crown, and wear the Manchu queue, the injunction to discontinue the foot-binding custom now has a force which did not exist before. So, too, in the organized crusade against opium, the missionaries have always been solidly for the effort of the Government to stamp out the "smoking" habit. This subject will engage our attention in the chapter to be devoted to a consideration of the duty of the United States towards China.

## CHAPTER IX

### *JAPAN'S INFLUENCE UPON CHINA*


WE begin this chapter with a statement that may surprise some and will perhaps be offensive to others: the Chinese and the Japanese have hated each other cordially for many centuries; ever since, if not before, the famous Taiko-Sama (Hideyosha Toyotomi) invaded Korea in the sixteenth century, without just provocation, and did not succeed in his effort to conquer the peninsula and anticipate history by centuries in annexing that country to Japan. For as long as there is anything that we can call Japanese history, before the year 1872 when New Japan found herself making her own, there was a pleasing and proper disposition on the part of the Japanese to admit gratefully their indebtedness to China for all that there was of culture or education among them. Since 1872 the disposition to find within their own borders the seed from which all their civilization grew, has been growing stronger day by day, until now Japan aspires not only to be China's mentor, but she would be quite willing to raise her flag over the whole of the Chinese Empire, not content with appropriating what certainly was once a part thereof, Korea, and with exerting her influence over what is yet incontestably China's territory, that is, Southern Manchuria.

There is nothing in the former history of Japan — that is to say, prior to the middle of the sixteenth century, when first the Japanese made the acquaintance of Europeans and began to learn what the West had to teach her — nothing that the Japanese do not owe to China; letters, history, religion, arts, sciences, the whole category of that which makes civilization and progress. If ever there was anything in Japan that approximated to a written language before the introduction of the Chinese ideographs, it has disappeared so completely that not a trace of it remains, and probably nothing of the sort ever was. To China the power to make written records was one of Japan's earliest debts; this, however, was something which had to be adapted to meet the mental attainments of the ordinary Japanese, and accordingly we find the Japanese syllabary appended to a page of ideographic text to facilitate the reading. Chinese scholars ridicule this, and native Japanese of parts affect to ignore it. Japanese history is palpably modelled upon the myths of creation and evolution which were old in China two thousand years ago. Shintō, the so-called native cult (it is not a religion in the strict sense of the word), is merely adapted Confucianism, expanded to gratify the vanity of the Japanese. Chronology in Japan is something made to order in imitation of such records in China, and it is, as has been declared by the most competent authority, Bramsen, one of the greatest literary frauds ever perpetrated; this condemnation receives the endorsement of such scholars as Chamberlain, Satow, Aston, and others. There is no such a thing as native fine art in Japan — what there

is of indigenous art is something so crude that even the Japanese themselves are ashamed of it, and it is acknowledged by archæologists only. True! and this writer is one who has borne testimony to this fact, the Chinese models from which the Japanese artists worked were so improved upon as to be transformed into something almost new. No one would for a moment think of comparing the work of a Chinese artist with the productions of Japan's best. If Japan did not get her first lessons in the making of pottery from China, we must admit that the specimens of this ware, made prior to the lessons taught by Korean and Chinese workmen, cannot be placed in our cabinet as types of the beautiful. What little there was of science in Japan prior to three hundred and fifty years ago was the result of Chinese teaching. There is good reason to doubt the claim of the Japanese to that unbroken line of sovereigns back to the beginning of Japan's history; for Chinese records indicate that there were formerly thirteen "kings" — probably they were feudal chiefs — in the land, who one by one disappeared until the whole power passed into the hands of the chief of the Yamato clan, and then, when Chinese history came to be pretty well known, this chief dignity demanded an ancestral line which should outshine the dynastic history of China, and accordingly, the Kojiki and Nihongi (see page 136) were prepared to gratify his vanity. Furthermore, if Japanese records for the past one thousand years are examined carefully, it may be more than suspected that through Imperial frivolity and feminine weakness the continuity of the Imperial line has not been so untainted as is claimed. In a country

where concubinage has been tolerated, the blood of the Imperial line can hardly be that of purity on both sides, Emperor and Empress, as would be demanded elsewhere; but even when we accept the many emperors of Japan who — on their mother's side — were not of the blood royal, we find that there are worse taints than this which comes from concubinage.

In all things Japan was China's pupil until the former decided, in 1872, to break away from the traditions of the Far East and to strike out upon a line of development diametrically opposed to the example that China had set for over a millennium and much against the admonition of her old teacher. It was not so difficult for Western nations to obtain residential and trading privileges in Japan as China had for so long tried to make it; and the wit of the Japanese soon made it appear clear that they had everything to gain by liberality and nothing to lose, when their development had progressed far enough to win from the West recognition of the sincerity in the change that had been wrought. Japan then ceased to be China's pupil, yet it was long before Japan became China's teacher; that has come within a very few years past. It was again unfortunate Korea that was to be the bone of contention and the means of reversing the relative positions of teacher and pupil which had existed for so many centuries. Japan promptly realized that the military methods of the Far East were in no way competent to stand against those of the West, and therefore she bent her energies to the creation of a "Western" army, and a "European" navy, always with the then one purpose in her mind, of changing the



TEA GARDENS WITHIN THE NATIVE CITY, SHANGHAI



record of history so far as it affected Korea, and reasserting (what never did in reality exist) her right either to possess in fact, or to control morally, that continental country. All this was as deliberate as anything can be, and in 1894 came the culmination of preparation, when the excuse was made for doing successfully what had failed certainly once, and — if we accept a myth — twice before. Because the Japanese say that Empress Jingo invaded Korea in the third century, they claim she was successful, but that is not true at all.

In 1894, then, China realized most painfully that her pupil had broken away from leading strings and turned against her teacher. China was not in any way prepared for war at that time and the action of the Japanese was startling, not only in its initial move, but in every stage of its further development. True, China had what she called an army, and the soldiers were of good stuff; had they been properly equipped and drilled; had they been decently cared for as to commissariat; most of all, had they been led by competent officers who had some sense of *esprit de corps*, that army might have met the Japanese on even terms. China had a navy, too, but of it the same things must be said that have been told of the army; yet with this material addition, the attainments of the Japanese naval commanders were not the same in 1894 that they were in 1904–1905, and competent American and European naval officers declare that had there been the slightest trace of technical ability on board the Chinese war vessels, the results of the Battle of the Yalu would have been quite different from what they were. But it was not to be, apparently. China had to accept

defeat and pay dearly for the lesson the despised little Japanese taught her. In one way the lesson was beneficial; it helped China to feel that the time had come when she must abandon her old policy and adopt in some measure the ways of the world. The defeat, however, never operated to bring about any love for the Japanese. On the other hand, since we always hate those whom we have injured unfairly, Japan's hatred of China became intensified and the contempt was frankly outspoken. Japanese school-boys have been taught, ever since 1894, to speak contemptuously of China, and they do it with a frankness that is disgusting to Western people and rankling to the Chinese. Yet the superior wisdom of China became conspicuous even in this defeat, disgrace, and hatred; Japan had learnt the ways of Europe, and by that knowledge she had done what had been incredible before, defeated great China—for China, of course, had the conviction, which was surmised elsewhere, that little Japan could not perform a miracle. It was easier for China to learn something of the way Japan had come into possession of this new and surprising strength by sending her young men to Japan to study, and there they went by tens, by scores, by hundreds, by thousands, until at one time there were upwards of thirty thousand of them in the city of Tokyo alone. However, when they began to return and as soon as they were called upon to show what they had learnt, in very few cases was it found that the stay in Japan had been productive of any real good, while in many more ways it had wrought absolute mischief. The moral atmosphere had been bad; the socialistic lessons, which

were curbed by home influences for the Japanese students, had run rampant with the Chinese; the slipshod methods which satisfied the average Japanese educator were totally unfitted for the thorough-going Chinese, and the experiment was eventually abandoned — although this statement rather anticipates the events in this story.

In 1900 there came to China an experience which was unique — the Boxer Insurrection. It is hardly too much to say now that this was in fact an attempt on the part of some government officials, if not of the Government itself, to drive out the foreigners; only bitter and expensive experience had taught that the government's hand must not be shown. Subsequently there came the anomaly of a foreign army on Chinese soil, fighting against China, and yet at all times in communication with the government and avowedly acting with that government's approval. The part which Japan played was unquestionably admirable, but it did not tend to wipe out the feeling of hatred. After the Boxer troubles were over, we know how Japan's place in the Liaotung peninsula was taken by Russia, and China's weakness at that time could not possibly have had any other effect than to increase Japan's contempt. There seemed to be no such thing as backbone in China — she who had professed to be sovereign of all Asia, who looked upon all those unfortunates that lived beyond her borders as "barbarians," was now being torn apart, and not one paid her the slightest respect; from being a nation, she was likely to become a sort of football.

For four years these wretched conditions went on

from bad to worse; yet, we must give Japan credit for having tried to persuade China into asserting her rights as against Russian aggression, German greed, and British apathy, but without avail. It was then that the West spoke of China as being in an almost hopeless condition and the partition of China was the theme. Finding that China would not or could not do anything to defend herself, the Japanese statesmen now saw their opportunity to further their own plans, and they availed themselves of it. Japan ostensibly and ostentatiously took China's place and ordered Russia out of Manchuria. Russia, of course, smiled and refused to obey. That "The Little Japs," as they called them, could be serious never entered the mind of the Russian Czar and his advisers; or, if they really meant what they were saying, to believe that they could enforce even a semblance of obedience was to insult the Russians' own sense of dignity and superiority. Then came the Russo-Japanese War with negative results. Japan did not defeat Russia and when the real conditions existing in the Summer of 1905, at the time President Roosevelt persuaded the combatants to patch up a peace in the interests of humanity, became known, it was found that that unfortunate interference had merely played into Japan's hands, saved her from inevitable and crushing defeat, and shifted the control of China's territory from one foreigner to another. The duplicity of Japan in taking Russia's place in South Manchuria intensified the feeling of hatred, and yet her seeming success against Russia in the battles that were fought and won by the Japanese troops undoubtedly, her compelling the fortress

of Port Arthur to capitulate — we say nothing of the treason and shameful cowardice of that act — all these things stimulated China to action. Then actually began a New China, for which the acts of the preceding seven or eight years had been merely a preparation.

If, then, the influence which Japan has exerted upon China and that which she continues to exert is good in some respects, it is bad in others. As a stimulus to the older nation to come out of the shell of exclusiveness that had so long kept her from taking the place in the world that she is fitted to fill, that influence was for good; but, judging by the standard of morality and friendship, it was for bad, and of this latter aspect there is much to be said. Let us go back to the time when Japan reopened her doors to people from the West — that is 1854 or 1857, according to the view we take of Commodore Perry's first and second efforts. Japan's exclusiveness had been more effectually maintained than China's; she had gone through somewhat similar experiences with Europeans in the sixteenth century that had come to China, but in a much smaller way. First, the Portuguese had sought acquaintance and had obtained privileges of engaging in trade; these strangers had been supplanted by the Spaniards and permission had been given to preach Christianity, the head of the government (the Shogun, not the Mikado) sagely declaring that, since there were so many divisions of the Buddhist Church with such diverse views as almost to make them different religions, he could conceive of no harm coming to the state or the people through the introduction of another foreign creed which appeared to him to

possess some very attractive features in its doctrines of charity, brotherhood of man, and other respects. But the quarrels of the Christian sects, and above all the indiscretion of one of the foreign laymen, a Spanish captain who declared that his Royal Master first sent merchants to trade, then priests to teach, and when the instruction had gone to the right point and the converts had learnt the use of the foreign weapons put into their hands by the merchants, soldiers were sent to take possession of the new country,—this combination caused the expulsion of the foreigners, the prescription of their doctrine, the death of many converts, and the closing of Japan's doors for nearly three centuries. This shutting up of Japan, China approved; the reopening to Americans first and then to everybody else who chose to come, she condemned.

When we come down to very recent times, China's mistrust of Japan assumes a more critical aspect. The loss of the Loo-Choo Islands — and the people of that little archipelago are in every respect more Chinese than Japanese — did not tend to make China love Japan. Her defeat in 1893–1894 and the loss of the Liaotung Peninsula, for which, at Russia's demand supplemented by the favour of France and Germany, Formosa and the Pescadores were soon substituted permanently, added to the feeling of resentment; and now the annexation of Korea, and the confident assurance that Japan is in Southern Manchuria to stay, have emphasized the distrust of Japan that has long existed in the breast of every loyal Chinese. It has seemed to them, not unnaturally, that all things are conspiring against them; the appar-

ently friendly efforts of America have so egregiously miscarried through Japan's machinations as to justify this thought. We are inclined to think that Chinese statesmen were more disappointed than they expressed when Mr. Secretary Hay accepted the demand of Russia to withdraw the Consuls to the five new places in Manchuria, after their government had issued exequaturs to them. It seemed to indicate an acknowledgment of the rights of the two belligerents to be where they were, to fight on Chinese soil, over an issue that would surely inure to the benefit of one or the other of them and work against China's integrity. Japan was prompt to recognize this weakness, and had America taken a firm stand announcing to both Japan and Russia that she intended to let those Consuls raise their flag, and that any affront offered to the flag would be at the peril of the country which gave it, would be at that nation's peril, it would have had a salutary effect upon the intruders and might have shortened the war in a way that would lead to China's comfort. The subsequent circular note concerning the "Open Door" had but little effect, and the still later effort of Mr. Secretary Knox to neutralize the Manchurian Railways was openly flouted by Japan and Russia.

It is well to note how Japan has stultified herself in China's eyes by the act of the anarchists who, in September, 1910, were discovered to have formed a plot to kill their Emperor; for the parade made by the Japanese of their unfailing loyalty to their ruler was accepted by the Chinese, as it had been by nearly all the world. It was believed that in no other country which made the

claim of being civilized and modern in its political and social organization was the "Divine Right of Kings" carried out so consistently as in Japan. To his subjects, the Emperor was supposed to be superhuman, a direct descendant, in an unbroken line extending back throughout eternity, of the gods themselves; yet some of those subjects conspired to take the life of that ruler who stood not only as the head of the nation, but as its intermediary between themselves and his divine ancestors; whose intercessions for himself and them were heard and answered by the gods who had given themselves to Japan alone, and therefore it was deemed unnecessary for the divinely descended people to take thought of the moral laws which govern such earthly, common, and hence weak and wicked people as the Chinese, all other Asiatics, Africans, Europeans, and Americans. The Chinese naturally and properly argued that if there were these few whose machinations had been discovered, there were, of course, others who thought as did those "political assassins." Then, too, the farce of their trial, the character of the punishments ordered, and the mode of their execution, all made an impression upon the Chinese, who have asked themselves many questions about the worth of Japan's pretended civilization. Why was it that some of those devoted subjects thus went diametrically against the principles of their land? The answer was prompt and emphatic: it is because the burden put upon the Japanese people by the mad desire of their sovereign and his advisers for military display has become insupportable, and this is too true. There is in Japan but little of the awful poverty that is to be

seen in every city of China, and yet we cannot truly call the Japanese a wealthy people; and for such people to give up one-third of their incomes, in direct and indirect taxation, with a prospect of this burden being increased instead of being lessened — as was promised when peace came after the war with Russia — is a burden they cannot bear. Looking for some reason for the tremendous increase in Japan's armament, a most logical suspicion was aroused: this great army and this huge fleet are to be used against somebody for the purpose of exacting an indemnity sufficient to pay off Japan's foreign indebtedness and relieve her Treasury from the inevitable bankruptcy which now faces Japan. No adequate provision is being made for paying that debt in an ordinary way; there is no proper sinking fund; each year the budget shows, after the juggling with figures has been adjusted and the eyes of the creditors are opened, that there is either an actual deficit or a paltry balance that is not a drop in the bucket as against the hundreds of millions of *yen* in bonds sold in Europe and America, which must sometime be paid or repudiated. In that view of the situation there recur the events of 1894-1895; but the indemnity then extorted from China would go but a very little way towards restoring Japan's financial condition, and, with this possibility before her, how is it possible for China to look upon Japan's influences upon her government and people as good?

There is a sort of consistency about the Chinese that is sterling. Granted that this consistency has often gone along the pathway of stupidity, it has been recognized by all students as a lasting trait in the Chi-

nese character. Therefore the lack of it in Japan has struck the Chinese with more force, and they reason somewhat thus: if the Emperor of Japan is such a god-like creature that his people must do him reverence as a descendant of the gods, why are not his son (by an imperial concubine) and that son's son equally divine? So sanctified is the reigning monarch that his subjects may not look down upon him from an elevation; they have but recently been permitted to look upon his face at all; and in every way they are compelled to yield him homage as if he were divine. When does the ordinary man attain this divinity? When will the miracle be wrought that transforms the present Crown Prince, or that Prince's son — should the Prince himself die before ascending the throne — from a man into a god? The influence of this superstition upon the minds of the enlightened Chinese is strongly to the prejudice of the Japanese; and the calm effrontery of some of those people in venturing to suggest that Japan will provide an emperor for China — should a dynastic change be brought about — who will reign by "divine right" is properly resented as an insolence. For with the insolence is coupled the patent fact of an intention to annex the whole empire of great China to the bankrupt little one, Japan, and, by exploiting the marvellous resources of the greater for the benefit of the smaller, replenish Japan's treasury and fill her war-chest for future contingencies.

But little thought or time was given by Chinese publicists to a careful study of Japanese character until less than fifty years ago. The Japanese were classed among

the "outer barbarians"; possibly, being of very much the same complexion as themselves, the Chinese formerly gave to Japan a little higher place in the list of those unfortunate beings who never had or could have the privilege of being like themselves, but they were outsiders, none the less. Until well within historic times, the embassies which the Japanese sent to China were called "tribute-bearers," although the objections raised by the Japanese to this contumely led the Chinese officials to refrain from addressing the messengers as such. In 1870 the high-handed proceedings of the Japanese in the matter of the expedition to Formosa was the first clash between China and New Japan. The episode does not redound to Japan's credit at all, and although China — as was usual — agreed to buy off Japan with a payment of three-quarters of a million dollars "to reimburse her outlays in Formosa for roads, houses, and defenses," yet the impression left upon the minds of the Chinese statesmen was not favourable, even if this opinion was altered twenty-three years later, which is doubtful. It is quite certain that the influence Japan has always tended to exert has not impressed the Chinese with confidence.

There has always been a sneer at China's "pretended" reform, reconstruction, and advance; while of positive obstruction, there is a goodly list to be charged to Japan's account. A complete enumeration of Japan's acts, which the Chinese not improperly conceived to be unwarranted obstacles thrown across the pathway their country has been trying to tread for some ten years or so, would be tedious; but one or two may be mentioned.

The protest which Japan made to the construction of the Hsin Min-Tung and Fakumen Railway in Southern Manchuria, on the ground that it paralleled a line already built and controlled by the Japanese, was enforced by a display of military power and the shaking in China's face of the "mailed fist" so vigourously that China had to give way. Yet her position was defensible from every point of view; fundamentally, her sovereign right should have left her the sole arbiter, and if she saw fit to build a line within her own territory, no outside government had the right to gainsay her; then, the position assumed by Japan was indefensible, as a matter of fact. In the sense that she pretended to use the word "parallel" there was no such objection to the railway China proposed to build; it would have traversed a country for which the line under Japanese control could not properly supply needed facilities; it was not any more parallel than would be, let us say, the New York Central and the Erie with New York City and Chicago as their termini. The objection raised by the strong was simply a display of superior might, and the yielding of the weak was, in the circumstances, inevitable. More recently the same line of argument has been followed in the matter of China's desire to build the Mukden-Antung Railway; her wish has been thwarted by another shake of the "mailed fist," and China gave way. The complaints which Japanese newspapers (and these, of course, voice the sentiments of both government and people) continually make of the inability or unwillingness of the Chinese authorities in Manchuria to preserve order and to protect the lives and property of strangers



ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY: THE CAMPUS, SHOWING YÜ HALL  
PREPARATORY BUILDING AND SCIENCE HALL, SHANGHAI



QUADRANGLE AND CLOCK: FOREIGN BUILDINGS WITH CHINESE  
ROOFS, ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI



would seem to be justified if we accept the Japanese statement of facts, and, with the Japanese people, put the whole responsibility for this neglect or inability upon China; but the West does not get a full and fair statement of both sides of the matter. There are no organized Chinese Press Bureaus in Europe and America to present China's interests and intentions in the most favourable light, the truth being a matter of vital importance: to emphasize merit and to condone (or misrepresent) faults. English editions of Chinese newspapers are not sent abroad; nor are there any native journals that give a column or a page in some language of Europe which can be read by others than adept Sinologues. All these things are carefully provided by the Japanese, and the newspaper correspondents are well supplied with money and information to make the best case for Japan — right or wrong. Consequently we do not know how often China's effort to maintain her rights in Manchuria and to afford protection to aliens are blocked by the interference of over-officious Japanese or Russian policemen, military guards, or civilians. It is not intended to maintain that China has done or is yet able to do her full duty in these matters; but it is contended that the interference upon every possible occasion is a poor way to develop ability to do right. The protestations in Japanese journals about China's sovereign rights in Manchuria are so palpably insincere and are so consistently refuted by Japan's acts — official and private — as to be farcical; this China knows, and if with that knowledge she finds Japan's influence to be bad, it is not anything to cause surprise.

But probably the most pernicious influence exerted by Japan has been in educational matters, because the defects in ability and the false notions imparted affect so many of the common people of China. The apathy of China was suddenly overcome about ten years ago, and to the surprise of all the world there was a sudden and vociferous demand for Western education. The supply of teachers at home was so preposterously inadequate as to be practically nothing as against the demand; naturally, those who were trying to establish primary and secondary schools sent to Japan for teachers, and the requisition was honoured in a sort of a way because the Chinese did not stop to inquire into conditions in Japan itself. Had they carefully inspected schools of these grades in Japan, they would undoubtedly have learnt that the supply of teachers was much short of the requirements at home, and, what is most important, that the standard for such teachers is altogether too low in Japan itself. The urgent demand for these lower-grade schoolmasters had to be supplied forthwith—anybody was made welcome. If he had a certificate, good; if he didn't, his own statement as to ability and experience was accepted, and the school began. The inevitable result was disastrous; it called forth severe and condemning criticism from competent European visitors who were disposed to be very friendly towards Japan, and nearly all of these low-grade Japanese teachers were soon found to be incompetent to teach anything, they could not talk Chinese, and they were slow and stupid in learning the language; they either knew no English at all or their pronunciation, grammar, locu-

tion were so atrocious as to make it impossible for them to use that language as a medium of instruction. When anything like science was attempted, in even its most rudimentary form, the superficial knowledge of these imported teachers became conspicuous, or their incorrect statements and deductions were likely to work irreparable mischief. These defects at the bottom of the educational ladder soon led the Chinese School Boards and the Bureau of Education to inquire as to the soundness of the upper rungs, and as a result the Japanese school-masters, higher school-teachers, and University professors were dismissed by the wholesale; and the contempt which the Chinese have always had for Japanese flippancy became intensified.

The Reverend Lord William Gascoyne-Cecil, in "Changing China," comments upon conditions in that country thus: "The cause of the new national movement was the sense of humiliation brought about by political events culminating in the battle of Mukden, when a flagrant act of insolent contempt for the laws of neutrality was felt all the more deeply because China had to submit to that which she was powerless to resist." He thinks, as do others, that China fears Japan more than she does Russia, and that China is far too rich a prize to be safe from the ambitions of her island neighbour if left unguarded. Consequently, the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire is for every reason most desirable, and that integrity can best be maintained by an increase of China's military power. It should be noted in this connection that Japanese military instructors are not considered by the Chinese the best suited to

their present needs; because, like their civilian congeners, they are too much given to an effort to instil an admiration for their own rulers and all things Japanese. This tendency is looked upon with grave suspicion. This same observer expresses the same dissatisfaction with the Japanese schoolmasters that has been given already. With somewhat strange inconsistency, however, he affirms that the Chinese do not hate Christianity, and are even tolerant of Christian missions, although they are disposed still to dislike them, "because Christianity is the religion of the military races, and they had an historical tradition that the advance of Christianity was connected with war." For when the question is which military instructors are likely to do the best for China and probably will not have designs upon her integrity, the choice is given to the European nations, who are Christian, rather than to Japan that is nearer China in the matter of religion, for the intentions of Japan are more than open to suspicion; and what a tempting prize to Japan is that great empire of China, with natural resources so far ahead of what Japan possesses, with a population that is courteous to a degree beyond comparison with the Japanese; industrious, patient, cheerful, contented, and obedient; for obedience in China is a word that connotes far more than it does in Japan. It means obedience to the Emperor, to the parent, to the family and government, although the Japanese have the reputation of being singularly marked in this trait. The annexation of the Chinese Empire is something more than a dream with the Japanese; it is a growing ambition. The writer has seen a map called

"The New Great Japan," upon which the boundaries of that empire are made to include Korea (it was drawn before the annexation), Manchuria, practically all of Eastern Siberia, and to the west as far as Lake Baikal, and all the rest of the Chinese Empire. Since this map was not published secretly, it may well have come into the hands of the Chinese, who would naturally have their worst fears confirmed thereby, although it is unnecessary to say that it was not an official publication, yet things of this kind do not, in Japan, spring solely from the overwrought imagination of an individual.

If we conclude that the influence Japan is now exerting upon China is not conducive to the welfare of the older, larger nation, and inimical to the good of the whole world, there is, nevertheless, something reassuring in the thought. There can be little doubt that when such a small country as Japan maintains a large navy and a great army, these armaments must be made use of in some way, or the people who are called upon to pay for the luxuries will rise in protest against the needless drain upon their purses. Indications of a desire on Japan's part to pursue still further her old ambition "to make the glory of Japan's arms shine beyond the sea," are unmistakable. That there are designs upon the United States may be, yet it seems incredible that Japanese statesmen could be so foolish. If, however, Japan were to convince China that an alliance, offensive and defensive, with her is a wise thing; and if then she could persuade her ally to join in aggressive measures, there might well be good grounds to apprehend all manner of disasters from a revised and strengthened "Yellow Peril." That there

is no such probability is our comfort. On the other hand, as has been said, there is every reason to believe that China still thinks Japan's army and navy bode evil for her, and indications of late seem to justify that apprehension. The ill-concealed satisfaction in Japan that China seems unable to find a competent leader at this critical moment leads us to suspect that this national weakness is pleasing because it must operate to prevent that consolidation which must be before China becomes what she should be, the leading Power of the Far East. If Japan means to strike China another blow, it will have to be done before there is consolidation, and before the reorganization — where now there is simply nothing but chaos — is brought about, and that probably means within the next five or six years at the longest.

## CHAPTER X

### *HOW SHALL CHINA BEAR HERSELF TOWARDS OTHER NATIONS?*

IN 1900, Chang Chih-tung, quoting from the ancient Classics of his country, said: "If a man will not understand in what misfortune consists, disgrace is sure to follow; but if he will only face the difficulty — happiness will come." It was an appreciation of the appositeness of this to the condition of his own country which led him to declare that, of all nations, China alone has for these fifty years past shown herself to be almost irreclaimably stupid and unmindful of changing conditions about her, which demand of her that she shall take her part in those changes, or else go down to the very depths of destruction. He could find not one man of discernment among the Chinese officials, no real scholar, no competent artisan; China's representatives abroad were incompetent and unable so to represent their government as to command that respect to which China, in his opinion, is justly entitled. He frankly declared, to the amazement and consternation of his fellow-countrymen, that "Old Custom" is the bugaboo which is but a password to lying and deceit and operates as an obstacle to desirable progress. This eminently progressive official felt that China's condition — when he wrote his blast

against the apathy and conservatism which are now hindrances — was not the same as that of ancient times. "When Emperor Chwang Wang of the Chou Dynasty lived, 696-681 B.C., he exhorted the people to diligence and they responded, so that the neighbouring countries — Ts'i, Tsin, Ch'in, and Sung were intimidated and held in check"; but, nowadays, Chang Chih-tung regretted to be compelled to say that all was confusion and no man, from emperor or regent down to the humblest officer, appears to be able to grasp the situation and mould events to China's advantage. "The conservatives offer the people food which they have no ability to swallow; the liberals are like a flock of sheep at a point where the road forks in many directions, and which is the right one to take they themselves do not know, so of course they cannot teach the people: the former do not understand what international intercourse means; the latter are ignorant as to what is radically wrong in Chinese affairs. The conservatives fail to appreciate the utility of modern military methods and the benefits which will accrue to China if successful changes are brought about; while the progressives are zealous without adequate knowledge and they look with undisguised contempt upon the widespread influence of Confucius' doctrine." In Chang's opinion there were three things absolutely necessary to keep China from a revolution that will tear the empire into fragments which shall be picked up by other nations and "The Middle Kingdom" will disappear forever; these three things are: First, to maintain the reigning dynasty; second, to conserve the holy religion; third, to protect the Chinese race. Now, when it is known

that Chang Chih-tung was a true Chinese, not a Manchu at all, the first of these essentials strikes one with peculiar significance; it seems to contradict the statements which have been made hereinbefore, that the Chinese people do not respect their Manchu rulers; but the contradiction is one in appearance; there never was a forward movement in any country, one that sought to break away from the deadening influence of old conditions, without there being some to oppose it. All residents of the thirteen English colonies of North America were not in favour of declaring those colonies independent of Great Britain in 1776. If Chang Chih-tung, a Chinese, believed that to uphold the reigning dynasty was to strengthen China, it must be remembered that he had always been a favourite with the late Empress Dowager; this does not impugn his patriotism, but it does admit that his views on this point were warped. As for his second essential, the conservation of Confucianism, no Western student of comparative religion, be he priest or layman, can possibly endorse that statement, nor does it gain the approval of the leaders in China's reform movement. If China is to advance at all, it must be at least somewhat in the same way that Europe and America have advanced, and the binding fetters of superstition, the dread of ghosts, the fear of what evil spirits may do, and the need for propitiating the spirits of good, must be forever thrown overboard. For the third essential, all men who have a spark of sympathy for China and who wish her well — it may not be all that her extremists desire — wish heartily. A race that has borne the vicissitudes of four or five thousand years, always pro-

gressing (in its own way that is scarcely progress to us), cannot be allowed to disappear or to be completely overshadowed, unless for some graver reasons than any which have been given by the most rabid of those who contend that China has outlived her usefulness; that she has shown no such adaptability as her young neighbour and erstwhile obsequious pupil, Japan, has evinced to put on Western civilization and to advance step by step with those of us who claim to march in the van. Pah! The veneer of modern civilization over Japan is so thin that it cracked off when her emperor was compelled to realize that his absolutism was resented by some of his own "family!" To paraphrase a saying ascribed to Napoleon, we say: "Scratch a Japanese, with all his adaptation of Western guns and battle-ships, and you will find a Mongolian more backward in real civilization than a good Chinese."

Must the reformed and reorganized China, for which some of the leaders are striving so vigourously and many of the common people looking for so longingly, necessarily be such a change from that which has been as to transform the land and the people into something unrecognizable? Hardly so. It is contended by some of the Chinese publicists that already there is much about their form of government which is republican to all intents and purposes. The ancient customs practically meet the case. If the government encounters difficult questions, the great ministers are called upon to help settle them, and the people can apprise the rulers of their needs and wants through the appointed channels; they now have the right to discuss questions, even though

the rulers retain the prerogative of settling them; while this adjustment is done with reference to the best interests of all. Therefore it is asked by some, who are progressive without being reactionary, why is a Parliament demanded, when the people already have that institution in effect? But the experiment has been tried and the result has not been disastrous failure. The responsibility of government has been in a way put upon the people of China and it is for them to decide how China shall act towards other nations, if the latter receive her into the ranks of the Great Powers, because it must be as such or not at all that China takes her place, for she will not be contented with second place even in the Far East, Japan to the contrary notwithstanding. We have never known the Chinese to declare their intention to dominate the Pacific, to rule the whole world, to oppress those whom they might properly call their former oppressors, and yet we know very well that Chinese pride will insist upon having a place in the front rank.

The main objections that have been raised to the Chinese being an active integral part of the great family of nations have been their arrogant superiority, their conservatism, their immobility, and their inability to see the need for change. These defects were, after all, merely the outgrowth of a chain of events three thousand years long. The first of the faults — let us call them such for momentary convenience — could hardly have failed to be because of the admitted inferiority by which the Chinese were surrounded on all sides, possibly excepting the south where physical obstacles prevented freedom of intercourse with what might have been recognized

as a civilization comparable with their own. It took much less than thirty centuries to make "the most polite and cultured people of Europe," but that superiority did not long stand as a bar to the recognition of others, as being entitled to respect. That the Chinese were for so long the very consummation of conservatism is another thing that could hardly have been otherwise; within their own borders they had everything which was necessary to their material and mental well-being; if there were some who were not satisfied with the "holy religion," they found that which for nearly two thousand years was sufficient, the imported but transformed Buddhism. Their manufacturers, their agriculturists, their artisans had no need to go abroad for even raw material, everything was at their hand. For education, their Classics sufficed, the standard being admitted as satisfactory in this particular case. Their government had withstood the shocks which would have overthrown many another system claimed to be built upon stronger foundations; their social system was admirable in many ways and objectionable in none condemned by Oriental rules; slavery there was, yet the position of the Chinese slave never approximated the horror of that which was forced upon such unfortunates in other parts of the world; while the only effort to introduce the caste system of India, that by one emperor centuries ago, was promptly rejected by nobles and commoners alike. The immobility of the Chinese must, we suppose, be admitted, since the opinion of one cannot weigh much against that of hundreds, and yet to this writer the progress which differentiates the Chinese of the last half of the nineteenth

century from their ancestors of the fifteenth contradicts flatly the statement that China shows no capacity to move on. Much the same thing may be said as to the charge that the Chinese were unable to see the necessity for change in their customs or their institutions. The organization of one steamship company and one insurance company with every dollar of stock taken up by natives, is enough to contradict the statement as to changelessness.

But now, apparently, the Chinese honestly aspire to become a part of the world, not merely in it. In the opinion of the old-time Chinese, that world consisted of China with a fringe of barbarous states surrounding it on all sides, and a few little islands called by uncouth names (*e.g.* England, France, Italy, etc.) in the narrow ocean intervening between the mainland, that is, China, and the ultimate confines of space. One must now go to some extremely remote place in China if he would find a peasant who thinks of that old world, who does not know of those other countries called properly "Great." Into the uttermost corner there has gone something brought from abroad, something useful usually, but also something ornamental at times. The old vegetable-oil lamp, or crude candle, has given way to a lamp burning American or Russian kerosene; and a hundred other evidences of the intercourse between China and the rest of the world are familiar to the Chinese of the interior. The railways, that already bring a semblance of the steel-rail gridirons of America and Europe, have already furnished the villagers with a method of communication for which China is indebted to the strangers from beyond

her outermost walls. All the people who know these new things by acquaintance or by use, already realize that they can hardly dispense with them; on the contrary, they must increase consumption and expand railways, and these things cannot be done without preserving and expanding intercourse with the peoples of the West. It is probable that no one desires to do this in any but an amicable manner, and amity in China means relations between two or more, just as it does anywhere else. How shall the intercourse be conducted that China may gain and keep the respect of other nations? The age is commercial everywhere in America and Europe, and it is the demands of commerce which are now the incentive and moving causes of international policies, "vested interests," that too often shape the policies both at home and abroad, almost to the exclusion of moral or altruistic movements. The questions of finance, transportation, expansion, colonial policy, the propriety or difficulty of opening the door and keeping it open, politics, dynasties, national and international,— all things that affect the supreme issues of industry and commerce, these are the things that, after all, give excuse for the maintenance of armaments. It is unhealthy, wrong, no doubt, but it is depressingly true; and being true, it is as necessary for China to accept her share of the responsibility as it is for us in ultra-commercial America.

Hence, this question of taking up her part and becoming one of the commercial and civilized nations is, perhaps, the first thing to be considered in discussing how China shall conduct herself towards other nations. The fact of being a part naturally implies an equality of

rights. These, as yet, China does not possess. The treaties she now has with all other Powers preclude it; they are not drawn in terms of equality, but if they are to be revised, China must prove to the world that she is qualified to receive this equal treatment; and her best friends must hesitate before they claim so much for her.

Consequently there is the imperative necessity for a remodelling of laws so that there shall be in all parts of the Chinese Empire reasonable protection for the lives and property of strangers; to guarantee such protection absolutely is beyond the power of any known government — we cannot do it in the United States; Great Britain, Germany, France cannot do so — mob-law asserts itself everywhere at times, and a recrudescence of the Boxer troubles may come in China, just as anti-Chinese riots may break out again in a Western mining camp or in a Pacific Coast city; but, other things being equal, that assurance the West demands of China before it can seriously consider the revision of treaties on terms of absolute equality. This is no disparagement of China's integrity and good intentions; a perusal of Mr. T. R. Jernigan's "China in Law and Commerce" will convince the reader of the necessity for radical changes in China's codes and legal regulations. Particularly, it may be remarked that the United States of America is not the only country that has passed and enforced rigourously Chinese Exclusion bills; Japan drew the new treaty she made with China after her victory in 1895 upon quite as strict lines as we have ever defined — "the most favoured nation" clause was expunged and Chinese labourers are not permitted to land in Japan.

Next, for commercial intercourse to be protected on truly equal terms, China must have the right to determine what her customs tariffs — import and export — shall be, and this brings up the pregnant question of the opium trade, but that will be somewhat fully discussed in the next chapter. At present China has not tariff autonomy, and it is more than doubtful if she is quite qualified to say just what she will do in this matter; but that she cannot be said to be one of the Great Powers until she has the right, needs no exposition. She must do something to prove that she may be left to arrange her tariffs, and — what is quite as important to her — that she is fully and satisfactorily prepared to resume the entire management of her customs service. A tentative effort in this direction was made a few years ago, but the conviction that the time had not yet come was too strong — with all foreigners and with the wisest Chinese statesmen and publicists — to justify putting an experiment into the form of permanency.

The present system of judicial procedure in China is still too crude to justify recognition by the West; that there is some improvement over the picture which Williams drew about 1860, cannot be denied, but still greater changes must be made. Codes must be drawn up on somewhat the same terms as those of advanced nations, and the machinery of courts and officers must be arranged. This will take some time, and we are inclined to think that when once the task is undertaken it will be done more thoroughly — but probably more slowly — than it was done in Japan, where there are even now, after eleven years of practice, hardly any

judges with adequate knowledge or experience. The peoples of the West are not wholly guiltless in this matter of China's backwardness in legal procedure. Save in a few instances of exceptional breadth of view and warmest sympathy, the effort to keep from the Chinese all opportunities to become familiar with Western methods of procedure was strong. When an American teacher undertook to translate a work on International Law, a French diplomat protested vehemently against this effort "to let the Chinese into our secrets!" The law courses in the foreign and native colleges and universities are admirably conceived and they are extremely popular with the Chinese, for the bent of mind in many of them is strongly in that direction, so that it is confidently expected a few years will bring about a Bench in China that need not yield precedence to any. Still the conviction that the administration of justice will be just and impartial must be exceptionally strong in the case of China before we can entirely trust civil cases to her judges.

The most important thing of all, however, is a general education. In order to qualify for a place in the society of nations, the people of China should be made to understand the responsibility they take upon themselves. This can be done, we think, only by a complete transformation, that is, to carry out thoroughly, comprehensively, and well the plan which has been formulated, and in some provinces, as has been shown, already carried to a semblance of success. To accomplish anything like satisfactory results, it is manifest that both moral and financial aid must be rendered by China's friends abroad;

competent teachers in large numbers have to be supplied forthwith, who are to give special attention to the training of the Chinese men and women to qualify them to take up in the future this work of education, until China can do with characteristic thoroughness what Japan has done in a superficial way, dispense with the service of foreign teachers in all branches except languages. There is reason to believe that the adaptability and receptiveness which Chinese students have shown, both in a remote past when the French Roman Catholic missionaries gave instructions in mathematics and other sciences, and in comparatively recent times, since so many young Chinese have been sent abroad, will bring speedy and pleasing results. To make a comparison which must necessarily be odious to the Japanese, it has been found a rule almost without exception, that the Chinese students who have had opportunity to study in America and Europe have displayed the greater thoroughness and firmer grasp of the special branches to which they have applied themselves.

It is very important that the teachers who are lent to China should be truly typical of the Christian education they represent; it may seem narrow to insist that such teachers shall be professing and consistent Christians, and yet, when the greatness of the mission entrusted them is considered, it is evident that none but strong men and women should be sent. Whether they go as professed Christian propagandists or merely as lay teachers, each one of them is to be a "missionary." Their lives are to be examples of that civilization among which they were born and reared, and as such they will be respected

or scorned according to their faithfulness and sincerity. Those who go to teach science and the higher branches will find themselves in an atmosphere that is intensely stimulating if the preparation for the work has been thorough; therefore, such must be highly skilled in Western knowledge, not only in their specialty but in science generally, for the incisive questions put to them will be a severe test. Those who go to take places in educational institutions under the control of an organized Christian missionary society must have something more than the special qualification for their own branch; besides being skilled in Western knowledge generally, they must be able to meet in debate many clever disciples of modern followers of those who attack Christianity; they must be competent to discuss sociology with disciples of Herbert Spencer as well as those who have gone astray in their efforts to follow him; they must recognize the force and advantages of a thorough knowledge of comparative religion; and they must be prepared to devote themselves assiduously to the study of the Chinese language, both colloquial and written. As to their being all the time examples of what Christian civilization means in the daily life of its professors, it is needless to enlarge here. Towards the right persons there is absolutely no question as to China's fully performing her duty.

But China is not a rich country save in its natural resources. There are some enormous fortunes there, it is true, but the masses are poor with a poverty which no one who has not seen it and felt it can realize. The districts rarely are so fortunate as to have public-spirited citizens possessing sufficient means to undertake the

expense of this modern education that is being called for more eagerly day by day. This fact must be taken into consideration for some time yet, and if there is sincerity in the wish to help China it must show itself in generous contributions of money to provide schools and colleges all over the land. It need not now be feared that China will fail in her duty as to appreciation or in an effort to protect the property endowed by these contributions. Dr. Sidney L. Gulick in "The White Peril in the Far East" has said: "There is perhaps no truer sign of the essentially provincial character of the self-centred white people than their failure to discover and appreciate the noble and the beautiful in the great civilization of the Orient. We have been blinded to these by the selfishness of our lives, the greed of our ambitions, and the pride of our might." If these weaknesses are overcome in China's interests we cannot but believe that the appreciation shown will repay many fold the sacrifice that act may entail; and, in displaying it, China will be mindful of her fullest duty to the West.

But there is everywhere manifest in America and Europe an apprehension that the helping of China to transform itself from the decadent into the progressive stage may result in a repetition of the Mongol invasion of Europe; and that that invasion will not only go West by land, to overrun the whole continent of Europe, but will spread across the Pacific to possess the American continent as well; and that Christian civilization will be annihilated in the onslaught. Let us consider for a little the possibilities and probabilities for and against this concern which is strangely widespread. That there is

little to say for it may be taken for granted; there have not yet been any distinct signs that China's scheme of reform and transformation from the effete to the living and active contemplates such a movement. There has never been a hint of a desire to requite the harshness that China has borne from Europe in the past with co-ordinate treatment in the future; we shall search in vain if we look for expressions of a desire to dominate merely for the satisfaction of ruling. The only ground for apprehension is the commercial and industrial one; but that is serious only when we admit that commerce and industry in China have been brought up to a level with conditions in Europe, and such progress in that nation and among its people means such a radical change in every habit of life as to eliminate almost absolutely the power to compete disastrously. A Chinese official\* who wrote some years ago, before the spirit of reform had spread throughout his people, said: "We measure the degree of civilization not by accumulation of the means of living, but by the character and value of the life lived. . . . Left to ourselves, we should never have sought intercourse with the West. We have no motive to do so; for we desire neither to proselytize nor to trade. We believe, it is true, that our religion is more rational than yours, our morality higher, and our institutions more perfect; but we recognize that what is suited to us may be ill adapted to others. We do not conceive that we have a mission to redeem or to civilize the world, still less that that mission is to be accomplished by the methods of fire and sword, and we are thankful enough

\* Op. cit.

if we can solve our own problems, without burdening ourselves with those of other people. . . . Economically, as well as politically, we are sufficient to ourselves. What we consume we produce. And what we produce we consume. We do not require, and we have not sought, the products of other nations; and we hold it no less imprudent than unjust to make war on strangers in order to open their markets. . . . You believe not only that your religion is the only true one, but that it is your duty to impose it on all other nations, if need be, at the point of the sword. . . . Commercial intercourse between nations, it was supposed some fifty years ago, would inaugurate an era of peace, and there appear to be many among you who still cling to that belief. But never was belief more plainly contradicted by the facts. The competition for markets bids fair to be a more fruitful cause of war than was ever in the past the ambition of rulers or the bigotry of priests. The peoples of Europe fling themselves like hungry beasts of prey into every unexploited quarter of the globe. Hitherto they have confined their acts of spoliation to those whom they regard as outside their own pale. But always, while they divide the spoil, they watch one another with a jealous eye; and sooner or later, when there is nothing left to divide, they will fall upon one another. That is the real meaning of your armaments; you must devour or be devoured; and it is precisely these trade relations, which it was thought would knit you in the bonds of peace, which, by making every one of you cut-throat rivals of the others, have brought you within reasonable distance of a war of extermination." When it is remem-

bered that this was written a few years ago, and when reasonable allowance is made for the change that has come over just such statesmen as the one who expressed himself thus — a change which contemplates moral, commercial, and industrial expansion, not an aggressive military one — there seems to be absolutely nothing in the sentiments expressed which warrants undue apprehension; and these sentiments are precisely those of all the best leaders in China. Chang Chih-tung said: "Examine the history of China for two thousand years back and then compare it with the Western history of fifty years. Does the government of those foreign countries present such a record of generosity, benevolence, loyalty, and honesty as ours? If we wish to make China powerful and capable of resisting foreign nations, we must cherish loyalty and righteousness and unite ourselves under the Imperial dignity and power. This is the unchangeable truth of the past and present, both in China and abroad. . . . Let us wait until our educational institutions are in full swing, and the capabilities of our own institutions are tested by daily experience, and then consider the matter [of Parliamentary government]. The present is not the time. To render China powerful and at the same time preserve our own institutions, it is absolutely necessary that we utilize Western knowledge. But unless Chinese learning is made the basis of education, and a Chinese direction given to thought, the strong will become anarchists and the weak slaves. Then the latter end will be worse than the former. English newspapers are ridiculing us for not reforming, and they state that the teachings of Confucius lie at

the bottom of our inflexible conservatism. This is a great mistake. The translators of the Four Books and the Five Classics missed the true intent of Confucius by accepting the explanations of inefficient Chinese instructors who knew nothing of our doctrine; they were misled by the heresies of scholars like Han Fei and Li Sze, officers under Emperor Ts' in (225 B.C.)." In advocating the organization of a Chinese army and navy upon Western principles, not for aggressive measures but merely for defence and to develop a certain, to him desirable, quality in young men, he advocated a most peaceful course of study, and apropos of the deficiencies in education he wound up with: "Confucius says: 'Know what shame is and you will not be far from heroism,' and Mencius: 'If one has not the sense of shame, in what can he be equal to other men?'" There are many other like expressions by Chinese of acknowledged ability and puissance; and the sentiments which they all affirm do not seem to justify apprehension that an incursion into Europe of hostile intent is remotely contemplated. Indeed, we fail entirely to find in anything written or said or done by Chinese such an aggressive declaration as many which might be quoted from Japanese newspapers.

But those who attach to the cry "Another Mongol invasion," when China has trained an army of a million or two million men and equipped it with all the best appliances devised by Western military art, and joined forces with Japan in a desolating march westward and an eastward cruise of acquisition, fail to take into consideration several important facts which tend to render



THE SETTLEMENT, AMOY



such a thing simply impossible. The devastation described by Howorth and given in popular style by De Quincey, was not wrought by Chinese, properly speaking — indeed, it is safe to say that in the hordes which swept far away into the very West of Europe there were no true Chinese at all — for “The Mongols were expelled by the Chinese” is a statement made in every history, and it is improbable that the conquerors would then ally themselves with the army of the conquered for the purpose of extending the Mongols’ conquests. The latter could not have induced the Chinese to go with them had they tried; to have attempted to engage the Chinese as mercenaries is a thought not justified by records; while to have tried compulsion would doubtless have resulted in further disaster. That Mongol invasion was precisely what the title implies, and from the time when the power of the Mongols was broken by the Chinese General, Chao Yuen-Chang, afterwards Emperor T’ai Tsu (Hong Wou), first of the Ming Dynasty, there has been nothing in the acts of the Chinese to arouse apprehension. The scattered tribes of Mongols are under more or less complete control and are carefully watched by the Chinese or the Russian Government — so that there is no danger of a leader appearing among them who could wear the mantle of Genghis Khan. Then, too, it must be remembered how completely changed are conditions now; when the Mongols swept down into Southwestern Asia and drove the Mahomedans before them, thereby contributing to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, and again, when a few centuries later they came as one of the Scourges of God into Europe, there

was no possibility of co-operation and conjunction, such as now would assuredly set at rest all differences between the Powers of Europe were another "Mongol invasion" threatened. In working themselves up to what those who know conditions in the Far East from actual observation feel to be an undue state of nervous anxiety, people refuse to take cognizance of the advanced state of that very part of Asia from which such an incursion would necessarily start, and of the extensive territory throughout which it would have to pass before reaching a point where its object could be attained. The difficulty which the Russian Government experienced in transporting troops and munitions of war to Manchuria only six and seven years ago was enormous, and yet it was all the time working within its own domains where there was no enemy to molest or impede. Even after crossing the Manchurian frontier there was no obstacle imposed by an opponent. If, however, a Chinese army, or let us say a combined Chinese and Japanese army, should be mobilized on the Siberian frontier, or even at the extreme northwestern limits of Outer Mongolia, in Uliasutai, with the intention of marching down the valley of the Irtish River on its way to carry out another "Mongol invasion" of Europe, the obstacles which might readily be put in its way would be simply insuperable; and any competent strategist must surely laugh in his sleeve at the idea of such an army of invasion ever reaching so far as the boundary between Asia and Europe. A very good but brief description of an old-time Chinese army is extracted from N. G. Pauthier's "*La Chine*" (1830); it was that of T'ai Tsong the Great of the T'ang Dynasty

(A.D. 627-650): "The military was drawn up after a new fashion. It was divided into 895 corps of the same name, but of three different ranks. Those of the superior rank consisted of 1200 men each; those of the intermediary of 1000 men each; and those of the inferior of 800 men each." Boulger (*Op. cit.*) adds: "This force gave an approximate total of 900,000 men: 634 of these regiments were retained for service within the frontier, and to the 261 remaining was allotted the task of guarding the western frontiers. It was not considered desirable to entrust the guarding of the capital and palace to any special force, and this service was performed now by one corps and again by another at the command not of the Ministers but of the Tribunal of War. Chinese armies had at the best, up to this point, been little more than a raw militia, and in their constant struggles with their Tartar neighbours it had been always an admitted fact that the Chinese soldier was the inferior of his opponent. T'ai Tsong resolved to remedy this defect, and to make the Chinese soldier individually the match for any antagonist he would be likely to encounter. In this he had to overcome first the bitter opposition of the lettered classes, who thought the duties of a military commander derogatory to the dignity of the Emperor." Although it has been repeatedly said that the raw material in China is susceptible of being trained into a good fighter, yet we are inclined to think the old prejudice against the profession of arms will still assert itself and be something of an obstacle to overcome by any commander who would aspire to bring about another "Mongol invasion."

If we distinguish between "Mongol invasion" and

“Yellow Peril” and think of the former as being in the main, if not altogether, an aggressive warlike move, and of the latter as a competition in commercial and industrial matters, we must still remember that whether or not China recognizes a duty towards other nations in this respect, it will exist nevertheless. What China now contemplates is, we are to understand, a complete reform in government and education, commerce, industry, army, and all other details. Doubtless she has had in her mind the expansion of Japan, although it is equally certain that no longer does China accept Japan as her model. If then she follows that line she must equally accept the responsibilities and results. Before Japan became obsessed with the madness for foreign wars, because there has never been any incontestable reason for Japan to engage in any one of them, her progress had gradually brought the penalty of having to pay for her Westernization. The expense of living had already slowly but surely climbed upwards until, in 1894, it was decidedly greater than it had been in 1872. After Japan’s success against China in her first proper foreign war, came the inevitable expansion and extravagance, and corresponding increase in the cost of living. Since 1905 the jumps upwards have been so enormous that to-day there is not a country in Europe, possibly excepting Russia, although statistics are not available to determine this, where the three classes, upper, middle, and lower, cannot live for much less than their confreres in Japan; while even in this so-called expensive and extravagant United States, it is quite possible for any man in any class to live well for less than a native of Japan can

do, and for about three-fourths of what he will pay to be comparatively as comfortable in that land as at home.

In this view of the case, it becomes imperative for China to consider seriously to what goal this pathway of reform will lead her, and how she shall comport herself towards other nations. We feel convinced that the aggressively military feature may be ignored; and in industry and commerce there must be so much assistance rendered by friends, if any appreciable success is achieved, that anything but wise consideration will defeat the object. In the nature of things, it must be such a long time before the products of China's factories can come into such successful competition with similar goods in America and Europe as to be rivals to dread, that probably it is borrowing trouble to think seriously of the contingency. Labour is now absurdly cheap in China, it is true; but it is the kind that does not cut any figure in serious commerce and industry, and by the time the reforms contemplated have been carried out, conditions are so almost certain to change as to strike out this factor of cheap labour. It is claimed, and doubtless with reason, that there has been a great expansion of manufacturing industry in China and that for the products of the factories, etc., there must be found an outlet abroad; but we fail to see that this is borne out by statistics. The changes in domestic economy, which have been brought about by the developments of the last ten years or so, have been rather in the line of increasing internal wants, and it is nominally these that the new industries are supplying; this expansion of local demands is likely to increase faster than the supply.

To the careful political economist the relations between China and the United States must appear to be strangely anomalous. On her side is the grievance of discrimination against her people of the agricultural and labouring classes, and this is about the only one which demands either relaxation so that Chinese shall be treated as immigrants entering the United States from any other part of the world, especially the Japanese, or continued enforcement with the consent of the party discriminated against. For China there is the obligation to support as well as she can the effort the United States has made to assist her; this effort admits of four specific statements: First, The Hay Agreement acceded to by the Powers at the time, 1899, by which the principle of China's political integrity and the "Open Door" was formulated into an international covenant; second, the refusal of the United States to the imposition in 1901 of an oppressive indemnity upon China as compensation for the murder of foreigners and the destruction of property at the time of the Boxer uprising, which would have made her the fiscal vassal of the other nations for an indefinite period; third, the action of the United States in 1904 in inducing the belligerent Powers, Russia and Japan, to confine hostilities to a definite region, that is the three Manchurian provinces, in order to limit the devastating results of the war upon Chinese inhabitants, and to prevent the further embroilment of China; fourth, the action of President Roosevelt in using his influence to terminate the war between Japan and Russia and to secure the definite assent of those nations, in their treaty of peace, to the restoration of Manchuria to China, to the doctrine

of the "Open Door," and to the territorial integrity of China. Excepting the matter of the "Open Door" in those parts of her empire over which China has been able to maintain her sovereign rights, there has not been successful effort made by her to support the United States in carrying out any of these provisions. It is true that superior force has seemed to make it impossible for her to do differently from what has been done, yet, if the United States were to withdraw the helping hand, it would simply be because China has displayed unpardonable weakness.

Beyond all these matters in which it is important that China shall amend her ways in dealing with other nations, or institute and carry out new ones, is the necessity for tearing out root and branch the slavish obedience to "Old Custom." In this, more than any other people of the world, the Chinese are tied down by superstition; if once the fact that a certain thing of most palpable inconsequence was shown to conform to custom that had come down from hoary antiquity, it had been almost impossible to do away with it or to amend it radically. That China is not absolutely unique in this crass obedience to "Old Custom" does not require any demonstration; everybody knows the story of the sentry who was posted in an open field, day and night, and relieved as regularly as the citadel guard was changed, because half a century before some lady of the Court had found a beautiful wild flower growing at that spot and demanded protection for the fragile plant; the original reason had long been forgotten, but the "Old Custom" was respected. In China this respect for that which the ancients had

found good was a benumbing power, and is still an obstacle; but that it is absolutely irremediable has been proved not to be true, because probably no superstition was ever more deeply implanted and more vigourously nourished than "Fung-Shui," and that has been done away with whenever it appeared as an obstacle to the laying out of a railway line. Still, there are other "Old Customs" which are yet obstacles; if people who desire to be classed with the "Great Powers" cling to the whole teachings of Confucius; if they are dominated by ignorant Buddhist and Taoist priests; if they cling to their old education and insist that what that teaches of geography, history, mathematics, and the like, is all sufficient; if the laws of sanitation are ignored; if adequate facility for the care of the sick and the maimed is not provided; if girl babies are thrown away because they are not worth raising; if a hundred other things are done, simply because ancestors had done them, there can be no respectful consideration expected from other peoples. To her friends in other parts of the world, it is China's duty to work reformation in these matters, if she expects to be received by them on terms of equality. Dynastic changes — constitutional government — full representation of the masses, readjustment of codes, are important, certainly, but they are like the massive blocks in the foundation of a stately edifice, which, after all, depend for their strength upon the character of that on which they rest; if this is solid rock it is because the particles are cohesive; if it is soil it is because the grains are tenacious; it is, after all, the "little things" in China that demand attention if a right conception of duty is

to be attained. When reform that is imperative has been started in these duties, it would follow almost as a matter of course that it will pass on to those larger ones which seem to be of greater importance in international relations. How China should bear herself towards other nations is a subject that demands a whole volume to itself, and it requires the combined knowledge of the ablest experts in diplomacy, religion, commerce, sociology, and the arts of peace and war to treat it properly; nothing more than a bald suggestion has been attempted here.

## CHAPTER XI.

### *THE DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS CHINA*

IN a certain way this subject has already been touched upon at places throughout the text of the preceding chapters. A brief resume of some points seems pertinent and in conclusion we shall speak at some length and with much emphasis about what is, undoubtedly, the greatest duty of all: to help China rid herself of the opium curse.

In every essential, the foreign policy taken by our government is the only one which consistently entitles it to support the doctrine of the "integrity of China" without danger of being suspected of insincerity or territorial ambition. The first treaties made by our representatives with both China and Japan were based upon conditions obtaining at the time, and almost from necessity contained the "extra-territorial" clause. To this, at that time, no serious objection was made by either Chinese or Japanese officials who took part in the preliminary negotiations. In both countries there was a feeling of relief on the part of the native authorities that responsibility for trying and punishing criminals of outside nations was taken from them; and this is not surprising when we remember how loud were the complaints made in the few cases which had been treated as native law provided. Even in Japan, although there

was subsequently a loud protest that this "extra-territorial" jurisdiction had been wrung from them most unfairly, it is easily proved that there, too, it was a condition favourably received at the outset. The United States was the first to consent to Japan's wish to revise the treaty and — among other amendments — eliminate this objectionable clause; but it was made a stipulation that satisfactory demonstration should be made of changed conditions which should justify; these having been provided, the promise was faithfully kept. The United States stands prepared to do the same thing — whether the other Great Powers join or refuse — with China upon the same stipulation, agreement, and consummation; for the American conception of the paternal relation of Western to Orient nations is not incompatible with the development by them of a genuine autonomy. If Japan's demonstration of the correctness of this conception has not proved perfectly satisfactory to all, that is something for which the United States is not responsible, and it does not vitiate the correctness of her reasoning; although it must be admitted that in giving up everything to the Japanese, we have received very little in return.

In China the evidence of government weakness after the Opium War, the "Arrow" War, the Taeping Rebellion, and that which culminated in the "Boxer" Insurrection was discouraging; but when that feeling of dissatisfaction began to pass away, as it did more than ten years ago, there came in its stead a conviction that the present agitation in China is not a transient or superficial discontent, but a veritable part of the new awaken-

ing of the East — of which reflections are to be detected in many other countries; or, perhaps, it is more correct to say that the advanced movements in China, and those other Eastern lands, are reflections of Japan's forceful pushing to the front. We believe, however, there is a marked difference with respect to China; and that is that the advance is likely to be unaccompanied by any great display of aggressive military ability, since the Chinese are essentially peaceful, while the Japanese are notoriously fond of war for the sake of the bustle and slaughter it brings, rather than for the results it may accomplish.

That the expectation of success in China's effort to inaugurate a change conformable to the progressive ways of the West has already received encouragement is to be seen in the way the first Provisional Parliament was conducted at Peking. The assembling of this body was done in a tentative way and completely satisfactory results could hardly have been expected, yet the Senate's action upon several matters indicates a pleasing sense of responsibility and also a disposition on the part of some of the Chinese people to know more than has ever yet been imparted to them of the conduct of affairs, the raising of revenue, and the disbursing of public funds. In a way, this assemblage appeals to the American citizen who looks back to a period in the early history of his country, and it seems as if support in this effort to make China a nation rather than an irresponsible monarchy should be cheerfully rendered.

If England was first to exploit the China Mission Field, the example set has been so admirably followed

by America as to win loud praise from Englishmen themselves; and there is entire agreement between the evangelical representatives of the two English-speaking peoples and the leaders in Christian civilization, that China offers the greatest and most promising field for Christian propaganda in the whole world. The importance, even sociologically considered, of this movement to the average student of oriental affairs, is not properly appreciated. It is beyond dispute that the influence which Protestant missions exert in China is the most potent one, even if it be silent, for the removal of race misunderstandings and prejudices and for the upbuilding of the era of good-will between the white man and the yellow man. One of the many duties is thus suggested, and there is little danger that the United States will be derelict; we have not put our hand to that plough to turn back; and hand in hand with it goes the parallel, if not equal, duty in the matter of general education.

China's appeal for assistance in carrying out radical changes in the educational system and expansion of the proposed new one, finds ready response in America, and pleasing promises have been made of aid in money and in teachers. In this matter, however, caution should be observed; if, as has been suggested, the controlling voice in the conduct of this educational expansion, especially in the higher branches, is to be given to Americans and Englishmen acting together; it is not compatible with our own sense of dignity to acquiesce in a plan to allow America to supply all the funds, because her purse is so plethoric, and let England administer the

affairs, disburse all the money, and appoint her own university and college graduates to all the posts for teachers. It is no part of America's duty to China to make herself so ridiculous in the eyes of the world as this confession of administrative weakness and pedagogic inefficiency would bring about. Such a claim has been made by those who profess to represent the movement in England for the educational advancement of China. On the other hand, an English writer has said: "The educational conquest of China, as of Japan, is a fact; and — the palm to her who merits it — in both cases it is America that has the right to hold it!" That American methods of teaching Christianity, science — pure and applied — all branches of higher education, rudiments of all, and the English language itself are in every respect coordinate with those of the English teachers in China, or in any other foreign field, is a matter to be decided by individual conviction; our representatives have no reason to be ashamed of results. Faults of intonation, accent, and locution are exactly as six and half a dozen.

The new national curriculum is of a very complete character commencing with the elementary school and ascending in stages through the secondary, the middle, and the higher schools to the universities. Already schools and colleges in each grade, but of varying degrees of efficiency, to be sure, have been established in most of the provinces. Many of those now open are supported by the local or the central government, but there are many private schools which must, however, conform to the national standards in their courses. In each minor

subdivision of a province, corresponding to the American township; in each congener of the American county, and in each province, there is a Board of Education, whose duties correspond in importance with the size of their jurisdiction; but all alike are under the authority of the National Board, a department of the central government in Peking. There are only three or four colleges in all the empire that have reached something comparable with a university standard, and the number of students enrolled is still very small; but the reason for this is not so much the lack of young men who would like to matriculate, as it is the inability to supply competent instructors. If present plans are held to, there will eventually be one fully organized university in each province. When one remembers the eighteen provinces of China proper (but the grand educational scheme is not necessarily to be restricted to these); that each province is divided into so many counties that there are nearly two hundred "prefectures," and some thousands of townships; the mind is appalled at the thought of providing teachers for all the schools which must be opened to carry out such a contemplated system in a hurry. Besides the schools, colleges, and universities in the regular educational scheme there are to be considered the kindergartens, as well as special and technical schools for which also teachers must be provided. It is unnecessary to say that the major part of the schools which have been started are doing very elementary work, but the leaven put into Chihzi province, to take one concrete example, is diffusing itself out into the remoter regions, and with a speed that is amazing to

those who think of China only as the conservative place of old. The financial and personal difficulties of getting competent teachers have been the most serious obstacles in pushing forward the consummation of the plan; and had it not been for the assistance given by those connected with the Protestant missions, and for the few natives who had been trained in those mission schools and are competent to do even the most modest part of the work, the plan would not have been carried so far as it has gone. The educational conquest of China is certainly in process of realization, and it is the American educator who has a right to claim the lion's share of the honour that present success confers; but it will be a sad neglect of duty if now America fails to grasp the opportunity to increase her honour by expanding her energies in promoting the educational reform and extension of Western education throughout the whole of the vast empire. An Englishman, Mr. W. E. Soothill, principal of Shansi University, has truly said that while British missionaries have done a measure of valuable service in this direction, their schools have been few and shamefully undermanned; and that those missions, with characteristic British conservatism, have held too much to the idea that their office is to evangelize and heal, and not to enlighten the mind. The American has applied himself also to the root of China's pressing temporal need, and spent a hundred times as much money — nay more — on education as British missions have done. It was wholly due to the influence exerted by American missionaries that such a large part of America's share of the Boxer indemnity — for the actual expenditures did

not entirely reimburse the material losses sustained—was returned to China for the purpose of using the money in defraying the expenses of students to be sent to American colleges. All this has been done, but it cannot be right to leave much more undone. If America realizes her opportunity, there is no serious danger of a lack of appreciation, as is now noticeable in Japan; to Dr. Verbeck must be accorded the credit of having laid the foundation of Japan's educational system; but in the accounts of this system that are now prepared by native writers, either the effort of Verbeck and many others is calmly ignored, as in the case of Mr. D. Kikuchi's "Japanese Education," or it is treated as a matter of trifling importance. China will not follow this example, we feel sure; and what is also to be considered, although it does seem rather to commercialize philanthropy, the gain to America in material ways is likely to return ten-fold what magnificent assistance in establishing a great educational system may cost.

But the assistance that the United States can and ought to render China in religious instruction, general education, manufacturing and industrial development, railways, and all other branches, is as nothing compared with what is an absolute obligation in the matter of opium, if we are to uphold our reputation for civilization. Here we are face to face with conditions that cannot be evaded, and our attitude should be firm, irrespective of what "vested interests" of other friends may suffer. The story of the opium trade between British India and China, of the development of the "smoking habit" amongst the Chinese, of the dangerous

course the Chinese Government was led to adopt in sanctioning the cultivation of "home opium"—an effort to wipe out the curse—and of every other phase, is entirely without one aspect that does not arouse indignation, sorrow, or sympathy in the breasts of all except those who have sordid motives to gratify or are callously indifferent to the mental, moral, physical, and financial welfare of over three million people.

The Pun Tsao, "Chinese Herbal," is a work of forty octavo volumes, and such Chinese volumes are usually counted as running three to one of our own. It is admitted to be a work of some value, but one in which a vast deal of nonsense is mixed up with but little useful and accurate information. The compiler, Li Shi-chin, who lived in the sixteenth century, gave some thirty years to gathering together the information on natural history subjects which was available, and this he arranged in a reasonably methodical way and, for his time and considering the knowledge of his people, rather scientifically. Since the poppy is mentioned in the Herbal, it is not unreasonable to assume that the plant is indigenous in China; but from the fact that the Chinese have no true word for opium in their language, it is evident that the drug was not formerly manufactured from it by themselves, and that until the Chinese made its acquaintance through importation from abroad, they knew nothing of it. "The drug is called *apien*, in imitation of the word *opium*, while the plant is called *afuyung*, a transliteration of the Arabic name, from which country it was brought about the ninth century." (Williams.) This etymology points to an interesting

phase of China's commercial relations with the southwest of Asia more than a thousand years ago; because the Arabs do not smoke opium, but eat it, and the force of example which attended its importation into China probably had nothing to do with the Chinese using the drug as they afterwards did. It is said that the Chinese were quite familiar with this smoking habit fifty years before Europeans first brought Indian opium to them. This statement—so far as it suggests something approaching a general use in that peculiar way—is discredited by competent authorities. It can hardly be possible that the Chinese acquaintance with opium had developed into familiarity so long ago as the early sixteenth century, because Roman Catholic missionaries—who were in that country from 1580 A.D. onwards—would almost certainly have mentioned the habit of smoking opium, had it prevailed. It was the Portuguese who did most of the importing at first, but in 1767 the quantity had reached to about one thousand chests only. In 1773 the East India Company took part in the business and, with varying results, kept up the importation until it went out of existence in 1858. In that year it was suspected that two million Chinese smoked opium, and in 1906, when the efforts of the government really began to assume an appearance of seriousness, a *most* conservative estimate puts the number of smokers at very nearly one-half the entire population. One who has visited China and seen the effect of the opium-smoking habit, but whose sense of propriety and consideration for others have not been blunted by personal interests, becomes impatient at reading that

the smoking of opium by the Chinese is about the same sort of thing as the use of alcoholic beverages in other countries—not specially harmful if done in moderation, but *likely* to prove disastrous to the individual only if the appetite is indulged to excess. There are no countries on earth where alcohol has wrought devastation in whole provinces, where once prosperous villages, and even small towns, are now mere piles of rubbish, where entire families have been actually extinguished; and these things have been done by opium smoking in many parts of what were once the fairest districts of China; for in China as in India the best land is given up to the cultivation of the poppy, and in the latter country fully six hundred thousand acres of land in the rich Ganges Valley were given over to the cultivation of the poppy in 1907, and British India still holds the championship (?) in the industry, for Chinese opium cannot compete in quality with the Indian drug; and the business is worth to the Indian Government twenty million dollars a year in net revenue; for, brushing aside all attempts at evasion and sickening subterfuges, that business is a government monopoly, and so it is called in the Official Records: a government monopoly, under the control of the "most highly civilized Christian nation on earth," that draws its profits from the very hearts of the poorest "heathen," for India exports five-sixths of her opium to China. There is a curious, and, to speak plainly, a disgusting, mixture of lofty dignity and grasping avarice in the business; the government monopoly delivering the chests at certain marts, and at the China ports a motley crowd disposing of them to the retailers and

consumers "without the Company being exposed to the disgrace of being engaged in an illicit commerce."

The best opium-producing gum is taken from a poppy plant that has a nearly pure white flower, and although there are blooms of other colours, it is from the white ones only that seeds for replanting are taken. The process of preparing the gum into marketable opium, if one cares to read about it, is described in many books, but this and many other details are given in "*Drugging a Nation*," by Samuel Merwin.


Most people have very confused notions about "smoking opium"; many of them think that it is done very much as a man smokes his tobacco pipe, not stopping to think that the narcotic effect could not possibly permit of such a thing. The drug has to be carefully prepared to make it ready for the smoker's pipe; the balls, as they come from India (or the interior of China, it may be), are stripped of their covering of dried leaves and then broken into little pieces, put into an iron pan filled with water, and allowed to boil slowly over a low fire, the scum, which rises and which contains whatever impurities there may be, being carefully skimmed off and saved for the "poor" smokers, and when the decoction has been evaporated to the consistency of thick treacle, it is ready for use. "Various kinds of opium are mixed with one another, and some shops acquire a reputation for their ingenious and tasteful blends. After the opium has been boiled to about the consistency of coal tar or molasses, it is put into jars and sold for daily consumption in quantities ranging from the fifteenth part of an ounce to four or five ounces." (Rev. T. G.

Selby.) The following description of the way of smoking opium is a combination of the personal observations of the writer and information derived from various sources. The pipe, expressly made for this purpose and never by any possibility used for tobacco, is a full joint—or even more—of bamboo an inch or so in diameter, or more frequently a tube of heavy, precious wood which is bored through with a very small orifice. The pipe is sometimes most elaborately carved and decorated with inlays of jewels, jade, and precious stones; there is no mouthpiece, properly speaking, the lips of the smoker being pressed against the broad, flat end of the tube; at the opposite end is a cavity, or sometimes a separate cup, into which fall the ashes. The bowl for the opium is made of earthenware, of an ellipsoid shape, with a very small rimmed orifice on the flat side, and it sets down upon the hole. The rest of the simple paraphernalia will be mentioned at the proper time. The opium smoker always lies down, and the impossible picture of "A Mandarin Smoking an Opium-pipe," dressed in full regalia and sitting at a table, and another of a man walking in the street with a large, long tobacco-pipe in his mouth (which action itself is something never seen in China) and said to be "An Opium Smoker," are simply ludicrous impossibilities. Divesting himself of his outer gown, the smoker stretches himself at full length upon the couch; if he is in a regular opium-smoking establishment, this couch will be a double one with the lamp in a shallow tray between two places upon each one of which a smoker will take his place; the couch is preferably one with nothing but a thin mat between the

smoker and the boards because the Chinese are quite unaccustomed to anything like a comfortable mattress. The head rests on a hard pillow, not infrequently merely a block of wood covered with cloth or a piece of leather. The smoker dips into the opium a spoon-headed needle and dexterously twists it about until he has gathered up a pellet about the size of a pea; this he holds in the flame of a small vegetable-oil lamp of a particular size and shape made expressly for this opium-smoking, with a hood to prevent the flame from flaring and spoiling the opium with soot. When the opium has become dry and spongy, the smoker thrusts it into the small orifice of the pipe, holds it directly over the flame so that the full heat shall impinge upon the opium, and with a strong inhalation — only one, if he is experienced, so that not a particle of the precious smoke shall be lost — he draws the smoke deep into his lungs, where he retains it for a remarkably long time and then slowly exhales it through the nostrils. The taste of the half-fluid paste is rather sweetish and oily, but the odour of the smoke is intensely disagreeable, pungent, and sickening. When the charge of opium has been burnt out, the smoker lies listless for a moment while the effect of the fumes is dissipating, and then repeats the process until he has used all his purchase, or taken the full quantity he has prescribed for himself. With the first whiff, the man becomes garrulous and silly, but gradually a vacant paleness and shrinking of the features is noticed; a deep, unrefreshing sleep of from half an hour to three or four hours' duration then follows, during which the pulse becomes slower, weaker, and more irregular than before

the smoking began. After the habit has been taken up, there is a general weakening of the mental and physical powers, and complete recklessness of all consequences, if only the craving for more of the drug can be gratified. As the Cantonese say, and perhaps none of the Chinese people have had such a long, bitter, and intimate acquaintance with opium: "There are Ten Cannots for the opium smoker: he cannot give up the habit; he cannot enjoy sleep; he cannot wait for his turn when sharing his pipe with his friends; he cannot rise early; he cannot be cured when he becomes ill; he cannot help relatives who are in need; he cannot enjoy wealth; he cannot plan anything; he cannot get credit even when he has been an old customer; he cannot walk any distance."

After China had made certainly two efforts to force the foreigners to obey her own laws and stop the importation, or rather the smuggling, of the forbidden "foreign medicine," although it is not fair to say foreigners—in the plural—because by the time of the second war the business was almost exclusively in English hands or under English control; and when China had paid dearly for her inability to gain her object, the government awoke to a realization of the fact that the poverty-stricken nation was growing more impoverished by the steady drain of silver going abroad to pay for the opium. Then the native authorities took the dangerous course of withdrawing the prohibition against cultivating the poppy and the domestic manufacture of the smoking opium, in the hope of keeping some, at least, of the silver at home. It was an awful thing to do, for it seemed to break down the last barrier between China



PACHAO PAGODA



and complete moral and financial ruin. That was only about fifty years ago, and in September, 1906, when the edict was issued calling upon the people to take their part in the effort to do away with the curse of opium smoking, it was said, "the provinces of Szechuen, Shensi, Kansu, Yunnan, Kweichau, Shansi, and Kanghwei abound in its product, which is, in fact, to be found everywhere." And Mr. Merwin says: "Within less than half a century after the native growth of the poppy began, the white and pink and mauve blossoms had spread across the great empire, north and south, east and west, until to-day, in blossom time, almost every part of every province has its white and mauve patches. You may see them in Manchuria, on the edge of the great desert of Gobi, within a dozen miles of Peking; you may see them from the head waters of the mighty Yangtze to its mouth; up and down the coast for two thousand miles; on the distant borders of Thibet."

When we pass beyond the doors of the Chinese Imperial Customs' offices, where there are foreign commissioners and accountants, and native officials who seem to be imbued with the sense of accuracy, it is simply impossible to get any such thing as statistics, and no dependence at all can be put upon figures or information supplied by prefectoral officers; therefore it is impossible to know how much opium was made from the native-grown poppies when their cultivation was at its height a few years ago; but the effect of that cultivation is said to be apparent throughout the length and breadth of the land, and always the blight has fallen upon the very best of the agricultural sections, for the

poppy thrives best in the rich bottom lands along the many rivers, where it has displaced grain and vegetables that would have supplied wholesome food. True, the profit from an acre of poppies is greater by several times than from an acre of grain, but so, too, is the damning effect upon both soil and husbandman. What did China gain by that effort to stop the importation of Indian opium? Practically nothing; the trade was hurt a little, but it was not stopped; and it will not be stopped until the Indian Government deliberately does that at the fountain-head, by forbidding the cultivation of the poppy except in the higher lands along the southern slopes of the Himalayas where the plant is of a quality to yield morphia, which the Ganges Valley plant does not supply to a satisfactory commercial extent; and when that same government permits the cultivation of sufficient only to supply the world's legitimate demand for morphia to be used medicinally; this, of course, is a proposition which bears condemnation on its own face, philanthropy does not figure in the trial balances of governments. To China's pitiful appeal, India replies that it cannot very well afford to cut off twenty million dollars (gold) a year from its budget receipts, because there seems to be no apparent way to supply the deficit; but that if she were really convinced of China's earnestness in trying to stop the consumption of opium in the way which tends to injure the people of that land, she would gladly reduce the output, "in compassion for mankind!" But when a treasure-chest is in danger of being depleted, it is very difficult indeed to see that somebody else is in earnest about anything which goes

contrary to our own selfish views; and the cultivation of the poppy goes merrily on in India, having been checked hardly at all. Therefore, this effort on China's part to stop the importation of Indian opium has been for all practical purposes a failure. Notwithstanding that, the Chinese Government, believing that the time had come which was forecast by the hypothetical speaker into whose mouth Sir Robert Hart put the words, "and when we have only the native product to deal with, and thus have the business in our own hands, we hope to stop the habit in our own way," determined to try the experiment.

Whether competition had failed or not, it was high time to do something drastic to check and, if a human possibility, eventually to stop the smoking of opium and the degradation of the people—mainly through the use of the pernicious drug—for they had gone down to the very depths; the land was impoverished, the supply of sustaining food was seriously impaired; the poverty of the masses had gone from bad to worse; and, worst of all, the effort of the reformers to get their country out of the rut of "Old Custom," was likely to be made to appear ridiculous in its insincerity through apparent failure, while more than one half of the people were debauched by the opium-smoking habit; for what can men do in the way of reform of unsatisfactory moral and educational institutions and in trying to establish representative government when ability to do anything is crippled by those "Ten Cannots"? In the one matter of opium, China had retained a semblance of tariff autonomy; the duty on imported opium could be raised, and

it is almost prohibitive; but with such a vice as the smoking habit fixed on a people, duties will not keep out the thing that is craved; they merely help to ruin the victim all the faster by increasing the cost of the stuff that he must have if smoking is allowed.

If our readers have any interest in this matter of China's wretched condition a few years ago, we suggest that they read carefully the chapter "A Glimpse into an Opium Province," in Mr. Merwin's book; it is worth studying closely, but some of the salient facts are epitomized here for those who either have not the time to consider more, or find it inconvenient to get that book. One would naturally expect the evidences of the havoc wrought by the opium-smoking vice to be most conspicuous at the ports where it is landed for distribution, or within easy reach thereof, but this is not the case; the provinces that have come nearest to absolute ruin from the cultivation of the poppy and the use of opium are well back in the interior; they have been already enumerated, and a glance at a map will show that they all form part of the great Yangtze and Hoang-ho River basins; in extent they are about one third the area of the United States and yet they support a population of upwards of one hundred and sixty million, probably a good half of the whole of China's inhabitants, for the handy round number, four hundred million, will probably shrink very much when that which never yet has been undertaken is done, and a careful census is prepared. A century ago those Yangtze and Hoang-ho Valley people were reckoned by the Chinese to be about the most fortunate of all those who were so

blessed as to be "Men of T'ang" (Chinese); but to-day, owing to the actual exhaustion of the best fields through constant poppy growing and the degradation of all the people because of opium smoking, the support that these valley people get in nutritious crops is aptly described as being "after a fashion." In Shansi province, probably, the opium curse has laid its hand most blightingly, for a Shansi man himself declared, five years ago, that ninety per cent seemed rather a low estimate to put upon the number of habitual opium smokers. All over the province, the cities, towns, and villages are clustered together just so thickly as must be to give 55,268 square miles a population of nearly thirty million people. New York State has an area of 49,170 square miles and a population of about six millions; and a comparison of density is interesting and very instructive in this particular collection. Ninety per cent and more of thirty million people, for in Shansi men, women, and children all smoked opium a few years ago, or over twenty-seven million! How meaningless is the statement that the opium-smoking habit in China is very much the same as the use of alcoholic beverages in America and Europe! And nearly every one of the villages of Shansi was little more than a heap of ruins; simply because the people had been debauched *en masse* by the opium curse. The information as to the ravages wrought by the pernicious drug for such a remote district as Shansi province, because although it is the next on the west to Chihli, the Metropolitan province, it is rather out of the line of travel, was obtained for the most part from missionaries, and yet their estimates are

declared by laymen to be more conservative than were those made by observers in the American and British diplomatic and consular services as well as by military men and physicians who are not connected with any mission at all. It seems as if the missionaries, "being constantly under fire as 'fanatics' and 'enthusiasts,' unconsciously lean too far towards the side of understatement."

To the Chinese, as well as to the foreigner, the phrase "an opium province," means one in which the curse has secured such a hold that all the good soil — no rod of which can be spared from the growing of necessary, nourishing food — has been given up to the cultivation of the poppy, and that practically all the people — irrespective of age, sex, class — are confirmed opium-smokers; it means that nearly the only industries followed are those which contribute to the habit; that is the boiling and preparation of the drug and the manufacture of pipes, lamps, and the few other accessories; it means absolute ruin.

"Everybody in Shansi smokes opium," is a saying; and it was almost literally true; for "in one village an English traveller asked some native how many of the inhabitants smoke opium, and one replied, indicating a twelve-year-old child, 'that boy does n't.'" While another cynical observer declared that "eleven out of ten Shansi men are opium smokers." With very little variation as to fact and with none whatever as to effect, the same conditions prevail in every one of a dozen or more provinces, until there seems to be no hope for these "opium provinces," or for any other part of China, because the disease has spread throughout the

entire mass of the people. Families, that had been wealthy a few years ago, sold their heirlooms, old bronzes, porcelains, furniture, and everything that was salable, in order to buy opium, until now they are poor; those who were poor, yet not actually indigent, having sufficient to supply them with something to eat each day (although that "something" might seem shamefully insufficient to our poorest farmers and day labourers), were reduced to such straits that there was not food of any kind some days, and, to give one concrete example of indigence, one man and his wife had but a single suit of clothing between them. Now, when it is remembered that even the poorest in America do not know what the meaning of "poverty" is in China, it may be taken for granted that the condition of the Shansi peasants had been brought to a wretched state by this accursed opium. Let the reader try to draw the mental picture the following statement suggests: "Up on the hills I stopped at a village and enquired if they had any food for sale, and they told me that they had nothing but frozen potatoes. So I asked to be shown these, and I went into one of the hovels and found little potatoes, perhaps one-half an inch across, frozen, and all strewn over the *kang* (the brick bed) where they were drying. As soon as they were dry, they were to be ground down into a meal of which dumplings were made, and these were steamed. That was their only diet and had been for the past month."\* The writer of that statement gave the man ten cents; but, instead of buying food for himself and family, the next day, when the giver

\* Taken from a quotation in "Drugging a Nation."

of that misplaced charity returned, the man was enjoying a pipe of opium. This is merely one illustration of the oft-repeated statement that the confirmed opium smoker is absolutely lost to all sense of decency and consideration even for those who have the right to expect support from him; wife and children are never thought of until after the cravings of his appetite are satisfied, and if there is not enough for both opium and food, the family must suffer.

Supposing, but it is asking too much — the case is hardly supposable — that the victim has not yet so sapped his vitality as to be totally unfitted to do work at all; what time has he to give to his trade, occupation, or profession? Only a very rich man can afford to keep servants to charge his pipe for him, and these servants are usually slaves, frequently the daughters of men who have so far given way to the craving for opium that, being without ready cash to purchase, they have sold their children. If, then, the man has to minister to his own wants, it will take him, assuming him to be an adept at manipulating the drug and charging his pipe, from fifteen minutes to half an hour to get through one smoke, and if — as is common, he smokes ten or twenty times a day, it is easy to see that there is no time left for any rational or wage-earning occupation; and think of the cost! If it is a poor man, one who must be satisfied with the dregs from the boiling process, or the scrapings from the rich men's pipes, he will pay from fifty cents to a dollar a day for his opium, and this in a land where twenty cents a day are a fairly good wage for an unskilled labourer. If the smoker is still suffi-

ciently affluent to be able to indulge himself with the best quality, his bill will run up to twenty dollars a day easily. There are some wealthy merchants who smoke (perhaps there are many who still do it) fifty and more times a day; burn up from seventy-five to one hundred dollars a day! The tobacco habit may be an expensive one, but no American or European Croesus ever plunged into extravagance to that extent; and the nicotine can not be named with the narcotic in the mental, moral, and physical deadening.

Something was done and, the circumstances considered, well done. It has been said that when the Chinese Government makes up its mind to do a thing, there is no government in the world that can accomplish so much; but it has to be done in the right way, and that way was followed, for the people were called upon to co-operate, and since not even a Chinese peasant farmer who has learnt that greater profit comes from an acre of poppies than from ten acres of rice, and who has also learnt how to smoke opium until the habit has become his master, cannot defend the habit, there was no ground for opposition to the government's mandate against poppy cultivation and opium smoking, as there has been against many laws made by the Peking Government during the last three hundred years, which were rendered inoperative by either the passive resistance or the violent opposition of the people.

There is something pathetic in the edict which the Empress Dowager issued in 1906. As translated by several writers, it reads somewhat as follows: "Since the first prohibition of opium almost the whole of China

has been flooded with poison. Smokers of opium have wasted their time, neglected their employment, ruined their constitutions, and impoverished their households. For several decades, therefore, China has presented a spectacle of increasing poverty and weakness. Merely to mention the matter, arouses our indignation. The court has now determined to make China powerful, and to this end we urge our people to reform in this respect. We, therefore, decree that within a limit of ten years this injurious filth shall be completely swept away. We further order the Council of State to consider means for prohibiting both the growing of the poppy and the smoking of the opium." The pathos lies in the confession of weakness because of inability, hitherto, to prevent the use of something that was known to be injurious, that was introduced to the people by outsiders, which had undermined the very framework of China's society; and in the appeal to the people to do something for themselves.

The Council of State obeyed the Imperial command and gave the decree the necessary operative force in definite regulation: opium smokers were required to report themselves and to procure a license if they wished to continue the use of their pipes. As the habit had shown the weakness of many officials, whose actions were a bad example to the people and a stimulus to ridicule by strangers, special instructions were issued to them; they were to be divided into two classes: young men must be able to show conclusively that they had finally given up the smoking habit within six months; while older men, in whom the habit had become so strongly

implanted as to make it difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate it, were not limited in the matter of time for effecting a cure. But both young smokers and old ones, too, had to supply at their own expense satisfactory substitutes in their offices during the time of the cure, no matter how long it might be. Within six months all public places where opium was smoked were to be closed, and, after that time no opium pipes or lamps were to be made or sold; but shops for the sale of the drug were to be permitted to sell during the ten years' limit put upon the traffic; this was the one weakness.

When the Manchu governor, Yü Hsien, was in authority in the province of Shantung, he fomented the Boxer uprising, and when transferred to Shansi, the same thing was repeated. Under Yuan Shih-kai, that same Shantung was restored to order and kept quiet during all the awful Summer of 1900. Chang Chih-tung held the upper Yang-tze provinces in check, notwithstanding that there were peculiar local complications. This shows, as Dr. Ferguson, of Shanghai, is credited with saying: "No other government in the world can so effectively enforce a law as the Chinese Government — when they want to." Now, let us consider for a little the sincerity of that government, its officials, and the people of China in the matter of trying to check and ultimately wipe out the opium curse. This sincerity has been openly scouted by some English public men and journalists, yet there seems to be reasonable ground for belief in it. The charge was made that this sincerity is merely a pretext for securing the monopoly of the opium business for the Chinese Government

itself; but why do that? The duty levied upon the imported article amounts to fully five million dollars a year, including the *likin* or internal revenue charges, and this sum is probably almost as much as could be raised from a domestic monopoly; this seems to contradict one aspect of the insincerity imputation.

Again, the sentiment of the people has manifestly turned against opium; the appeal to the people of all classes, rich and poor, mandarin and farmer, has been listened to, and the feeling is strongest among those who are in the advanced guard of the reform movement. "Opium smoking used to be taken as a matter of course; now, when you find a man smoking too much, you also find a group of friends apologizing for him." Opium smoking is absolutely forbidden in the new army; and there are many Chinese officials and merchants who positively refuse to employ opium smokers in any capacity. In all parts of the country, too, there are societies formed which are co-operating vigourously with the efforts of the officials to do away with the curse. But another imputation has been laid: some declare that if the Chinese do succeed in this crusade against opium, it may result in the complete expulsion of foreigners from their country. We fail to see the precise connection; the argument appears to be illogical. Statements, acts, and all evidence point to a desire on China's part to come out absolutely from her past exclusiveness and to become one of the Powers; that this cannot be done without conforming to the ways of the others in international intercourse, in large measure, if not entirely, demands no argument in its support. Admitting this, there comes

the reciprocal duty of exchange in everything, ideas, commercial intercourse, all relations. If China wishes to progress, she must be in touch with the world and this means that some of her people must go abroad; the complement is evident. The "Clear out the Foreigners" of Prince Tuan was doubtless intended to be complete at the time; but back of it was a wish to close up China once more; that cry has been discontinued.

Returning to the efforts on the part of local governments to put in force the regulation of the Council of State. In many of the "Opium Provinces" there has been a considerable diminution of the area planted in poppies; in other districts the area is declared to be "less than last year," and this has been going on now for three or four years. Such men as Chang Chih-tung (before his death in 1909), Tong Shao-i, Yuan Shih-kai, and other governors who had the desire to do so, made short work of the dens where opium was smoked publicly. They stopped the manufacture of pipes and all accessories and they *did* show that China is sincere in its effort. But what is to be said for the "foreign concessions?" That story is simply shameful, seemingly not so much as a pretence of complying with China's wish is noticeable in any place of importance save Shanghai; and at most of the places on China's soil over which the government of that country exercises no jurisdiction, the opium dens are described as being "wide open." At Shanghai the movement to suppress opium smoking received remarkable assistance from the native populace.

This is not intended to be a full exposition of the

opium curse in China; for that the reader is referred to the works which have been mentioned, and to many others, but enough has been said to justify our contention that one of the first duties of the United States towards China is to render every possible assistance in stamping out that curse as quickly as it can be done, if there is any spark of sincerity about the expressions of friendly desire to promote the welfare of the oldest empire in the world.

Sir Ernest Satow, for some time British Minister to the Chinese Court, is quoted as saying that "foot-binding" of the Chinese girls is as productive of misery as is the smoking of opium. This seems to be a most extraordinary statement. We would not try to minimize the misery that this wretched fashion entails upon the young girls who are subjected to the terrible torture of having the toes bound back in infancy and the checking of the foot's growth; but to compare it with the moral, physical, and financial curses of opium is simply beyond reason.

Since this chapter was written, information has been received of the signing of the Anglo-Chinese Opium Convention at Shanghai, on May 8, 1911. The text thereof is reproduced from *The Japan Weekly Mail* of May 13, that journal having obtained it through the *Tokyo Asahi*.

The opium convention of 1907 shall be continued subject to the following conditions:

1. China shall decrease the amount of opium production in proportion to the decrease of the annual importation of Indian opium until the total prohibition of opium shall have been enforced in 1917.



WOMAN WITH COMPRESSED FEET



2. Great Britain admits the successful prohibition of opium enforced by China and consents to the suspension of importation of Indian opium at an earlier date than 1917, if the production of opium in China ceases.
3. Great Britain agrees not to import Indian opium to the provinces where opium has been successfully prohibited, but Shanghai and Canton shall not be closed to opium until the last.
4. Great Britain reserves to herself the right to investigate the decrease of opium production in China, and China shall accord her every facility for such investigation.
5. China reserves to herself the right of investigating transactions in opium in India.
6. Great Britain agrees to the imposition of an import duty at the rate of 350 *taels* per chest, provided China shall have imposed a similar rate of tax on her domestic production.
7. China shall abrogate the restrictions now placed by each province on the wholesale import of Indian opium and permit the imposition of taxes at the ports of importation; otherwise Great Britain will suspend and abrogate the present convention.
8. The exportation of Indian opium in 1911 shall not exceed 30,600 chests and the exportation shall be annually decreased by 600 chests in subsequent years. The chests shall be marked and numbered.
9. The present convention is subject to a modification by mutual agreement.
10. Indian opium stored at Hongkong and in the Customs warehouses at all the treaty-ports as shown in

the list appended to the convention shall be admitted under the present Customs tariff during the period of seven days after the convention goes into operation.

This, apparently, gives promise of relief for which the Chinese Government and a majority of the people are struggling. It is not fair to impugn the motives of either party, and yet it must be admitted that clause seven does leave a very wide loophole through which Great Britain may creep, if she is disposed to do so, and we must admit, regretfully, that there have not yet appeared those absolutely unimpeachable evidences of a keen desire to help the Chinese people, in this opium matter, that their true friends would like to see. We can but hope for the best; and that hope really makes us believe that the most dreadful blight which was ever cast over a whole nation will ere long be removed.

The Chinese Court has issued a decree, following up the convention, to the effect that the sooner the use of opium is discontinued the earlier the importation will stop. This is not quite so simple as it reads, for the *use* of opium is, in a measure, conditional upon the home manufacture. All authorities are, therefore, again urged to exert themselves vigorously to stamp out the cultivation of the poppy, to prevent the manufacture of smoking-opium, to forbid the use of the drug for smoking, and to stop the carriage of opium throughout the whole country.

## THE CHINESE DYNASTIES, SYNOPTICAL TABLE

From Prof. Herbert A. Giles' Chinese-English Dictionary

Name of Dynasty	Number of Sovereigns	Began	Ended	Duration
The Age of the Five Rulers	9	B.C. 2852	B.C. 2205	647
Hsia	17	2205	1766	439
Shang or Yin	28	1766	1122	644
Chou	34	1122	255	867
Ts'in	5	255	206	49
Han, or Former Han, or Western Han	14	B.C. 206	A.D. 25	231
Later Han, or Eastern Han	12	A.D. 25	221	196
The Three Kingdoms	11	221	265	44
<i>Minor Han</i>	2	221	265	44
<i>Wei</i>	5	220	265	45
<i>Wu</i>	4	229	265	36
Western Tsin	4	265	317	52
Eastern Tsin	11	317	420	103
Division into North and South	58	420	589	169
<i>Sung (House of Liu)</i>	9	420	479	59
<i>Ch'i</i>	7	479	502	23
<i>Liang</i>	6	502	557	55
<i>Ch'en</i>	5	557	589	32
<i>Northern or First Wei</i>	15	386	535	149
<i>Western Wei</i>	3	535	557	22
<i>Eastern Wei</i>	1	534	550	16
<i>Northern Ch'i</i>	7	550	589	39
<i>Northern Chou</i>	5	557	589	32
Sui	4	589	618	29
T'ang	22	618	907	289
The Five Dynasties	13	907	960	53
<i>Posterior Liang</i>	2	907	923	16
<i>Posterior T'ang</i>	4	923	936	13
<i>Posterior Tsin</i>	2	936	947	11
<i>Posterior Han</i>	2	947	951	4
<i>Posterior Chou</i>	3	951	960	9
Liao	9	907	1125	218
Western Liao	5	1125	1168	43
Kin	10	1115	1260	145
Sung	9	960	1127	167
Southern Sung	9	1127	1280	153
Yuan (Mongol)	9	1280	1368	88
Ming	17	1368	1644	276
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